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ABSTRACT 
 
Hall, David C., Essays on Sourcing Decisions: a Behavioral Perspective 
Thesis directed by Professor Aleda V. Roth 
 
This dissertation examines how managers make and perceive supply chain 
governance decisions.  A plethora of supply chain management literature suggests that 
managers will a priori choose a governance form that will manage risks while pursuing 
benefits. A number of theories have been used to inform this view: agency, resource-
based view and transaction cost economics.  Agency theory, the resource-based view and 
transaction cost economics all share the common assumption that a manager is 
considering both the risks and benefits of their decisions.  In addition each of these 
perspectives assumes managers are boundedly rational. Taken together these two 
assumptions suggest managers have imperfect information, the inability to explicate the 
perfect contract, or limits on their ability to process relevant information when they 
consider risks and benefits. Yet, other than suggesting that managers have limited 
cognitive ability (bounded rationality), these perspectives are silent about the influence of 
cognitive processes on managers consideration of risks, benefits, and ultimately their 
decision-making.  Thus there is a gap in the extant supply chain management literature of 
our understanding of how cognitive processes such as attention, emotions, feeling, 
memory or social context may result in a cognitive or decision-making bias.  Specifically, 
evidence from psychology suggests that managers may inadvertently overlook or 
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misperceive risks and benefits because of biased attention and memory (i.e., availability 
and salience), emotions and feelings, and social considerations (e.g., bandwagon 
pressure).  As a result of a gap in our understanding, supply chains may be overly risky 
(costly), while not receiving offsetting benefits (value creation). 
Our two essays seek to fill this gap in the operations management and supply 
chain management literature using two theory-based models of how managers make 
supply chain governance decisions.  We empirically test these models using data 
collected from an experiment that involved 384 Institute of Supply Management (ISM) 
members.  In the first essay, we examine two related questions that suggest supply chain 
managers systematically deviate from extant supply chain management theory: 1) Do 
managers account for supplier opportunism when making their governance decision? 2) 
Are managers’ governance decisions influenced by competitor’s actions because of social 
pressures? We find that 1) managers may be selective in the type of opportunism that 
influences their governance decision-particularly they seem to be concerned with 
opportunistic renegotiation but not quality shirking, and 2) managers are socially 
influenced to jump on the outsourcing bandwagon. In the second essay, explain that 
managers may assess the risks and benefits of their governance decisions based on their 
feelings.  Moreover, this assessment process may be biased such that risk and benefit are 
perceived to be negatively, not positively, related. We find support for the “risk as 
feeling” proposition and additionally find that both cost and quality influence the 
governance decision but play a different role in how managers perceive risks and 
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benefits.  This finding establishes an important link between psychology and supply 
chain risk  
 v
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
“Anything that gives us new knowledge gives us an opportunity to be more rational.” 
-Herbert Simon 
1.1 Background 
Management, and henceforth supply chain management, is about planning, 
executing and controlling the cost-benefit relationship in order to efficiently or 
effectively accomplish some set of goals or objectives.  Often the focus in supply chain 
management is on how to develop or acquire the most effective (Barney, 1999) or 
efficient source of supply (Williamson, 2008). However, acquisition or development of a 
source of supply is the result of a decision-making process. Yet, often influences on 
decision making process are overlooked (Cyert & March; 1963; March, 1993).  The 
decision making process be biased by several influences within the firm such as: 1) 
competing priorities within the firm (Cyert & March, 1963); 2) the costly, intensive, and 
imperfect information gathering (Simon, 1957); 3) persistent organizational routines 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982) and 4) organizational satisficing (March & Simon, 1958).  At 
the same time, the decision-making by managers may be biased because 1) learning may 
be myopic (Levinthal & March, 1993); 2) individual history, socialization or physiology 
may influence values, beliefs, memory or cognitive ability (March, 1994), and 3) 
individuals with limited resources may satisfice (Simon, 1958). Our research focuses on 
the latter instead of the former because typically supply chain decisions are made 
individuals within the bounds of organizational constraints.  In order to control for 
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organizational constraints and focus on individual decision-making, we use a scenario 
based role-playing experiment. 
We limit the scope of our research to the managerial perceptions and decision-
biases that occur during or after supply chain governance decisions.  Governance 
decisions such as make-buy (Porter 1980; Williamson 1985), partial outsourcing 
(Parmigiani, 2007) and supplier selection (Choi & Hartley 1996) are fundamental to 
supply chain management.  The common problem faced by organizations and thus 
managers across these governance decisions is how to best structure the production of a 
good or service (Hayes, Pisano, Upton, & Wheelwright, 2005). 
The definition of best structure varies across the literature.  In general, it falls into 
three general categories lowest cost, most desirable resources and lowest risk. Best in 
terms of lowest cost means managers should choose the governance structure that will 
give them the lowest total costs.  Essentially, lowest cost means managers pursue the 
most efficient transaction structure (Williamson 1985).  Pursuit of the most desirable 
resources emphasizes how managers should acquire or develop resources to be the most 
effective (Barney 1999).  Lastly, the pursuit of lowest risk is tied with both efficiency 
(lowest transaction costs) and effectiveness (best resources) because disruptions that are 
caused by risks influence the production and delivery of the end product or service 
(Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007; Sodhi, Son, & Tang, 
2012).  Therefore both efficiency and effectiveness may not be attainable if risks are 
realized.  This perspective suggests that managers should minimize potential risks in 
order to minimize disruptive events (realized risks). Nevertheless, achieving efficiency, 
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effectiveness or low risks from the governance choice is becoming more complex in part 
because supply chains, customer demand and comprehension of the environment are 
becoming more complex.  Practically, there is a need to address: how one simultaneously 
pursues low cost and acquires resources that will give a competitive advantage while 
minimizing risk? 
The work of Simon (1957; 1987) would suggest that in the face of complexity and 
bounded rationality managers most likely pursue one attribute over another.  As a result 
managers will likely satisfice instead of optimizing. For example, a manager may choose 
a supply source based on low costs and ignore risks or resource acquisition.  
Alternatively, some attributes maybe be order qualifiers where as others could be order 
winners.  However, we know little about how managers satisfice when facing a 
governance decision. Governance decisions typically entail some degree of concern for 
low cost, acquiring resources and risks. Our research asks, broadly: How do managers 
choose to satisfice in governance decisions? We find that, in general, manager’s satisfice 
by pursuing low costs directly at the expense of increasing risks and not acquiring 
resources that could impact costs.  Moreover, managers perceive the pursuit of low cost 
as being low risk.  Ironically, these findings both enhance our understanding by suggest 
that managers may myopically be pursuing low cost in the short run at the expense of 
long run costs.  
1.2 Theories Informing Extant Sourcing Literature 
The extant sourcing literature suggests that managers make decisions based on 
costs, resources and risks. Essentially every sourcing decision is the outcome of a cost-
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benefit1 analysis where a manager enumerates all the possible outcomes of their decision 
then multiplies the probability of that outcome and finally assesses if the value of 
outcomes is acceptable given the costs or level of risks.  There are four difference 
perspectives that inform how managers should look at the cost-benefit also known as 
risk-benefit: Agency theory, resource-based view, transaction cost economics and supply 
chain risk management. 
1.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory describes a contracting situation where there is a principal who 
wants to have an agent do work on their behalf (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Within our 
supply chain context firms or managers are people and typically the buying firm or 
manager is viewed as the principle and the making firm as the agent.  The agent is either 
the best person for the job (effectiveness) or a lower opportunity cost then if the principal 
did the job (efficiency).  But there is one problem that plagues the principal-agent 
relationship: the principal and agent are self-interested (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Moreover, their interests do not align. Deviation from principal-agent goal alignment 
results in costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1978).  In addition the agent is risk and effort averse 
(Levinthal, 1988), thus principals have to figure out how to govern the relationship such 
that the agent does what the principal wants. In other words, agency theory provides 
insight that advises how a should work with a supplier to get the benefits from using the 
supplier (agent) at the lowest cost or risk. 
                                                 
1 See Ratchford (1982) for a discussion of how costs and risks are really the same thing.  
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1.2.2 Transaction Cost Economics  
Transaction cost economics describes how to most efficiently structure a 
transaction given certain characteristics (Williamson, 1985).  Transactions have three 
important characteristics: specific assets, behavioral uncertainty and frequency 
(Williamson, 1985).  Frequency refers to how often a transaction occurs.  At one extreme 
on a continuum of frequency is a one-time deal and at the other an ongoing transaction 
that has no foreseeable end.   Most transactions in supply chains are in between these two 
extremes but tend to be a reoccurring discrete transaction with a foreseeable end.  
Therefore, frequency tends not to be a variable that supply chain studies examine. Asset 
specificity refers to the degree of redeployability associated with investments that must 
be made in order to conduct the transaction (Williamson, 1985).  Asset specificity occurs 
across a continuum at one extreme is completely redeployable assets at the other entirely 
unique assets that cannot be repurposed. Once the investment in specific asset is made the 
transaction is subject to the classical hold-up problem allowing for opportunistic 
behavior.  Lastly, behavioral uncertainty refers to the ability of the firm to determine the 
potential supplier’s contractual behaviors or outcomes (Williamson, 1985).  Transactions 
lie on a continuum where firm’s at one end are completely able to determine what is 
occurring in the transaction and at the other end they are completely unable.  Essentially, 
managers should choose to internalize any transaction that has high asset specificity and 
high behavioral uncertainty because the risks and costs of outsourcing (externalizing) are 
large and thus inefficient (Williamson, 1985).  Otherwise, managers should externalize 
transaction as it minimizes bureaucracy, internal coordination and obsolescence costs 
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(Williamson, 1985). As the focus of transaction cost economics is efficiency, it is often 
supplemented by resource-based view which deals with how effective use of resources 
influence the boundaries of the firm (Leiblein, 2003). 
1.2.3 Resource-based View 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm describes how managers identify, 
acquire or build resources that may offer a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).  In 
supply chain management this often means a manager looks both internally and 
externally to assemble the right combinations of resources with the emphasis on 
effectiveness (Barney, 1999).  Managers may outsource thus risking supplier 
opportunism in order to acquire valuable supplier resources (Barney, 1999).  While RBV 
suggests how managers should acquire advantageous resources, it is less clear how they 
perceive or maintain them.  In fact, much of the existing evidence suggests that resources 
give at best a temporary advantage (Winter 2003). The prevailing view is that dynamic 
management of resources is necessary to attain or maintain an advantage (Teece, Pisano, 
& Shuen, 1997).  In a dynamic supply chain, managerial perception becomes critical to 
resource management as it may guide their managerial behaviors (Ajzen, 1991). 
1.2.4 Supply Chain Risk Management 
Supply chain risk management focuses on managing risks (Sodhi et al., 2012; 
Zsidisin, 2003). The predominant focus of this literature is to manage risks after a 
governance decision has been made; although it is worth noting that the governance 
decision can be used to mitigate risks (Choi & Krause, 2006; Tomlin, 2006).  With this in 
mind the presumption is that risks should be managed to obtain the expected benefit 
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instead of how to a priori obtain the best risk-benefit combination with the governance 
decision.  However, this literature is divided at how risk is treated.  Specifically, this 
literature views risk as either something that is a priori known (Tomlin, 2006) or based on 
the perception of managers (Ellis, Henry, & Shockley, 2009; Zsidisin 2003). The 
dominant view taken in the extant literature assumes the former over the latter, but most 
supply chain situations are ill-structured such that a priori distributions may not be 
known.  Nonetheless, how to management supply chain risks when perceptions are the 
main source of risk information is a relatively sparse literature (see for example Ellis et 
al., 2010; Zsidisin, 2003).  
1.3 Gaps in the Sourcing Literature 
The theoretical (see for example Fine & Whitney, 1999; Hayes et al., 2005) and 
analytic literature on the make-buy topic is quite expansive (see for example Anderson & 
Parker, 2002; Gray, Tomlin, & Roth, 2009).  Yet, this literature typically simplifies the 
complexities of the practical world to explore a particular aspect of sourcing decision 
making. This literature is clearly helpful for managers analyzing a specific aspect of 
sourcing and describes how a manager should make a decision in this simplified and ideal 
situation, but often in the empirical “real” world sourcing decisions are multi-
dimensional.  Specifically, manager’s face competing priorities and trades offs (Boyer 
and Lewis, 2002; Skinner 1974).  These competing priorities are exacerbated by the 
cross-functional objectives that supply chain management organizations face (Krause, 
Pagell & Krukovic, 2001).  Moreover, managers may face situations where trade-offs 
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may not necessarily need to be made (Rosenzweig & Easton, 2010; Schroeder, Shah, & 
Peng, 2011).   
Many existing empirical studies examine intention to make some sourcing 
decision (Gray et al., 2009; Mantel et al., 2006) or secondary data about outcomes of 
sourcing decisions (Novak & Eppinger, 2001; Novak & Stern, 2009).  Studies that 
assume that intention is strongly linked with behavior assume that behavior is volitional 
(Azjen, 1991).  However, intention may not be linked with behavior because of socially 
desirable responses (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith, & Gonzales, 1990) or biases may 
exist such that decisions are not made with willful deliberation (Simon, 1957; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).   
These studies that use secondary data do not directly examine the impact that 
individual decisions makers play in making the sourcing choice because of difficulties in 
execution of choice or path dependencies that constrain organizational strategies 
(Mintzberg, 1978).  In addition, secondary studies often fail to examine the 
counterfactual of buying when firms choose to make instead of buy because it is often 
unobservable.  Often these empirical studies examine only what drives buying. Among 
the few secondary studies that examine make-buy, they use a proxy for making by 
examining the degree of vertical integration across firms in a particular industry to get at 
the make-buy decision (Novak & Eppinger, 2001; Novak & Stern, 2009; Ulrich & 
Ellison, 2005).  
Therefore taken together the theoretical, analytical and empirical sourcing 
literature often fails to examine managerial biases that may influence managerial choice.  
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A few notable exceptions specific to sourcing exist: Mantel et al. (2006), Sutcliffe and 
Zaheer (1998); Verma and Pullman (1998).  Verma and Pullman (1998) find factors that 
managers’ report as important and do not necessarily have the same influence on their 
sourcing choices.  Specifically they note that conformance quality is stated to be the most 
important drive of the sourcing decision, yet when making their choice cost and other 
factors are more influential than quality.   
Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998) examine the role different types of uncertainty 
(primary, competitive and supplier) play on sourcing decisions.  They defined primary 
uncertainty as uncertainty introduced by exogenous environmental forces.  They define 
competitive uncertainty as uncertainty introduced by the actions of competitors. 
Similarly, they defined supplier uncertainty as uncertainty introduced by the supplier.  
Counter to transaction cost economics that argue uncertainty permits an increase in 
supplier opportunism and thus managers should in-source more when faced with 
uncertainty, Suttcliffe and Zaheer (1998) find that primary and competitive uncertainties 
actually increase outsourcing.  The logic that they use is that in high primary uncertainty 
environments, profit (benefit) is low and thus firms increase their exposure to 
opportunism to gain more profit (benefit).  Also, firms remain flexible avoiding high 
obsolesce costs (high risks) by outsourcing. They use a similar logic to explain 
competitive uncertainty by suggesting that firms do not incur high costs of competing in 
the market place. Yet, supplier uncertainty is viewed as high risk/cost and therefore 
should be avoided.  What is not made clear by these arguments is the relationship 
between risk and benefit?  Seemingly, Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998) are suggesting that 
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counter to standard economic theory managers may perceive that risks and benefits are 
negatively related.  Primary, competitive and supplier uncertainties are seen as high risk 
but not concomitantly opportunities for high benefits.  This study is relevant to our 
research as it suggests managers may make sourcing decisions based on heuristics, 
managers perception of risk as well as benefits may be complex and uncertainty may lead 
to more outsourcing. 
Lastly, Mantel et al. (2006) look at how the characteristics of the firm (i.e., core 
competencies), sourcing task and individual influence the likelihood to outsource. They 
find that firm and task characteristics both significantly influence outsourcing. Moreover, 
task complexity and core competencies may interact such that managers are less likely to 
outsource when it is perceived as more complex.  They attribute this finding to bias in 
individuals towards preferring known to unknown.   
From these studies we conclude three things about managers sourcing decisions: 
1) What managers’ report as important may not influence their sourcing decision; 2) 
Uncertainty may encourage managers to outsource more, and 3) Individual biases may 
play a significant role in their decision to outsource.  While these studies contribute 
significantly to our understanding, they suggest we don’t fully understand how managers 
make sourcing decisions or how their decisions may bias subsequent management of the 
supply chain.  Specifically, what are the biases that influence a manager’s sourcing 
choice?  After a manager’s sourcing decision, how does a manager perceive the risks and 
benefits associated with their decision? Answering these questions will contribute to our 
understanding of how to make better sourcing decisions.  In Essay 1 we examine how a 
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manager’s overconfidence or reliance on bandwagon information increases outsourcing.  
In Essay 2, we examine how a manager’s perception of benefit from their decision may 
reduce their perception of risks. Lastly, we discuss the broader contributions and 
implications of this dissertation.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
ESSAY 1 THE DECISION TO OUTSOURCE PRODUCTION: A BEHAVIORAL 
STUDY OF SUPPLIER ADVANTAGE, MONITORING AND BANWDAGON 
PRESSURE 
“When everybody in a group is susceptible to similar biases, groups are inferior to 
individuals, because groups tend to be more extreme than individuals.” 
-Daniel Kahneman 
Abstract 
The past decade has witnessed an unprecedented outsourcing of manufacturing jobs to 
contract manufacturers (CM). Conventional wisdom in operations strategy advocates that 
managers from firms with competitive cost or quality capabilities should limit their 
outsourcing to retain their firm’s competitive advantage.  Conventional wisdom, also, 
suggests that managers should pursue outsourcing to gain a competitive advantage if their 
firm has the ability to monitor the supplier’s performance. But what if managers are 
endangering their competitive capabilities because their decision-making processes are 
systematically biased to increase outsourcing even when managers are unable to monitor 
a supplier’s performance?  Or what if managers increase outsourcing not to gain 
competitive advantage but simply because others are outsourcing? The extant literature 
would suggest that such biases may exist. Specifically, we propose that managers may be 
biased in their beliefs about their ability to control supplier performance or prevent 
supplier opportunism.  Additionally, we propose that managers may be joining an 
outsourcing bandwagon. These biases could have significant long term unintended 
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consequences that would be deleterious for the firm.  We empirically test whether these 
managerial biases exist systematically and, if so, provide explanations for such biases 
using a scenario-based behavioral experiment. Our behavioral results show the conditions 
under which the managers should be beware of possible bias in their outsourcing 
decisions. 
Keywords: Bandwagon, Outsourcing, Overconfidence 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper takes a behavioral operations lens in examining the managerial decision to 
outsource all or part of a firm’s production to a contract manufacturer2 (hereafter refered 
to simply as outsourcing) versus producing within its own plants. Our focus here is to 
investigate the role that a supplier’s cost and quality capabilities--relative to the buyer’s 
own internal production abilities--plays in a manager’s decision process. With the 
exception of Gray, Roth and Tomlin (2009a), who investigated a firm’s propensity to 
outsource production, much of the prior empirical research on outsourcing evaluates 
performance of a given supply chain structure (e.g., contract manufacturing or internal 
manufacturing) (See for example, Gray et al. 2011, Handley 2012, Handley and Benton 
2012, Randall and Ulrich 2001). In contrast, our work informs research and practice on 
how a manager’s outsourcing decision process may be biased both influencing the 
structure of the supply chains and performance. Specifically, our study provides evidence 
                                                 
2 See Gray, Roth and Leiblein, 2011 for a definitions and a discussion of internal production, offshoring; 
outsourcing and offshoring-outsourcing. In this research, we examine onshore outsourcing; but not offshore 
outsourcing or offshoring.   
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that managers may be enabling supplier opportunism or degradation in performance.  Our 
work is motivated by the conundrum revealed in the empirical work of Gray, Roth and 
Tomlin (2009a), which called for more rigorous research on how the ability to measure 
capabilities--such as quality--may influence production outsourcing decisions. These 
authors found that manufacturing managers’ propensity to outsource production was 
influenced by the buyers’ strategic intent of low cost, but puzzlingly from an operations 
strategy view, not quality. Gray et al. (2009a, p. 712-713) conclude:  
 
“The resulting insight (regarding quality priorities): manufacturing managers, on average, may 
be overconfident regarding their ability to manage quality across organizational boundaries  
and may not fully understand the unintended consequences of their outsourcing choices…in their  
make-buy decision making, manufacturing managers are apt to weigh measurable, direct low-cost  
benefits, which in turn shapes their propensity toward outsourcing. Managers are less consistent  
in their consideration of quality when deciding whether or not to outsource, possibly because the 
 risks and benefits associated with quality in outsourcing are often difficult to assess…However,  
the cost of poor quality can have a  deleterious influence on the business and the brand, which may 
not be immediately evident.” 
As a result, unintended, often hidden, costs surface for the firm due to manager’s 
underweight quality risks, supplier quality shirking and opportunistic renegotiation. We 
conjecture that managers underweight these sources as they are confident in their ability 
to monitor and subsequently manage supplier performance.  Confidence in the ability to 
monitor supplier performance would manifest itself in the outsourcing decision. Thus, we 
ask: Do managers overlook the ability to monitor supplier performance when 
outsourcing?   
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More traditionally, the supply chain management literature proposes broader 
strategic management and economic schemas, such as production outsourcing as a 
decision that is determined by the macro characteristics of the competitive environment 
(Porter 1985), the supplier (Barney 1999) or the transaction (Williamson 2008).  
Accordingly, the rational, focal firm (buyer) must determine how production should be 
governed in order to minimize costs and opportunistic behavior (Barney 1999, 
Williamson 2008, Handley and Benton 2012, Handley 2012).  The focal firm (buyer) 
may decide to make versus buy (Williamson 1975) or partially outsource the production 
requirements (Anderson and Parker 2002, Gray et al., 2009b). In practice, these supply 
chain decisions are based on the key assumptions that managers, who actually make the 
outsourcing decision for firms, 1) have the foresight to anticipate opportunistic behavior 
and choose the governance structure that appears to provide the greatest competitive 
advantage (Williamson 1975, 1985) and 2) are wealth maximizing and are not influenced 
by social utilities (Camerer and Thaler 1995). Yet the supply chain literature is silent on 
how the managers’ individual outsourcing behaviors, caused by bounded rationality 
(Mantel et al. 2006) and/or individual characteristics (March 1994), may be biased; and 
in turn, may actually increase opportunistic behavior and decrease competitive advantage.  
Lastly, it is clear that social utility influences supply chain dynamics (Griffith et al. 2006, 
Handley and Benton 2012, Maloni and Benton 2000). Nonetheless, managers either do 
not know how to appropriately manage or remain unaware of social influences (Griffith 
et al. 2006, Handley and Benton 2012, Maloni and Benton 2000).  Arguably, ignorance 
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of these influences may result in outsourcing decision biases that exacerbates what 
Benton (2010) calls “hidden supply chain costs.”   
Our study advances prior related supply chain strategy literature and practice by 
examining empirically two outsourcing decision biases identified by Gray et al. (2009a) 
that may influence outsourcing: managers may be confident in their ability to manage 
supplier capabilities and influenced by bandwagon pressure to outsource.  Specifically we 
investigate how ability to monitor supplier performance and bandwagon pressure 
moderates the relationship between relative supplier advantage (i.e., cost and quality) and 
outsourcing.  The ability to monitor supplier performance may affect the relationship 
between relative advantage (i.e., cost and quality) and outsourcing in two seemingly 
contradictory ways. First, a rational theory of behavior would propose this: the less able 
to monitor supplier performance, the more effort will need to be expended to overcome 
difficulties in determining performance.  Increased effort used to determine supplier 
performance should increase the direct costs incurred (e.g., auditing) (Eisenhardt 1985). 
Thus the impact of any supplier advantage on outsourcing should be diminished because 
the advantage is more costly to monitor or opportunistic supplier behavior (e.g., shirking) 
will reduce the realization of the supplier’s advantage.  Alternatively, if the firm is unable 
to easily determine supplier performance, but managers believe they can, also known as 
overconfidence, then the relationship between supplier advantage and outsourcing will 
not be impacted by the ability to monitor supplier performance.  Overconfidence occurs 
when people overestimate their level of control, their performance or the accuracy of 
their predictions (Moore and Healy 2008). Notably, research in behavioral economics, 
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psychology and management indicates that overconfidence is ubiquitous in managerial 
decision-making.  To date, however, Gray et al.’s (2009a) conjecture--that managers may 
be increasing outsourcing because they are overconfident in their ability to manage 
supplier advantage (i.e., managers overestimate their ability to control supplier behavior, 
believe performance will not be impacted by inability to monitor supplier performance, 
and believe they are accurate in their assessment about suppliers) --has not been 
established empirically.  In order to test this conjecture, we ask two related questions: Do 
managers outsource less (more) to a supplier with a cost advantage when unable (able) to 
monitor the supplier’s performance? Do managers outsource less (more) to a supplier 
with a quality advantage when unable (able) to monitor the supplier’s performance? 
Thus, the first major contribution of this study to is to employ a rigorous 
behavioral experiment to help resolve the alternative perspectives. The practical 
implications of managers’ systematically overestimation of their ability to monitor and 
control contract manufacturer’s actions on sourcing decisions--especially for difficult to 
measure capabilities, like quality-- is potentially significant. Conceivably, much more 
“risky” outsourcing would occur than if managers’ choices were more calibrated to 
suppliers’ potential for opportunism.  We note that managerial confidence is domain 
specific (West and Stanovich 1997), such that managers may be overconfident about their 
ability to control or manage some supplier behaviors (e.g., quality shirking), but not 
others (e.g., opportunistic renegotiation). Specifically, managers may perceive 
(incorrectly) that cost performance is easier to monitor than quality (Crosby 1979, 
Deming 1986).  Accordingly, we would expect a manager to emphasize quality and the 
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ability to monitor supplier performance when outsourcing, then cost.  However, this may 
not be the case because managers may be overconfident about quality (Gray et al. 2009a).  
Thus, we evaluate how ability to monitor supplier performance may behaviorally affect 
managers’ outsourcing choices with respect to both a supplier’s cost and quality 
advantage and find contradictory results.  Specifically, we find that managers outsourcing 
decisions are influenced by the ability to monitor supplier cost performance but not 
quality.  This finding broadens our understanding by demonstrating that 1) cost is king 
and 2) managers are confident about supplier quality, so much so that they may be 
encouraging shirking by not being concerned with monitoring quality performance.  
In addition, Gray et al. (2009a) posited that managers may feel pressure join the 
outsourcing bandwagon in order to acquire supplier advantages, especially those 
advantages that they perceive to reduce costs.  This conjecture leads to our second 
question:  Does bandwagon pressure moderate the relationship between relative supplier 
advantage (i.e., cost and quality) and outsourcing, leading managers to increase the 
percentage of outsourced?  Or are managers directly influenced by bandwagon pressure?  
The extant literature suggests that managers may be influenced by bandwagon 
pressure for irrational, rational and rationalized reasons as well as it may both directly 
influence outsourcing and moderate the relationship between supplier advantage and 
outsourcing.  Bandwagon pressure may irrationally and directly influence managers to 
outsource by 1) reduce a manager’s perception of responsibility (Cialdini 2009) for 
outsourcing; 2) urge a manager to respond socially acceptable manner (Cialdini 2009, 
Cialdini and Goldstein 2004) and 3) inform a manager about what is right (Cialdini 
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2009).  These reasons are commonly referred to as social influence.  Yet, social influence 
may depend on context or situational cues (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, Wood and 
Bandura 1989), thus we would expect bandwagon pressure’s influence to depend in-part 
on the advantages offered by a supplier. This may be the case because a specific supplier 
advantage (i.e., cost or quality) may be perceived to diffuse responsibility, signal socially 
acceptable situations or reinforce what a manager already believes to be right.    
Additionally, bandwagon pressure may encourage managers to rationalize 
outsourcing in order to become more similar or compete with other organizations that are 
outsourcing.  Managers’ rationalization may be driven by institutional coercive, mimetic 
or normative pressures to conform (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Similar to social 
influence, the institutional or competitive reasons for bandwagon pressure may depend on 
the specific supplier advantage. This moderating effect is plausibly a direct result of 
institutional values or competitive priorities. For example, if an institution values or has a 
priority of low cost, is considering outsourcing to a low cost supplier and a manager is 
subject to feel bandwagon pressure, then a manager may increase outsourcing as 
bandwagon pressure may remind the manager of an institutional norm or of the 
competitive environment. 
Contrastingly, managers may rationally respond to bandwagon pressure because 
they believe joining the bandwagon 1) may increase a manager’s safety and reduce risks 
(Hamilton 1971); 2) pay-off externalities create incentives to outsource (Devenow and 
Welch 1996) and 3) cascading information from better informed managers indicates that 
outsourcing is optimal (Devenow and Welch 1996).  Again, these rational reasons for 
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bandwagon pressure may depend on the supplier’s advantage.  While rational, each of 
these reasons assumes information asymmetries among decision-makers, but allows for 
observation of a public decision (i.e., outsourcing).  As the specific details of a 
competitors outsourcing decision remains private, a manager is left to infer why.  This 
inference depends on the managers beliefs as well as attributes of the outsourcing 
decision (i.e., supplier cost and quality advantage).  It is easier for a manager to believe 
that joining the bandwagon increases safety, increases a managers pay-off because of 
externalities (see for example Cachon and Harker 2002) or that better informed managers 
are acting optimally. 
These three views of bandwagon pressure are not incommensurate. In fact, 
managers may join the outsourcing bandwagon for social, institutional and rational 
reasons.  While we believe bandwagon pressures may drive managers to increase 
outsourcing, there is dearth of evidence at the micro level in the supply chain 
management and strategy literatures about whether bandwagon pressure systematically 
influences managers. Thus a major contribution of this research is to empirically validate 
that at the micro level, outsourcing decisions are positively impacted directly by 
bandwagon pressures. Yet, curiously we find that bandwagon pressure does not moderate 
the relationship between supplier cost or quality advantage and outsourcing. 
We contend, but do not test in this study, that these results and contributions 
suggest managers are making the wrong outsourcing choices.  Making the wrong choices 
may lead to unintended consequences, including the loss of sourcing leverage due to a 
deterioration of the firm’s manufacturing and learning competencies (Anderson and 
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Parker 2002, Gray et al. 2009, Handley 2012). Further, these challenges and associated 
hidden costs and quality risks associated with knowledge transfer to contract 
manufacturers (Gray et al. 2012), as well as a degradation of its innovation capabilities, 
are often linked to internal manufacturing prowess (Council on Competitiveness 2011, 
Pisano and Shih 2009, Roth et al. 2010). 
We investigate our questions using a scenario-based role playing experiment 
(Rungtusanatham et al. 2011). We use a volunteer sample of 304 experienced Institute of 
Supply Management (ISM) members to capture implicitly the complexities and nuances 
of sourcing decisions. Following Gray et al. (2011, 2012), the context for our study is the 
pharmaceutical sector3. We design the decision-making scenarios so that a single 
manager has all the relevant outsourcing information about the supplier’s cost and quality 
advantage, the ability to monitor supplier performance, and bandwagon (competitive) 
pressures.  The use of scenario-based role-playing experiments may enable the isolation 
of individual decision-maker characteristics and biases that may influence their 
outsourcing decision (Mantel et al. 2006) or decision-making process (Rungtusanatham 
et al. 2011).  
 We extend prior research on supply chain management and governance in three 
ways.  First, we investigate if the managers are concerned about their firm’s ability to 
monitor supplier performance. We find that when outsourcing managers may be 
concerned with monitoring supplier cost performance but not with monitoring supplier 
                                                 
3 According to Gray and co-authors, pharmaceutical products (excluding devices) are not 100% testable. At 
the plant level, quality risks have been associated with contract manufacturing, but not at the decision-
making level. 
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quality performance. Ironically, the latter will influence the former. As a direct result, 
managers may be increasing their firm’s exposure to quality-based morale hazards such 
as shirking.  Second, we investigate if managers are joining the outsourcing bandwagon 
to pursue cost or quality based competitive advantage, which is often the stated reason for 
outsourcing.  We find that managers do not join the bandwagon to gain supplier cost or 
quality advantage.  Instead, we find a direct effect between bandwagon pressure and 
outsourcing suggesting that managers join the outsourcing bandwagon regardless of 
supplier advantage.  Third, we investigate these phenomena using a scenario-based 
roleplaying experiment, which allows us to control for contextual factors or randomly 
distribute unobserved factors that could impact outsourcing. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  First, we review the partial outsourcing 
literature and our theory-based, hypotheses and model.  Next, we discuss our scenarios-
based role-playing experiment. Third, we discuss our results.  Lastly, we conclude with 
the implications for academia and practice with suggestions for future research.  
2.2 Model and Hypotheses 
Our hypothesized model is depicted in Figure 2.1. We begin with a discussion of the 
percentage of production outsourced, and then develop the hypotheses leading to 
outsourcing decisions. 
2.2.1 Percentage Outsourced 
The percentage outsourced is the percentage of production outsourced to a contract 
manufacturer.  The percentage outsourced definition allows for partial outsourcing. 
Partial outsourcing occurs when a manager allocates production such that their firm 
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simultaneously makes and buys (Anderson and Parker 2002, Gray, et al. 2009b).  We 
allow for partial outsourcing because the decision to outsource “need not be a binary 
decision (Mantel et al. 2006 p. 835),” and therefore, make or buy are “endpoints of a 
continuum of sourcing strategies (Heriot and Kulkarni 2001 p. 18).”  Moreover, partial 
outsourcing is a commonly used strategy in practice (Hennart 1993, Heriot and Kulkarni 
2001, Parmigiani 2007).  
Figure 2.1 Essay 1 Hypothesized Model 
 
2.2.2 Supplier Advantage 
Outsourcing to acquire supplier expertise (Leiblein and Miller 2003) or partially 
outsourcing to access supplier expertise (Parmigiani 2007, Parmigiani and Mitchell 2009) 
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while developing internal expertise is well established.  This literature stream generally 
treats supplier expertise as an absolute advantage or disadvantage (Leiblein and Miller 
2003, Parmigiani and Mitchell 2009).  However, competitive advantage is heterogeneous 
across firms and relative; and thus, a supplier may have a competitive advantage in one 
operational area (e.g. cost) and a disadvantage in another (e.g., quality).  Thus, it is 
important to examine the difference in operational capabilities between the firm and a 
potential supplier, also known as relative capability position (McIvor 2009).   
In this study, we limit our investigation to relative supplier cost and quality 
advantage and disadvantage because low cost and conformance quality are fundamental 
concerns in the structuring of production (Hayes et al. 2005).  Supplier cost advantage 
(disadvantage) occurs when a potential supplier has a low cost production capability that 
is lower (higher) than the firm.  Similarly, supplier quality advantage (disadvantage) 
occurs when a potential supplier has a conformance quality production capability that is 
higher (lower) than the firm. Moreover, low cost and conformance quality are often 
motives for considering outsourcing (Moschuris 2007) or are stated competitive priorities 
when outsourcing (Gray et al. 2009a). That said, the positive relationship between 
supplier cost and quality advantage and the percentage of outsourcing is consistent with 
the extant outsourcing literature (i.e., Barney 1999, Gray et al. 2009a, Leiblein and Miller 
2003, Parmigiani and Mitchell 2009), which draws on the resource-based view (RBV) of 
the firm.  The logic is simply that managers act to increase the percentage of outsourcing 
to a supplier who provides an advantage either in terms of cost or quality.  Therefore:  
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H1a: Supplier cost advantage (disadvantage) relative to the buying firm has a 
positive (negative) influence on the percentage outsourced, ceteris paribus. 
H1b: Supplier quality advantage (disadvantage) relative to the buying firm has a 
positive (negative) influence on the percentage outsourced, ceteris paribus. 
2.2.3 Ability to Monitor Supplier Performance 
The literature is mixed as to whether or not managers will be influenced by the ability to 
monitor supplier performance.  The dominant view suggests that managers will account 
for the ability to monitor a potential supplier’s performance when outsourcing (Heide 
2003, Mayer and Salomon 2006).  The analytic and economic literature proposes that 
supplier opportunism may be contingent upon the ability of the firm to monitor supplier 
performance (Kaya and Ozer 2009, Eisenhardt 1985, Jensen and Meckling 1976).  The 
ability to monitor supplier performance correlates with the costs of monitoring and 
enforcing the adherence to contractual terms (Williamson 1975, 1985, 2008), observing 
behaviors that may lead to the desired outcomes, measuring outcomes and subsequently 
the rewarding or punishment of performance (Eisenhardt 1985, Eisenhardt 1989, Jensen 
and Meckling 1976).  Therefore, we would expect managers to prefer less outsourcing 
when their firm is unable to monitor a potential supplier’s performance because more 
intricate and costly control systems are required to measure performance outcomes 
(Eisenhardt 1985). 
An alternative perspective suggests managers may be overconfident in their 
ability to monitor and control supplier behavior (Gray et al. 2009a).  This minority view 
is supported by literature that suggests when managers believe that they can control 
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outcomes they will often overlook factors that they cannot control (Camerer and Lovallo 
1999, Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008).  As a result we believe managers may overlook 
the ability to monitor supplier performance because the managers believe they can 
control supplier outcomes.  In other words, managers may be overconfident. Typically, 
overconfidence results in excessive risks that may harm performance (Camerer and 
Lovallo 1999, Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008). When may mangers be overconfident?  
Managers are more confident in a familiar domain (West and Stanovich 1997). Moreover, 
familiarity and the resulting confidence may result in an illusion of control when in fact 
managers may have little to no influence over events or outcomes (Langer 1975).  Again, 
if managers believe that they can control supplier outcomes or malfeasance, they may 
overlook the ability or inability to monitor supplier performance when outsourcing.  Thus 
we hypothesize that: 
H2: The ability (inability) of the buying firm to monitor supplier performance has 
a positive (negative) influence on the percentage outsourced, ceteris paribus. 
2.2.4 The Moderating Effect of the Ability to Monitor Supplier Performance on 
Supplier Advantage 
Supplier cost and quality advantage are important for establishing initial production costs, 
but they require monitoring as the supplier can under bid to win a contract then raise 
prices in renegotiation (Gray et al. 2012; Gray et al 2009a) or shirk on quality (Gray et al. 
2011).  The greater the inability in monitoring supplier performance that results in 
information asymmetry about a supplier’s behavior, the more the threat of opportunism 
reduces the appeal of acquiring a supplier’s advantage (Heide 2003), and in turn, acts to 
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reduce outsourcing.  In this case, managers can be expected to pursue more insourcing 
because the benefits of the planned allocation of production to the supplier may not be 
fully realized. Yet, it is not clear if managers behave differently based on the type of 
supplier opportunism.  The extant literature suggests that type of supplier opportunism 
may depend on the potential supplier’s advantage in cost (Williamson 1975, 1985) or 
quality (Kaya and Ozer 2009).  For example, suppliers may misrepresent changes in their 
cost structure or cost advantage in order to opportunistically renegotiate contractual 
terms, while supplier quality advantage is ripe for shirking.  
Moreover, the literature is also mixed as to whether or not managers may act 
differently when presented with different forms of opportunism. The dominant 
perspective--in the realm of economics—contends that managers will be concerned with 
opportunistic behavior whether it is opportunistic renegotiation or quality shirking 
(Eisenhardt 1985, Jensen and Meckling 1976).  This view suggests managers should 
prefer less outsourcing when unable to monitor the potential supplier’s performance as 
there is less exposure to opportunistic renegotiation or quality shirking as the percentage 
of outsourcing decreases.  In contrast, managers should choose a higher percentage of 
outsourcing when a supplier has an advantage and they are able to monitor supplier 
performance because they can capture the benefits of the supplier’s advantage (Barney 
1999).  The minority view posited by Gray et al. (2009a) suggests that managers may be 
overconfident and as a result overlook the ability to monitor supplier performance or 
detect opportunism when outsourcing.  This rationale is supported by the psychology 
literature, whereby managers may be overconfident in one domain (i.e., quality 
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management) and not another (i.e., cost management) (West and Stanovich 1997).  
Accordingly, it is plausible that managers are prone to the “illusion of control” over 
certain supplier behaviors, leading to quality shirking, but not others leading to 
opportunistic renegotiation.  Hence the attractiveness of supplier cost or quality 
advantage may be contingent upon the firm’s ability to monitor their performance.   
    Both a supplier cost and quality advantage represent supplier-specific assets and 
capability (Hayes et al. 2005).  Supplier opportunism may be a result of the leverage over 
the purchasing firm that these supplier-specific assets and capabilities provide 
(Williamson 1975).  However, supplier cost or quality disadvantage represent a lack of 
supplier-specific assets or capability and as a result the supplier lacks leverage. 
Nonetheless, the existing theory fails to address how managers may differentially react to 
supplier cost or quality advantage enabled opportunism.  
Specifically, supplier cost advantage may be subject to the well-known “hold-up” 
problem where it is common for suppliers to bid below cost order to win a contract, and 
then to act opportunistically upon contract renegotiation due to asset specificity or high 
costs of switching (Aron et al. 2005).  The hold-up problem leads managers to place 
effort in accurately assessing a supplier’s cost advantage prior to outsourcing and during 
the on-going transaction.  Moreover, opportunistic renegotiation doesn’t only occur at the 
beginning or end of a contract.  Opportunistic renegotiation can occur anytime when 
there are high switching costs and incomplete or unenforceable contracts in a transaction 
(Williamson 1975, 1985).  For example, a supplier that files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection is allowed to renegotiate its contracts, such as observed recently in the 
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opportunistic renegotiation within the automotive industry. Moreover, renegotiation may 
occur without bankruptcy. For example, Ford Motor Co. received contract concessions 
without declaring bankruptcy (Dolan 2009, Ingrassia 2009).  Ironically, these concessions 
were made in-part by threats not facts (Ingrassia 2009). Clearly, the actual facts may be 
unable to be verified.  Therefore, the ability to monitor supplier cost performance can 
help the firm avoid opportunistic renegotiation by establishing or verifying facts as well 
as detecting changes in the supplier’s cost structure.  Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H3a: The positive relationship between supplier cost advantage and the 
percentage outsourced is reduced (increased) when the buying firm’s ability to 
monitor supplier performance is low (high). 
Similarly, suppliers have incentives to offer high quality initially and then to 
allow quality to diminish over time (Roth et al. 2008).  In this case, suppliers may not 
benefit from continued investment in maintaining quality (Kaya and Ozer 2009).  
Moreover, a supplier may not realize the impact of poor quality (e.g., reduced customer 
loyalty, increased warranty costs) (Deming 1986)--and unless the poor quality is detected 
and the supplier is held responsible, quality shirking may persist (Kaya and Ozer 2009). 
Hence, the supplier’s quality advantage must be monitored for shirking behavior.  If the 
ability to monitor supplier quality performance is low, then a manger will fear quality 
shirking. So even if the supplier is highly capable, the manager will be hesitant because 
of the lack of monitoring ability.  On the flip side, a high ability to monitor supplier 
quality performance assures a manager that they will realize the benefits of a supplier’s 
quality advantage. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
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H3b: The positive relationship between supplier quality advantage and the 
percentage outsourced is reduced (increased) when the buying firm’s ability to 
monitor supplier performance is low (high). 
2.2.5 Bandwagon Pressure 
Bandwagon pressure is the informational (Devenow and Welch 1996), institutional 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983), or social influence (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, Cialdini 
2009) to adopt the same course of action as other managers or organizations.  We 
consider these three sources as having rational, rationalized or irrational influence, 
respectively on mangers’ decisions and discuss their effects individually below4. 
Nonetheless, the result of bandwagon pressure or the bandwagon effect has been 
observed in a wide variety of management situations including acquisitions (McNamara 
et al. 2008), adoption of management techniques (Staw and Epstein 2000) and technology 
adoption (Rohlfs 2003).  Bandwagon outsourcing occurs if managers are influenced by 
bandwagon pressure to outsource.   
At the same time, bandwagon pressure and subsequently bandwagons may be 
rationalized by managers who fear their firm’s of loss of competitive advantage or 
opportunity (Abrahamson and Rosenkoff 1993, McNamara et al. 2008).   
Bandwagon behavior may be considered rational if managers discern that there is 
a competitive advantage associated with the trend in the supply market (Porter 1985).  
However, managers will rarely know why a competitor made a particular outsourcing 
                                                 
4 We recognize that these effects may be additive or multiplicative.  However, our main concern in this 
paper is influence of bandwagon pressure on outsourcing not the discrimination of all the possible causes of 
bandwagon pressure. 
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decision; they just may know what the outcome of the outsourcing decision-making 
process.  Thus, managers may face a decision-making situation where they have their 
own private information, no access to the competitions private information but access to 
public information about their choice to outsource.  This public information constitutes 
the competitor’s opinion and may apply bandwagon pressure through social influence.  A 
manager may be socially influenced by bandwagon pressure to increase outsourcing 
because they feel: 1) social pressure (Asch 1955); 2) informed about the decision  
through subjective information (Festinger 1950) and 3) social proof of the correct course 
of action (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, Cialdini 2009).  Peer opinion (i.e., the 
competitor’s decision to outsource) exerts social pressure on the decision maker to 
conform to the perceived peer group’s norms (Asch 1955). We are suggesting that the 
competitions outsourcing behavior may signal that outsourcing is the accepted norm, thus 
bandwagon pressure would encourage a manager to outsource.  Alternatively, “If 
everybody else is outsourcing,” then the manager may alter their beliefs to believe their 
peers possess relevant information, which is unavailable to the manager (Festinger 1950) 
but at the same time the competitor’s outsourcing behavior implies a belief that it is the 
correct outsourcing decision.  Thus, a manager that makes the same choice as their 
competitors (peers) has social proof of the “correctness” of their choice (Cialdini and 
Goldstein 2004).  Moreover, the manager may feel that they may diffuse their 
responsibility by giving into any of these social influences (Wallach et al. 1964) as a 
result managers may reduce internal and external criticism of a given choice by imitating 
the competition. 
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Managers may rationalize outsourcing in the face of bandwagon pressure because 
they feel institutional coercive, mimetic or normative pressures to do so (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983).  Bandwagon outsourcing may be the result of institutional coercion as 
managers may fear their firms of loss of competitive advantage or opportunity 
(Abrahamson and Rosenkoff 1993, McNamara et al. 2008). Managers facing an 
outsourcing decision face uncertainty created by information asymmetries between the 
buyer and potential supplier as well as the competitive environment.  Imitation (Alchian 
1950) or pressure to mimic other firms is motivated by uncertainty surrounding a 
decision (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Specifically, manager’s will imitate as a result of 
uncertain outcomes and the resulting search for solutions to the problem encourages 
managers to duplicate what organizations which are perceived as successful have already 
done to address the same problem (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  As a result of decision 
uncertainty, we believe managers face a non-trivial bandwagon pressure to imitate or 
outsource.  Lastly, managers may feel bandwagon pressure to outsource as a result of 
institutional norms such.   
Selfish herd theory, rational herding and information cascades suggest that 
bandwagon pressure may rationally inform managers and subsequently encourage more 
outsourcing. Selfish herd theory suggests by following the crowd that a manager’s job is 
safer (Hamilton 1971).  Specifically, a manager is safer by avoiding having their 
reputation damaged by herding (Devenow and Welch 1996). Rational herding may occur 
when pay-off externalities (i.e., the utility of the manager’s outsourcing decision depends 
on the decisions of others) exist (Devenow and Welch 1996). In other words, other 
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managers or organizations outsourcing may create positive externalities for outsourcing 
production (e.g., economies of scale or scope) or negative externalities (e.g., reduction of 
profit, cost advantage or external investment) for producing in-house. Lastly, boundedly 
rational managers abandon or update their private information by observing the actions of 
better informed managers who are acting rationally5 resulting in an information cascade 
(Bikchandani et al. 1992, Devenow and Welch 1996, Newell et al. 1958).  The 
information cascade informs a manager’s outsourcing decision by signaling the rational 
and optimal choice.  These models of rational responses to bandwagon pressure are 
predicated on the reasonable assumption that there is imperfect and asymmetric 
information such that managers have their own private information and may only observe 
other managers or organizations public information when making a decision.  Moreover, 
the publically available information is assumed to be explicitly based on optimal 
decision-making and implicitly based on the assumption that the conditions that make the 
decision optimal apply to the manager’s current decision-making situation. As a result, 
these models depend on the beliefs or inferences about the publically available 
information of the manager, who makes the outsourcing decision.  Ironically, the reliance 
on a manager’s beliefs suggests that rational reasons for succumbing to bandwagon 
pressure have much in common with the rationalized institutional and irrational social 
reasons. 
As such, we believe that the informational, institutional, or social pressures are 
not incommensurate and may work in tandem to encourage managers to outsource. Thus 
                                                 
5 By rational we mean that decisions are the result of rational expectations. See Muth (1961) for a 
discussion of rational expectations and rationality. 
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we postulate that bandwagon pressure will have a positive influence on outsourcing. 
Formally, we posit: 
H4: Bandwagon pressure has a positive influence on the percentage outsourced, 
ceteris paribus.  
2.2.6 The Moderating Effect of Bandwagon Pressure on Supplier Advantage 
Supplier advantage may be enhanced by the presence of bandwagon pressure for several 
reasons (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, McNamara et al. 2008, Staw and Epstein 2000).  
First, popular management techniques (e.g., outsourcing), which are presumed to increase 
performance at least in the short run, may lead to increased imitation (Staw and Epstein 
2000).  Second, increasing outsourcing in order to gain some advantage is a fundamental 
premise underlying the resource based view in supply chain management (Barney 1999, 
Hayes et al. 2005)); therefore, institutionalized norms may exist that put pressure on 
managers to pursue supplier advantages (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Third, managers 
may face competitive pressure to outsource to gain supplier advantage (Gray et al. 2009a, 
McNamara et al. 2008).  Specifically, managers may feel pressure from coercion to 
follow the bandwagon if they assume everyone else is outsourcing to gain an advantage. 
However, they may feel a normative pressure since pursuing supplier that is what is 
expected of them or they may feel a mimetic pressure to imitate other firms’ successes 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In short, managers may be conforming because they “fear 
missing out on competitive opportunities that early adopters appear to be seizing” 
(McNamara et al. 2008, p. 116).  Consequently, managers may overlook formal analyses 
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of the risks and benefits associated with their decision and jump on the bandwagon 
(McNamara et al. 2008).  
Alternatively, managers may assume that cost or quality supplier advantages are 
enhanced (i.e. positive externalities exist) by joining the outsourcing bandwagon.  For 
example, managers may believe that joining the bandwagon may increase supplier 
economies of scale or scope, thus the supplier’s cost advantage (economies of scale) or 
quality advantage (economies of scope) may be enhanced.  For these reasons, the effect 
of supplier advantage on the percentage of outsourcing will be increased in the presence 
of bandwagon pressure. Thus we hypothesize that: 
H5a: The positive relationship between supplier cost advantage and the 
percentage outsourced is increased when bandwagon pressure increases. 
H5b: The positive relationship between supplier quality advantage and the 
percentage outsourced is increased when bandwagon pressure increases. 
2.3 Research Methods 
Our research questions require an examination of managerial decision-making processes.  
Experimentation is an approach for such an examination since it allows for a high degree 
of control over data collection and a mechanism to reduce extraneous influences.  
Traditional laboratory experiments are, typically, not appropriate for complex research 
questions such as ours, where the problem context requires subjects with specialized 
domain knowledge (Mantel et al. 2006, Rungtusanatham et al. 2011).  Conversely, 
controlled field experiments are unlikely to yield a sufficient sample of managers since 
subjects would be hesitant to participate in manipulating real aspects of their operations 
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or supply chains (Fisher 2007).  Because of these dual challenges, a scenario-based role-
playing experiment is well-suited for collecting data to examine our research questions 
(Rungtusanatham et al. 2011).  Scenario-based role-playing experiments are widely 
accepted in general management research (Tomlinson et al. 2004) and marketing (Song 
and Zinkhan 2008). These types of experiments are gaining popularity in supply chain 
management research (Mantel et al. 2006, Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998, Verma and Pullman 
1998, Tangpong et al. 2010).   
This study uses a scenario-based role-playing experiment to examine differences 
in outsourcing decisions that can be attributed to supplier cost advantage, supplier quality 
advantage, ability to monitor supplier performance, and bandwagon pressure, while 
simultaneously considering the impact of differences in individual characteristics.  In our 
scenario-based role-playing experiment, we manipulate supplier cost advantage, supplier 
quality advantage, and ability to monitor supplier performance as between-subject factors 
at two levels (HIGH versus LOW) and bandwagon pressure as a within-subject factor 
also at two levels (ABSENT versus PRESENT).  The four-factors, repeated-on-three-
factors design matrix is shown in Table 2.1. 
2.3.1 Subjects 
Our target population is supply managers, who have experience making 
outsourcing decisions.  As such, we invited 470 Institute of Supply Management (ISM) 
members from 18 ISM Chapters throughout the United States to participate in the 
experiment. Of them 383 accepted our invitation (75 percent response rate).  Of the 383 
subjects, 310 had prior sourcing experience, completed our experiment, and provided 
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useable responses.  Of the 310 subjects, only six indicated having a doctorate degree.  
Given the small subset and the inability to draw inferences from this small number, we do 
not include these six subjects in our subsequent analyses6.  Table 2, detailing the profile 
of the 304 sample, reveals that these subjects are highly experienced, middle aged, 
predominantly male, well educated, employed across a variety of industries, and 
primarily from large firms. 
Table 2.1 Repeated-Measures Design Matrix 
Scenario 
Between-subjects factors Within-subjects factor
Supplier Cost 
Advantage 
(SCA) 
Supplier Quality 
Advantage 
(SQA) 
Ability to monitor 
supplier 
performance 
(AMSP) 
Bandwagon pressure 
(BP) 
Treatment 
1 
Treatment 
2 
A Inferior Inferior Unable Absent Present
B Inferior Inferior Able Absent Present
C Inferior Superior Able Absent Present
D Inferior Superior Unable Absent Present
E Superior Superior Able Absent Present
F Superior Inferior Unable Absent Present
G Superior Inferior Able Absent Present
H Superior Superior Unable Absent Present
 
 We compared our sample, to a voluntary sample collected by ISM from the 
Results of the 2009 Membership Needs Survey (Institute of Supply Management 2009) to 
assess the degree to which our sample may be biased.  We assess the potential sample 
bias by constructing contingency tables and making a simple chi-square test for 
differences.  While we are unable to compare age, we find that our sample may be 
                                                 
6 Notably, preliminary analysis of our respondents indicated that subjects with doctoral degrees had 
significantly different responses than those with master’s degrees; and hence, could not be collapsed into a 
‘graduate’ degree category. Assessing the influence of higher education on outsourcing decision-making is 
a key area for future research 
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representative of ISM membership in terms of education, firm size, gender and years of 
sourcing experience, but may differ by industry (See table 2). Specifically, our sample 
may be over representative of managers from manufacturing industries and under 
representative of service industries. 
2.3.2 Experimentation Procedure 
To recruit subjects for our research, we contacted 42 ISM affiliates in the United States 
and offered to make presentation related to outsourcing as part of their monthly meetings.  
15 ISM affiliates accepted the offer, including: Augusta, GA; Baltimore, MD; Dallas, 
TX; Grand Rapids, MI; Indianapolis, IN; Madison, WI; Philadelphia, PA; Reading, PA; 
San Antonio, TX; Springfield, MO; Tenneva, TN; Triad, NC and Wichita, KS.  These 15 
ISM affiliates ranged from small to large in terms of membership and included both 
major metropolitan and rural locations.  The subject details by ISM affiliate can be found 
in Appendix A. 
 Before attendees arrived to the meeting, we distributed the eight scenarios 
randomly among the available seats provided for the meeting; each seat received one of 
the eight scenarios.  The meeting began with a brief introduction (about 5 minutes) as to 
the potential prosperity and peril of outsourcing and how little is known about how 
managers actually make their outsourcing decisions.  We then invited the attendees to 
voluntarily participate in our pen-and-paper scenario-based role-playing experiment.  
Participants were then instructed to read the scenario to which they to assume the role of 
a sourcing manager and sole decision-maker, consider the advantages and disadvantages 
of outsourcing in the scenario, and finally asked to make their outsourcing decision.  
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Initially, subjects made a choice about the percentage to be outsourced.  Subjects were 
then informed that competitors were choosing to outsource (the bandwagon pressure cue) 
and allowed to change their decision based on the new information, if they so choose. At 
the conclusion of the experiment, we debriefed the subjects and engaged in a brief 
discussion with all participants regarding how they made their decision.   
To test the effect of our researcher or interactional experimenter effects on our 
results (see Rosenthal and Rosnow 1991 for a discussion), we supplemented our initial 
data collections with data collections from the Kansas City, MO; St. Louis, MO and 
Chicago, IL where we remove the possibility of artifacts between the experimenter and 
our subjects.  The procedure for these three locations was notably different from the other 
15 in that the scenario-based experiment was given as a supplement to the meeting by a 
local ISM member.  We did not find any significant differences in our results suggesting 
that they are not an artifact of experimenter or experimenter-subject interaction. 
Moreover, our results are robust to including or excluding the data collected at these 
locations. 
2.3.3 Scenario Design 
2.3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
For our scenarios, we use an 11-point reference-based scale for the response or dependent 
variable, percentage outsourced, which gives higher item response rate than open-ended 
questions. On this 11-point scale, zero reflects complete insourcing, with each unit 
increase demarcated from 1=0% “completely in-house, 2= 10% outsourced, 3= 20% 
outsourced, etc. and with 11 = 100% “completely outsourced”.   
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2.3.3.2 Manipulation Cues 
The four experimental factors of interest in our study are supplier cost advantage, 
supplier quality advantage, ability to monitor supplier performance and bandwagon 
pressure. Statements to cue the HIGH versus LOW levels of these factors were designed 
and validated through the Q-sort methodology described by Menor and Roth (2009) using 
17 supply chain managers from our population of interest.  For example, supplier cost 
advantage, defined as the ability of the supplier to compete on cost compared with the 
contracting firm, was cued with statements indicating whether or not the supplier (XYZ 
Co) has/does not have a cost advantage relative to the buying firm (Alpha Pharma): 
“XYZ Co’s manufacturing costs are lower/higher than Alpha Pharma.”  For supplier 
quality advantage, defined as the ability of the supplier to compete on quality compared 
with the contracting firm, a statement indicating a supplier quality 
disadvantage/advantage would be: “XYZ Co’s manufacturing function provides 
inconsistent/consistent quality, while Alpha Pharma does not.”  The manipulation cues 
for both supplier cost advantage and supplier quality advantage are based on extant 
literature (i.e., Gray et al. 2009a, Rosenzweig et al. 2003).  Consistent with Eisenhardt 
(1985) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), the ability to monitor supplier performance is 
based on the ease with which the supplier’s actions and behavior can be determined by 
the contracting firm.  A statement cueing this HIGH/LOW level of ability to monitor is: 
“Evaluating XYZ Co's performance will be primarily a subjective/objective process.” 
Lastly, because bandwagon pressure is captured as a within-subjects factor, we 
cue the factor in terms of PRESENCE/ABSENCE.  Subjects are presented with an 
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opportunity to make the outsourcing decision with bandwagon pressure being absent (i.e., 
no information about what competitors are doing) and then given information that their 
competitors are pursuing outsourcing.  The full set of manipulation cues and information 
held constant across treatments are included in Appendix B. 
2.3.3.3 Analytical control variables 
2.3.3.3.1 Employment characteristics 
We control for a manager’s employment characteristics, specifically, firm size 
and industry because these characteristics have been found to influence a firm’s decision 
to outsource (Heriot and Kulkarni, 2001). Firm size or industry may influence learning 
processes or the level of institutionalization.  We believe that both organizational learning 
as well as institutionalization may bias managers’ outsourcing decisions because the 
organizational environment influences learning processes (Levinthal and March 1993), 
socialization (March, 1994) and the level of institutionalization within an organization 
influences the persistence of managerial behaviors (Zucker 1977).  In addition, we 
control for the possibility that firm size or industry may moderate the relationship 
between bandwagon pressure and the percentage outsourced.  Bandwagon pressure may 
differ based on these employment characteristics because learned bandwagon behavior 
may be a response to organizational pressures to conform (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) 
or respond ‘correctly’ to an uncertain situation (Calidini 2009).
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Table 2.2 Sample Characteristics 
  Our Sample   ISM   
  n %   n % Χ2 (df) 
    
Age Age 
  Under 30   20 6.6   Under 25 7 1.4 N/AA 
  31-40   34 12.2   26-35 54 11 
  41-50   77 32.6   36-45 109 22 
  51-60   94 35.9   46-55 189 38.2 
  61 or better   31 12.2   56 or better 135 27.4 
  No response     2    0.7 
  Total 304 100.0   Total 494 
Gender Gender 0.17(1) 
  Female 127   41.8   Female 199 40.3 
  Male 177   58.2   Male 295 59.7 
  Total 304 100.0   Total 494 
EducationB EducationB 0.08(2) 
  Less than Bachelor's degree 64 21.1   Less than Bachelor's degree 95 19.2 
  Bachelor's degree 145 47.7   Bachelor's degree 227 45.9 
  Master's degree 95 31.3   Master's degree 149 30.1 
  Total 304 100.0   Total 471 95.2 
Number of employees (firm size) Number of employees (firm size) 2.01(1)C 
  Under 1000 133 43.8   Under 900 191 38.7 
  Over 1000 171 56.3   Over 900 303 61.3 
  Total 304 100.0 Total 494 100 
IndustryD IndustryD 79.30**(1) 
  Manufacturing 221  72.3   Manufacturing 199 40.3 
    Aerospace   25     8.2 
    Automotive   42   13.8 
    Chemical Mfg.   16     5.3 
    Consumer Products   29     9.5 
    Hi-Tech   26     8.6 
    General Mfg.   70   23.0 
    Pharmaceutical   13     4.3 
  Services & Other   83   27.3   Services & Other 295 59.7 
  Total 304 100.0   Total 494 100 
Years of sourcing experience Years of sourcing experience 6.58(4) 
  Less than 3 years 16 5.3   Less than 3 years 26 5.3 
  3-8 years 60 19.7   3-8 years 86 17.5 
  9-15 years 102 33.6   9-15 years 133 26.9 
  16-24 years 66 21.7   16-24 years 129 26.1 
  25 or more years 60 19.7   25 or more years 120 24.2 
Total 304 100 Total 494 100   
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; †p≤ 0.10.  
A The comparison not made because the groups are too different 
B Doctorate is excluded from comparison and analyses 
C This comparison is not precise 
D This comparison can only be made at an aggregated level 
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2.3.3.3.2 Individual Characteristics 
Individual characteristics may influence decision-making.  Specifically, March (1994, 
p.58) states that individual characteristics may shape decisions because “Social systems 
socialize and educate individuals into rules associated with age, gender, social positions 
and identities.”  As such, we examine the role of managers’ individual characteristics on 
their outsourcing decision.  Specifically, we examine the gender, education, impression 
of contract manufacturers and years of sourcing experience. Prior decision-making 
literature has established that these characteristics may influence outsourcing for several 
key reasons: 1) Gender differences in preferences between men and women may reflect 
socialization (March 1994) or physiological differences (Atkinson 1957) that may 
influence decision-making; 2) Education may be inversely related to risk aversion (Shaw 
1996); 3) How managers feel about contract manufacturers, in general, may influence 
their preference (Zajonc and Markus 1982); 4) Experience contributes to the development 
of expert decision-making skills (Klein 1997, Simon and Chase 1973), which influence 
how the problem is identified, what alternatives may be considered and the accuracy of 
their decision (Klein 1997, Simon and Chase 1973).   
At the same time, we control for the possibility that these individual 
characteristics may moderate the relationship between bandwagon pressure and the 
percentage outsourced.  Bandwagon pressure is posited to be an influential force that 
encourages the manager to conform to the competition’s outsourcing behavior.  As such, 
individual characteristics that directly or indirectly affect conformance through mediating 
factors (e.g., confidence and group orientation) should be controlled.  Gender (Eagly 
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1978), education (Puri and Robinsion 2007), experience (Griffin and Tversky 1992), and 
affective disposition (i.e., impressions of contract manufacturers) (Cialdini 2009) may 
influence conformance and thus the influence of bandwagon pressure.  
2.3.4 Analytical Method 
The analytical method employed is a function of experimental design and characteristics 
of our data.  To test our hypotheses about how a manager’s individual characteristics (i.e., 
education, gender, and years of sourcing experience) mitigate the bandwagon effect we 
designed our experiment with a repeated measures of a subject’s outsourcing decision 
both when bandwagon pressure is absent and then again when it is present.  These two 
observations of the outsourcing decision are likely to be correlated because they share a 
common source of variability, the specific manager.  As a result of this, we are likely to 
violate the independence of residuals assumption used in standard regression analyses.  
We statistically test for this assumption by examining the degree of nesting or intraclass 
correlation coefficient (ICC).  We find, as expected, that the residuals are highly 
correlated within-subjects (ICC=0.81, p <0.001).  Not accounting for correlated residuals 
inflates Type I error rates (Cohen et al., 2003).  Moreover, our subjects are randomly 
drawn from a population of managers and may have random variations in outsourcing, 
suggesting a potential violation of the homogeneity of variance assumption of standard 
regression.   
Linear mixed modeling (LMM) or a two-stage random effect model accounts for 
violations with respect to the independence of residuals and the homogeneity of variance.  
LMM explicitly models (see Equation 1) for random variability due to differences in 
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managers and correlated errors of their repeated outsourcing decisions.  As a result LMM 
accurately predicts estimates of our hypothesized relationships (see Equation 2) or fixed 
effects, which are exactly like regular regression coefficients in that they are a single or 
‘fixed’ parameter estimate that applies to all managers (Cohen et al. 2003).   
2.3.4.1 Model Specification 
Our model specification includes the four factors seen in Table 1.  In addition we specify 
our model to control for employment and individual characteristics as well as other 
possible relationships among our factors that we did not hypothesize.  The individual 
characteristics in our study are self-reported measures of gender, education and years of 
sourcing experience.  Similarly, we asked subjects to self-report their employment 
characteristics: firm size and industry.  In addition, we specify other possible 
relationships among our factors of interest (i.e., SCA x SQA and SCA x SQA x AMSP).  
These relationships are included because we do not want to alias or confound the 
hypothesized relationships with these extraneous relationships; and by doing so, we are 
able to reduce spurious effects. 
We use notation consistent with Cohen et al. (2003) to analytically model the 
random effects or variability introduced by subjects in our experiment (see Equation 1), 
the fixed effects or population estimates of the parameters of subject-level predictors 
(Supplier Cost Advantage: SCA, Supplier Quality Advantage: SQA, Ability to Monitor 
Supplier Performance: AMSP, Gender: GDR, Education: ED, Years of Sourcing 
Experience: YSE, Firm size, and Industry), the interactions of subject-level predictors 
(SCA x DMSP, SQA x AMSP, SCA x SQA, SCA x SQA x AMSP), “repeated measures 
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level” fixed predictors (BP) and the fixed interaction between level 1 and 2 predictors 
(BP x SCA, BP x SQA, BP x AMSP, BP x SCA xSQA, BP x SCA x AMSP, BP x SQA x 
AMSP, BP x GDR, BP x ED, BP x YSE) as seen in Equation 2. The Level 1 (repeated 
measures level) equation can therefore be written as: 
                                               yij = Β0j + rij                                                          (Equation 1) 
Where repeated measure within a manager, i, is observed twice in our experiment; hence 
i= {1 or 2}.  Subjects are denoted by j = {1, 2, 3…, 304}. The Level 2 (subject level) 
equation can be written as: 
 
Β0j=  γ00 + γ 0,1 (Firm sizej)+ γ0,2 (Industry 1j) + γ0,3 (Industry 2j)  + γ0,4 (Industry 3j) 
+ γ0,5 (Industry 4j) + γ0,6 (Industry5j) + γ0,7 (Industry 6j)  + γ0,8 (Industry 7j) 
+ γ0,9 (Education  1j) + γ0,10 (Education 2j) + γ0,11 (Genderj)  
+ γ0,12(Impression of contract manufacturersj) + γ0,13 (Years of sourcing experiencej)  
+ γ0,14 (SCAj) + γ0,15 (SQAj) + γ0,16 (AMSPj)   
+ γ0,17 (SCA x SQAj)  + γ0,18 (SCA x AMSPj)  + γ0,19 (SQA x AMSPj)  
+ γ0,20 (SCA x SQA x AMSPj) 
         (Equation 2)
 + γ1,0 (BP) + γ 1,1 (BP x Firm sizej)+ γ1,2 (BP x Industry 1j) + γ1,3 (BP x Industry2j)   
+ γ1,4 (BP x Industry3j)  + γ1,5 (BP x Industry4j) + γ1,6 (BP x Industry5j)  
+ γ1,7 (BP x Industry6j)  + γ1,8 (BP x Industry7j)   +  γ1,9 (BP x Education 1j)  
+ γ1,10 (BP x Education 2j) + γ1,11 (BP x Genderj) + γ1,12 (BP x Impression of contract manufacturersj) 
+ γ1,13 (BP  x Years of sourcing experiencej)+ γ1,14 (BP x SCAj) + γ1,15 (BP x SQAj)  
+ γ1,16 (BP x AMSPj) + γ1,17 (BP x SCA x SQAj) + γ1,18 (BP x SCA x AMSPj) 
 + γ1,19 (BP x SQA x AMSPj) + u0j 
 
Dummy variables were created for Industry where 1= Aerospace, 2= Automotive, 3= 
Consumer Products, 4= Hi-Tech, 5= Pharmaceutical, 6= Chemical Manufacturing and 7= 
Services & Other and 8= General Manufacturing.  “General Manufacturing” is the 
omitted group.  Dummy variables were created for Firm size where 1= Under 1000 
Employees and 2= Over 1000 Employees.  “Over 1000 Employees” is the omitted group.  
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Dummy variables were created for education where 1= Less than a Bachelor’s degree, 2= 
Bachelor’s degree, 3= Master’s degree.  “Master’s degree” is the omitted group. 
 We use maximum likelihood (ML) to estimate the parameters from equation 1 
and 2.  We implement our analyses of these equations in SAS making use of the 
“GLIMMIX” procedure and the Newton-Raphson algorithm.  We use the Newton-
Raphson algorithm as it allows for an asymptotic estimate of standard errors and 
covariance parameters using the observed Hessian matrix, while the alternative 
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithms are known to provide optimistic estimators 
(Lindstrom and Bates, 1988).  In addition, we use a Kenward-Roger (see Kenward and 
Roger, 1997) adjustment the degrees of freedom used in tests of statistical significance 
because unbalanced data that is not independent results in inflated Type I error rates 
(Kackar and Harville, 1984).  
2.3.4.2 Specification of the Random Effects  
We examined our data for the possibility for misspecification of our random effects (see 
Equation 1).  We had three plausible forms of random effects in our model.  The first 
plausible model was simply a random intercepts model where managers are allowed to 
vary on their percentage of outsourcing preference. The second plausible model involved 
a random intercept for variability across managers and a random slope based upon 
bandwagon pressure.  The third model allows for a random intercept, slope and an 
interaction between the intercept and slope.  We estimated each of these plausible models 
using Residual Maximum Likelihood Estimation (REML) as REML provides unbiased 
estimates of the covariance parameters.  We then use a likelihood ratio test as described 
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by Verbeke and Molenberghs (2009) to empirically compare the three plausible 
covariance structures of our data.  We find that the specified model with only a random 
intercept is the most parsimonious and best fitting model. 
    We use Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) as a robustness test of the 
correct specification of our random component.  LMM assumes that the random 
components are correctly specified, while GEE is robust to misspecification of random 
components (Hardin and Hilbe, 2002).  We believe misspecification to be unlikely, but 
cannot exclude the possibility.  The GEE results mirror the LMM results, providing 
additional support to our findings.   
2.4 Experimental Checks 
2.4.1 Manipulation Checks  
In order to assess convergent validity, we must determine if the subject’s perception of 
manipulated cues is the same as intended (Perdue and Sommers, 1986).  To assess our 
manipulations, we ask simple “yes” or “no” questions regarding the perception of 
supplier cost advantage, supplier quality advantage and the ability to monitor supplier 
performance.  We then perform a series of logistic regressions with the manipulation 
check variable as the dependent variable and the full factorial of the manipulations as the 
predictor variables. We find that the manipulation check is significantly predicted by only 
the intended manipulated variable, which is the pattern of the statistical results that 
suggest convergent validity (Perdue and Sommers, 1986).  
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2.4.2 Confound Checks 
To assess discriminate validity, we examine plausible confounding variables (Wetzel, 
1977).  We compare our manipulations with the subject’s self-reported experience with 
contract manufacturers as the subject’s experience with contract manufacturers is 
theoretically independent from the factors examined in our research.  If confounding is 
absent then experience with contract manufacturers should not be related to the 
manipulated factors.  To test for confounding, we performed univariate analysis of 
variance tests with the subject’s experience with contract manufacturers as the dependent 
variables and our manipulations as the independent variables.  Subject experiences with 
contract manufacturers did not depend on any of our manipulations suggesting that 
confounding may not be present.   
2.4.3 Demand Characteristic Checks 
Demand characteristics or systematic and uncontrolled cues may bias subject responses 
(Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1991).  We look for these demand characteristics at two 
different levels: the locations where the experiments were conducted and the scenarios 
used in the experiment.  As a statistical test of location effects we look at the significance 
of the ICC; we found it to be not significant.  We then tested for systematic effects due to 
our scenarios or Hawthorne effects (Adair 1984; Bachrach and Bendoly, 2011) by 
comparing subject perceptions as to the realistic nature of the scenario, the extent to 
which they took their role seriously in the experiment, their level of similarity between 
issues depicted in the scenario to those they dealt with at work, and their knowledge of 
the issues depicted in the scenario, which we will use later to perform realism checks.  
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We use these measures of realism to check for Hawthorne effects as a subject’s 
perception of realism should not depend on which experimental manipulation that they 
were assigned to.  To test for Hawthrone effects, we performed four separate univariate 
analysis of variance tests with each of the subjects’ perceptions as the dependent variable 
and our manipulations as the independent variables.  The manipulations did not differ 
statistically along these perceptions of realism, role seriousness, similarity between issues 
depicted in the scenario to those they dealt with at work, and knowledge of the issues.  
2.4.4 Realism Checks 
As a realism check, subjects were asked to respond to a set of questions developed by 
Pilling, Crosby and Jackson (1994) to assess the extent to which the scenarios depicted 
realistic context and issues.  The responses to these questions are based on a 5-point 
Likert scale where 1= Strongly disagree, 3= Neutral and 5= Strongly agree. Subjects, on 
average, deemed the scenarios to be realistic (=4.05, =0.52), took their roles seriously 
(=4.02, =0.51), have dealt with similar issues at work (=3.49, =0.84), and were 
knowledgeable about the issues raised in the scenarios (=3.79, =0.76).  . 
2.5. Results 
Table 2.3 provides a summary of the predictions and results. We estimate our 
hypothesized linear mixed model using maximum likelihood estimation.  We report a 
summary of the statistical results from the LMM regression in Table 2.4.   
2.5.1 Direct Effects of Supplier Cost and Quality Advantage  
H1a and H1b state that managers will prefer to outsource more when the supplier has a 
competitive advantage over internal manufacturing operations.  As posited parameter 
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estimates, depicted in Table 2.4, suggest that managers may indeed increase the 
percentage of outsourcing to suppliers with a cost or quality advantage.  Simply put 
managers, on average, pursue more outsourcing when a contract manufacturer has a cost 
advantage the (γ0,14= 12.79, p < 0.05).  Similarly, managers, on average, pursue more 
outsourcing when a contract manufacturer has a quality advantage (γ0,15 = 20.09, p ≤ 
0.01).  Taken together, our findings support conventional wisdom in operations strategy, 
as advocated by the resource-based view (Barney 1999, Leiblein and Miller 2003).  
Namely, managers pursue outsourcing because the supplier provides some production 
advantage. 
 
Table 2.3 Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis Result 
H1a: Supplier cost advantage → (+) outsourcing Supported 
H1b: Supplier quality advantage → (+) outsourcing Supported 
H2: AMSP → (+) outsourcing Not supported 
H3a: AMSP moderated supplier cost advantage → (+) outsourcing Supported 
H3b: AMSP moderated supplier cost advantage → (+) outsourcing Not supported 
H4: Bandwagon Pressure → (+) outsourcing Supported 
H5a: Bandwagon Pressure moderated supplier cost advantage → (+) outsourcing Not supported 
H5b:Bandwagon Pressure moderated supplier quality advantage → (+) outsourcing Not supported 
AMSP, ability to monitor supplier performance 
 
2.5.2 Monitoring and Outsourcing Behaviors 
2.5.2.1 Does Monitoring Influence the Percentage Outsourced?   
H2 predicts that managers will allocate the percentage of production that is outsourced in 
part due to the ability to monitor supplier performance.  Upon examining the parameter 
estimate (γ0,16 = 1.70, p > 0.10), we find evidence that does not support H2.  This finding 
may be a result of managers being overconfident in their firm’s ability to detect supplier 
malfeasance and overlooking increased transaction costs resulting from increased risks  
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Table 2.4 Linear Mixed Model Regression Results 
Variable     Model Hypothesis Coefficient Estimatea   Std. error 
Intercept γ00   19.64**   5.10 
Firm sizeb γ0,1     -1.39   2.80 
Industryc     
                      Aerospace γ0,2      0.30   5.20 
                  Automotive γ0,3    -0.69   4.42 
                  Consumer Products γ0,4     8.69†   4.97 
                  Hi-Tech γ0,5    -7.23   5.19 
                  Pharmaceutical γ0,6    12.24†   6.72 
                  Chemical Manufacturing γ0,7    -8.35   6.18 
                  Services & Other γ0,8     1.57   3.82 
Educationd  
                     Less than a Bachelor's degree γ0,9       2.40   3.83 
                     Bachelor's degree γ0,10     -4.92   3.03 
Gendere γ0,11      6.08*   2.62 
Impression of contract manufacturers γ0,12      1.96   1.32 
Years of sourcing experience γ0,13      0.05   0.14 
Supplier Cost Advantage (SCA) (Superior) H1a γ0,14    12.79*   5.11 
Supplier Quality Advantage (SQA) (Superior) H1b γ0,15    20.09**   5.09 
Ability to Monitor Supplier (AMSP) (Able) H2 γ0,16      1.70   5.13 
                    SCA x SQA γ0,17      6.88   7.02 
                    SCA x AMSP H3a γ0,18    22.27**   7.20 
                    SQA x AMSP H3b γ0,19      2.10   3.16 
                    SCA x SQA x AMSP γ0,20      11.83   9.72 
Bandwagon Pressure (BP) (Present) H4 γ1,0      7.79**   3.49 
BP x Firm sizeb γ1,1      3.58†   1.95 
BP x Industryc     
                      BP x Aerospace γ1,2     1.79  3.65 
                  BP x Automotive γ1,3    -0.75  3.11 
                  BP x Consumer Products γ1,4    -11.31**   3.50 
                  BP x Hi-Tech γ1,5    -5.08   3.64 
                  BP x Pharmaceutical γ1,6    -9.55*   4.72 
                  BP x Chemical Manufacturing γ1,7     0.43   4.35 
                  BP x Services & Other γ1,8    -2.10   2.67 
BP x Educationd  
                   BP x Less than a Bachelor's degree γ1,9     -2.48   2.70 
                   BP x Bachelor's degree γ1,10      0.14   2.13 
BP x Gendere γ1,11     -1.66   1.84 
BP x Impression of contract manufacturers γ1,12      0.23   0.93 
BP x Years of sourcing experience γ1,13     -0.29**   0.09 
BP x SCA H5a γ1,14      4.90   3.16 
BP x SQA  H5b γ1,15      2.06   3.16 
BP x AMSP γ1,16      0.44   3.19 
BP x SCA x SQA γ1,17     -5.21   3.58 
BP x SCA x AMSP γ1,18     -0.97   3.63 
BP x  SQA x AMSP γ1,19     -0.23   3.61 
Residual error (rij) 116.19**  
Subject variance (u0j ) 352.24**  
R12     43.75g 
- 2 Log Likelihood 5210.88**g 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; †p≤ 0.10.  Bold indicates statistically significant regression coefficients 
a Unstandardized estimates 
b Firms Over 1000 employees is the omitted group. 
c General Manufacturing is the omitted group. 
d Master's degree is the omitted group. 
e Female is the omitted group.   
f The interaction of Bandwagon Pressure and Master's degree is the omitted group. 
g The null model used in calculations includes covariates. education   
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costs of contracting and monitoring costs associated with supplier dependence.  
Nonetheless, this finding suggests managerial behavior may invite the unintended 
consequence of an increased likelihood of undetected supplier opportunism.  In short, this 
finding suggests managers may be complacent and suppliers may benefit by pursuing 
opportunistic behavior.  
2.5.2.2 Are Managers Concerned with Monitoring Cost Advantage? 
H3s asserts that the ability to monitor supplier performance will moderate the relationship 
between a supplier’s cost advantage and the percentage outsourced.  We find support for 
H3a (γ0,18 = 22.27, p > 0.01).  To help explain the statistically significant interaction we 
examine pairwise comparisons7 to determine the direction and magnitude of interaction 
effect.  The results are summarized in Table 2.5.  We find that when the supplier has a 
cost advantage and the ability to monitor supplier performance makes a statistically 
significant difference (I-J= 19.71, p < 0.01) on the percentage outsourced. However, 
when the supplier has an inferior cost capability the ability to monitor performance does 
not make a statistically significant difference (I-J= 3.91, p > 0.10) on the percentage of 
outsourced.  From Figure 2.2, managers prefer to outsource a greater percentage to a 
supplier with a cost advantage, but the percentage outsourced will conditionally depend 
on the ability to monitor that supplier’s performance.  Yet, when the supplier offers no 
cost advantage the ability to monitor performance does not affect the decision.  
Moreover, this finding may be rational because the governance structure may be used as 
a mechanism to control costs and risks.  An increase in outsourcing increases the  
                                                 
7 Our pairwise comparisons are protected tests and not subject to familywise error rates (Cohen et al. 2003). 
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Table 2.5 Pairwise Comparisons 
(A)  Supplier Cost Advantage  Ability to  Monitor Supplier Performance Estimated Mean  Mean Difference (I‐J) 
Superior  Able (I)  71.95 19.71** 
Unable (J)  52.49 
Inferior  Able (I)   38.75  3.91 
   Unable (J)  34.84    
(B)  Industry  Bandwagon Pressure Estimated Mean Mean Difference (J‐I) 
Aerospace  Absent (I) 45.56 11.85** 
Present (J)  57.42 
Automotive  Absent (I)  44.56  9.30** 
Present (J)  53.86 
Chemical Mfg.  Absent (I)  36.9  10.49* 
Present (J)  47.4 
Consumer Products  Absent (I)  53.95  ‐1.24 
Present (J)  52.7 
General Mfg.  Absent (I)  45.25  10.06** 
Present (J)  55.31 
High Technology  Absent (I)  38.02  4.97 
Present (J)  43 
Pharmaceuticals  Absent (I)  57.5  4.31 
Present (J)  58.01 
Services & Other  Absent (I)  46.82  7.95** 
   Present (J)  54.78 
(C)  Years of Sourcing Experience  Bandwagon Pressure Mean Mean Difference (J‐I) 
  5.96 yrs  Absent (I) 45.61 9.46** 
  5.96 yrs  Present (J)  55.07 
15.19 yrs  Absent (I)  46.07  6.72** 
15.19 yrs  Present (J)  52.8 
24.32 yrs  Absent (I)  46.54  3.99** 
24.32 yrs  Present (J)  50.53    
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; †p≤ 0.10.      
 
exposure to opportunistic renegotiation, and hence may increase costs and risks.  
However, the ability to monitor supplier performance mitigates the risk and subsequently 
costs of opportunistic renegotiation, but monitoring is not free.  Therefore we would 
expect less outsourcing when a firm has an inability to monitor supplier performance 
because developing or implementing the ability would be costly or difficult. Moreover, 
these findings are also consistent with agency theory (Eisenhardt 1985, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976) and suggest that managers do not exhibit overconfident in their firm’s 
ability to monitor and control a supplier’s cost advantage. 
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2.5.2.3 Are Managers Concerned with Monitoring Quality Advantage? 
H3b states that managers will be concerned with monitoring the supplier’s quality 
advantage for shirking behavior.  We find (γ0,19 = 2.10, p > 0.10) therefore, we reject 
H3b.  In other words, the relationship between the supplier’s quality advantage and the 
percentage of outsourcing does not depend on the ability to monitor the supplier’s 
performance.  This finding may, in part, be attributed to manager’s overconfidence 
assuming that a supplier’s quality will not change when monitoring is difficult, which is 
consistent with Gray, et al. (2012).  Managers may believe that their firm can either 
control or manage supplier quality (e.g., be able to detect any change in quality without 
effort or that the supplier won’t shirk on quality).  In short, if managers believe they can 
manage supplier quality without monitoring, they may be overestimating their firm’s 
ability to detect changes in supplier behavior. Conceivably, managers may be 
overconfident because their beliefs are miscalibrated (Kahneman et al. 1999). Another 
possible source of managerial overconfidence is the fallacy of initiative (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1973), where managers may attribute less opportunistic behavior to contract 
manufacturers because they believe them to have less initiative to act opportunistically.  
In addition, we speculate managers may be treating quality as an order qualifier and 
treating cost as an order winner by overlook the monitoring of supplier quality advantage 
because they are placing an emphasis on the suppliers cost advantage.  Yet, by failing to 
consider the ability to monitor the supplier’s quality advantage managers may be 
inadvertently increasing quality risks and agency costs.   
 59
2.5.3 Do Managers Outsource More When Facing Bandwagon Pressure? 
H4 asserts that managers facing bandwagon pressure will outsource more.  We find a 
significant and positive relationship between bandwagon pressure and the percentage 
outsourced (γ1,0 = 7.79, p ≤ 0.01) supporting H4.  Our finding adds a subtle nuance to the 
prevailing view that supply chain decisions are influenced by the actions of the 
competition (Hayes et al. 2005, Porter 1980).  The prevailing view suggests that 
managers should assess their new competitive position, prior to making a decision.  Our 
operationalization of bandwagon pressure was simply to 
Figure 2.2 Interaction of the Ability to Monitor Supplier Performance and Supplier 
Cost Advantage 
 
tell the managers that competitors were outsourcing.  We do not say why the competition 
is outsourcing, which we believe is consistent with practice8.  Managers are left to 
speculate as to the rationale behind the decision as well as what the news means for their 
competitive position.  This ambiguity may contribute to managers looking to the 
competition for the right course of action (Cialdini 2009).  In real world outsourcing 
                                                 
8 News articles or firm financial reporting of outsourcing seldom mention anything beyond improved 
performance or competitive position. 
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situations, managers may be ignorant of what the right decision is to make and thus 
follow “the rest of the crowd” assuming that the competition is better informed.  
Ironically, ‘the rest of the crowd’ may be ignorant as well.  This pluralistic ignorance can 
cause bandwagon behavior (Cialdini 2009).  Additionally, conformity or joining the 
outsourcing bandwagon has several psychological benefits for managers.  First, it 
provides social proof the right course of action and may reduce criticism if the choice 
turns out poorly (Cialdini 2009).  Second, conformity diffuses responsibility for the 
decision, thus the manager may feel less culpable (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004).  Third, 
and finally, managers that conform may have a positive assessment of their choice and 
subsequently may feel better about their decision (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004).   
2.5.3.1 Does the Effect of Bandwagon Pressure Enhance the Supplier’s Cost or 
Quality Advantage? 
H5a-b state that the relationship between supplier advantage and the percentage of 
outsourcing will increase when bandwagon pressure is present.  In other words managers 
will find supplier cost or quality advantage more appealing when faced with bandwagon 
pressure.  We do not find evidence for either H5a (γ1,14 = 4.90, p > 0.10) or H5b (γ1,15 = 
2.06, p > 0.10), as the interaction between bandwagon pressure and supplier cost 
advantage does not explain a statistically significant amount of the variance in the 
percentage of outsourcing.  Failure to find support for Hypothesis 5b suggests managers, 
on average, are not increasing their outsourcing because they are not jumping on the 
bandwagon to increase quality.  Rejection of Hypothesis 5a and 5b, taken together, 
indicates that managers may not be jumping on the bandwagon because of supply market 
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factors and pursuit of competitive advantage, as suggested by Gray, Roth and Tomlin 
(2009).  Also, finding neither the effect of cost nor quality are influenced by bandwagon 
pressure suggests institutional pressures to imitate (i.e., DiMaggio and Powell 1983) may 
not directly influence an individual’s preference. 
Rather the bandwagon has a direct effect on outsourcing.  This direct relationship 
indicates that managers may be conforming because managers observe the actions of the 
competition (or speculate about competitive actions) and infer the competitors actions 
may be the ‘right’ thing to do irrespective of their firm’s specific situation. Therefore, our 
study suggests that the bandwagon effect reflects a psychological phenomenon (e.g., 
social proof) (Cialdini 2009).  We look for additional information about what may be 
driving the bandwagon behavior by examining the influence of employment and 
individual characteristics on bandwagon behavior.  We examine these characteristics 
below. 
2.5.3.2 The Moderating Effect of Individual Characteristics on Bandwagon Pressure 
We do not find that education (γ1,9 = -2.48, p > 0.10; γ1,10 = 0.14, p > 0.10 ), gender (γ1,11 
= -1.66, p > 0.10) or impression of contract manufacturers (γ1,12 = 0.23, p > 0.10) 
moderate the relationship between bandwagon pressure and the percentage outsourced.  
However, we find the interaction between the years of sourcing experience and 
bandwagon pressure is statistically significant (γ1,13 = -0.29, p < 0.01).  Managers with 
more experience outsource due to bandwagon pressure at a smaller rate than those with 
less experience, see Figure 2.3. Notably, highly experienced managers or managers with 
24.32 years of sourcing experience are less affected by bandwagon pressure, than less 
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experienced managers, who have only 5.96 years of sourcing experience.  This finding 
suggests that experience can substantially reduce, but not eliminate the effects of 
bandwagon pressure.  Arguably, the reduction in the effect of bandwagon pressure on the 
percentage of outsourced is due to differences in confidence and uncertainty about the 
decision.  As experience increases individuals tend to become more confident in their 
decisions (Griffin and Tversky 1992).  This increased confidence leads to a decrease in 
the reliance on social proof (Caildini 2009) because the manager believes he already 
made the right choice.  Similarly, managers with more experience may be more 
knowledgeable or have greater expertise.  This greater level of knowledge may allow 
managers to be more discerning (Simon and Chase 1973); and in turn, they may 
determine that in this context the information provided by bandwagon pressure is not 
relevant to their decision.   
2.5.3.3 The Moderating Effect of Employment Characteristics on Bandwagon 
Pressure 
We find that firm size (γ1,1 = 3.58, p < 0.10) and industry (γ1,4 = -11.31, p < 0.01; γ1,6 = -
9.55, p < 0.05) may significantly influence manager’s bandwagon behavior.  Large firms 
tend to jump on the outsourcing bandwagon slightly more than small firms. In addition, 
we find that managers from most industries (i.e., aerospace, automotive, chemical 
manufacturing, general manufacturing, high technology and services) tend to be 
influenced by bandwagon pressure more than managers from consumer products or 
pharmaceutical industries, see Figure 2.4.  Both of these findings suggest that industry 
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trends or institutionalization forces influence the managers learning processes and 
subsequently their outsourcing decisions.  
Figure 2.3 Interaction of the Years of Sourcing Experience and Bandwagon 
Pressure 
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Figure 2.4 Interaction of Industry and Bandwagon Pressure 
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2.6. Discussion and Limitations 
Our findings suggest that managers may be overconfident when about their ability to 
monitor a supplier’s quality advantage but not a supplier’s cost advantage. As a result, 
 64
excessive outsourcing may be occurring9.  This contradictory finding suggests that 
managers are concerned with supplier opportunistic renegotiation but not quality 
shirking.  Nonetheless, managers should clearly be concerned with both because they 
both influence cost or risk.  To the extent that suppliers are inherently effort adverse 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976), they will shirk unless monitored. We believe there are 
several possible explanations that may explain this contradictory finding.  First, managers 
may be overconfident about their ability to control supplier quality (Gray et al. 2009a), 
but not cost.  Overconfidence may be a result of miscalibration in beliefs (Kahneman, et 
al. 1999). Specifically, managers may believe quality is ubiquitous or easy to control.  
The proliferation of quality management literature, systems and certification standards 
(e.g., ISO) may contribute to this misperception.  However, quality varies greatly even 
when similar quality systems are in place (Gray et al. 2011) or the same quality standards 
are implemented (Sroufe and Curkovic 2008).  Any of these causes individually or a 
combination of causes may explain why managers are overconfident in their ability to 
monitor or control supplier quality advantage but not cost advantage.   
Second, this miscalibration of cost and quality beliefs may be the result of myopic 
learning.  The supplier actions based on cost opportunism (i.e., contract renegotiation) 
may provide feedback that is immediate and unambiguous outcomes (i.e., reduced 
profits).  To the contrary, supplier actions based on quality opportunism (i.e. quality 
shirking) may be time lagged and have ambiguous outcomes (decreased customer 
satisfaction, increased warranty costs and product recalls).  Levinthal and March (1993) 
                                                 
9This interpretation is supported by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) who found that overconfidence may 
promote excess entry into competitive games or markets. 
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report that learning is biased towards immediate and unambiguous outcomes, whereas it 
is difficult to learn when the cause-effect relationship is lagged.   
Third, cost opportunism may be more available in memory than quality 
opportunism.  Thus, cost may be more memorable because of the aforementioned 
learning, as well as from their performance evaluations and incentive systems.  Managers 
are evaluated and promoted in part on their job performance.  It is commonly believed 
that managers are more likely to be evaluated on their performance in terms of short-term 
costs not total delivered costs may include the lagged costs of poor quality from 
suppliers. Moreover, incentive systems may reemphasize short-term cost performance 
over long-term total costs.  For these reasons, supplier cost opportunism may be more 
memorable than supplier quality opportunism.  Tversky and Kahneman (1973, pg. 232) 
suggest that: “Continued preoccupation with an outcome may increase its availability, 
and hence, it’s perceived likelihood.”  In other words, because cost is more memorable, 
managers may believe that supplier cost opportunism is likely to occur, than supplier 
quality opportunism.  As result, managers choose to monitor cost but not quality. 
   Regarding bandwagon pressure, our findings indicate that conformance is not 
driven by the pursuit of supplier cost or quality advantage.  Instead, bandwagon pressure 
appears to have a systematic effect where managers imitate what the competition is 
doing.  This suggests outsourcing bandwagon behavior may be a primarily a 
psychological phenomenon instead of an institutional one.  Significant interaction 
between bandwagon pressure and sourcing experience support this interpretation.  
Moreover, it suggests that managers may assume the competition knows what the right 
 66
decision is, hence they conform (Cialdini 2009).  Ironically, managers that conform to 
bandwagon pressure may evaluate their outsourcing decision performance as better when 
they are following the crowd (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004, Cialdini 2009); however, 
actual perform may be worse because they are later adopters (McNamara, et al., 2008) or 
efficiency is reduced (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Moreover, managers may not be 
aware that they are influenced by bandwagon pressure (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004).  
  Thus, managers may systematically increasing risk because they are joining the 
bandwagon and overconfident about their ability to control quality.  Our findings suggest 
that buyer behaviors may have unintended consequences for the buyer-supplier 
relationship.  Specifically, the buyer by being overconfident and failing to monitor 
supplier quality advantage may create a perverse incentive where the supplier may 
benefit more from quality shirking. Additionally, managers that think they can control 
quality or that are joining the bandwagon may be the cause of adverse selection.  This is 
contrary to the traditional view (Akerlof 1970) that the supplier’s hidden information 
causes adverse selection as managers may ignore supplier information when making their 
choice. In contrast, the buyer may make decisions that do not have firm’s best interests in 
mind and consequently increase costs. 
   Given our results, the biases introduced by bandwagon pressure, overconfidence 
and individual characteristics may be reduced by counterfactual thinking (Kahneman 
1995). Take for example, the managerial interventions: First, by identifying instances 
where a higher or lower percentage of outsourcing does not make sense managers may be 
able to identify underlying assumptions or gain insights into their current decision.  
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Second, firms can require that alternative supplier assessment occur, one where the 
suppliers are evaluated holistically and another where attribute based evaluation 
strategies are implemented.  Evaluating potential suppliers in these two different ways 
has two primary benefits. (1) Reevaluating the contract manufacturer from different 
frames may offer different insights and convergent validity.  (2) Considering alternative-
based evaluation and attribute based evaluation are complementary.  Evaluating every 
alternative requires high cognitive attention (Hastie and Dawes 2010), so important 
details (i.e., quality) may be overlooked.  Conversely, attribute-based evaluation defines 
attributes a priori (e.g., cost and quality) making sure that important details are evaluated 
but often results in narrower search for information (Hastie and Dawes 2010).   
  As with any study, ours is not without limitations. First, we examine individual 
manager decisions.  These decisions may not be indicative of organizational behavior as 
organizational processes may mediate the relationship between the individual manager’s 
decision and the organization’s decision.  Behavioral operations would indicate that the 
manager’s decisions or recommendations will weigh heavy in their organization’s 
decision-orientation. Future research is needed regarding organizational processes and 
decision shaping.  Second, we do not explicitly link overconfidence or bandwagon 
pressure to organizational outcomes.  While the literature is clear that overconfidence 
(Malmendier and Tate 2005, Malmendier and Tate 2008) and joining the bandwagon 
(McNamara et al. 2008, Staw and Epstein 2000) tend to lead to negative organizational 
outcomes, nonetheless overconfidence (Galasso and Simcoe 2011) and bandwagon 
behavior (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) may have positive outcomes. The extant literature 
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does not examine overconfidence or bandwagon behaviors within supply markets or 
more specifically outsourcing.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that either overconfidence 
or bandwagon behavior result in poor supply chain performance. Third, institutional 
theory suggests that early adopters may be benefiting and that late adopters may be 
joining the bandwagon for institutional reasons.  We do not distinguish between the 
influences of these two possibilities in our study.  Fourth, our operationalization of 
bandwagon pressure shows bandwagon behavior but does not distinguish the possible 
competing causes that may drive bandwagon behavior.  Additional research should 
examine if bandwagon outsourcing is driven by herding behavior, information cascades, 
social proof or some combination of these causal mechanisms. Each of these limitations 
is an opportunity for future research.  We suggest that in the future researchers tie 
overconfidence and bandwagon pressure to organizational outcomes and supply chain 
performance. 
2.7 Conclusions 
In summary our study finds that both superior cost and/or quality capabilities of the 
contract manufacturer when compared to the buying firm’s manufacturing abilities 
indeed act to increase outsourcing.  In addition, we find that manager’s outsourcing 
propensity is reduced, on average, when there is difficulty in monitoring supplier 
performance, even when the supplier has a cost advantage over the firm’s internal 
manufacturing.  In contrast, difficulty in monitoring supply performance has no 
moderating influence on relative supplier quality advantage. These are consistent with 
Gray, et al.’s (2009a, 2012) findings that difficult to measure capabilities, like quality, 
 69
have no effect on the decision to outsource. In other words, unlike costs, where the 
rational model is prevails, reduced sourcing occurs when measurement is difficult; 
however, managers are not altering their decision processes accordingly when it comes to 
supplier quality advantage.  Thus, managers may be overconfident in assuming that they 
can adequately manage quality (e.g., by codification and testing) and knowledge transfer 
issues (e.g., adding sufficient resources) or that their suppliers know more than they do 
regarding quality, and will provide it even without their ability to monitor adequately.  
Unexpectedly, these behavioral results signal a naive understanding of quality 
management practices and their relationship to costs (Crosby 1979, Deming 1986,Ward 
and Duray 2000, Rungtusantham et al. 2001, Shah and Ward 2003) and knowledge 
management (Anand et al. 2010, Grant 1996, Roth et al. 1994). It is well-established in 
quality management that ensuing product failures, quality risks, and recalls in the field 
actually increases total costs.  The notions of overconfidence (Langer 1975), availability 
bias (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), and myopic learning (Levinthal and March (1993) 
may further explain these observations from a behavioral lens. Specifically, managers 
may believe they can control supplier quality thus shifting their focus to cost 
management. The more emphasis the firm places on costs relative to quality, the more its 
internal decision makers may emphasize cost over quality, regardless of tangibility and 
monitoring ability.  Therefore, the pervasiveness of firms’ emphasis on per unit “costs” 
determined prior to the make-buy decision, and the likelihood that the costs of poor 
quality outcomes are lagged, provide a plausible explanation underlying the behavioral 
theories. 
 70
Additionally our study finds that the bandwagon affects outsourcing directly, 
regardless of relative supply cost and quality advantages as posed by Gray et al. (2009). 
Rather managers may be jumping on the bandwagon for psychological reasons, such as 
following the crowd because the crowd provides proof of what should be done (Cialdini 
2009).  Third, we examined employment and individual characteristics sheds light on 
factors that may enhance or mitigate bandwagon pressure, and in turn, offers managerial 
guidance in such areas as leadership training and simulations. We find that managers with 
more sourcing experience are less affected by the bandwagon pressure, but the 
bandwagon behavior is not completely eliminated.  Surprisingly, we find that industry 
norms may play a role in outsourcing, which suggests outsourcing may be in part a fad.  
Our experimental results, taken together, suggest that managers increased 
outsourcing due to bandwagon pressure and prospective overconfidence, and 
consequently, may inform from a behavioral perspective what Anderson and Parker 
(2002) call an outsourcing trap.  Furthermore, the deleterious effects of overconfidence 
and bandwagon pressure have been hypothesized to be major and irrational causes of 
both stock market and housing bubbles (Shiller, 2005).  Using these analogies, this study 
provides the first empirical evidence that similar behavioral operatives may be creating 
an outsourcing bubble, with significant ramifications for supply chain structure. Many 
companies have moved production to suppliers they may not have the ability to monitor, 
yet nonetheless remain confident about their ability to know what the suppliers is doing 
(Harney 2008, Roth et al., 2008).  Both supply chain management theory (Eisenhardt 
 71
1989, Williamson 1985) and case study observations (Harney 2008, Roth et al., 2008) 
suggest suppliers will shirk when the buyer is unable to monitor supplier performance.  
While not specifically addressed in this paper, many of the touted benefits 
associated with outsourcing to suppliers in low cost countries are diminishing, as costs 
rise due to increased complexities of outsourcing and offshoring (Gray et al. 2011), and a 
myriad of operational malfeasances come to light.  While low cost countries provide an 
attractive price tag, the cost of shirking, poaching of intellectual property and contract 
renegotiations may eclipse the benefits of outsourcing (Harney 2008).  Nonetheless, 
many companies may be joining the offshoring-outsourcing bandwagon (Gray, et al. 
2009a, Levine 2011); and the unintended consequences associated with outsourcing may 
be eroding manufacturing country and firm-level competitiveness (Handley 2012). We 
believe future research on offshore outsourcing is needed to study this issue. Nonetheless, 
joining the outsourcing bandwagon and overconfidence in the ability to control supplier 
quality may be increasing supply costs and risks. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ESSAY 2 MAKE-BUY: THE PERCEPTION OF RISK AND BENEFIT 
THROUGH ROSE COLORED GLASSES 
“One of the major biases in risky decision making is optimism. Optimism is a source of 
high-risk thinking.” 
-Daniel Kahneman 
“With things of a human origin, it's harder to objectively figure out the probabilities. To 
the best of my knowledge, people are not doing credible analysis on the risks facing this 
country, and if they were, who's to know that those are static probabilities?” 
-Barry Fischhoff 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on how managers perceive risk and benefit after deciding to govern a 
transaction by either making or buying.  Supply chain management theory espouses 
managers should try to maximize benefits and minimize risks.  Managers weigh the 
positives (benefits) versus the negatives (risks), and then choose a course of action.  To 
be completely rational a manager must explicitly know the probability and magnitudes of 
all possible outcomes. Yet, in most supply chain situations the information needed to 
employ actuarial science is unavailable.  This lack of information may be due to 
deliberate information asymmetries or ignorance.  Nonetheless, the result for managers is 
the same: They must assess risk and benefit based on limited information.  As the 
assessment of risk and benefit is often made based on perception, it may be subject to 
biases and heuristics. One such heuristic, the affect heuristic, suggests managers may 
perceive benefit and as a result feel good about transaction attributes such as low cost, 
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high quality, and ability to monitor that align with their decision to make or buy. 
Subsequently, this good feeling about alignment will affect how managers perceive risk 
such that managers may be viewing risk through rose-colored glasses. We design an 
experiment to examine this phenomenon. Our results indicate that managers choose to 
make or buy based primarily on acquiring low cost, thus they perceive acquisition of low 
cost capability to be beneficial.  Concomitantly, they perceive acquisition of low cost to 
be less risky, thus resulting in a negative correlation between perceived risk and benefit.  
We explore the implications of this finding for supply chain management.  
Keywords: Supply Chain Risk Management, Perception of Risk 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study aims to explore how risk and benefit are perceived after managers 
make a decision to insource (make) or outsource (buy) the manufacturing of a product. 
After the make-buy decision is made the manager’s perception of supply risk and benefit 
influence how the supply chain is managed.  Recent empirical evidence suggests that the 
buyer may be unaware of the risks presented by supplier opportunism (Handley, 2012), 
selective in the type of risks that influence their decisions or ignore difficult to determine 
risks altogether (Hall, Roth, & Rungtusanatham, 2012).  This evidence is particularly 
troublesome in light of the fact that supply chains are becoming more global, complex 
and increasingly risky (Choi & Krause, 2006).  At the same time, supply chains face an 
increasing diversity of environmental factors (e.g., political, social, macroeconomics) 
which may increase risk (Rao & Goldsby, 2009). Identification and assessment of supply 
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chain risks rely heavily on manager perceptions (Analytics, 2012; Ellis, Henry, & 
Shockley, 2010) and guide managerial risk management strategies (Kleindorfer & Saad, 
2005; Tomlin, 2006).  Yet, we do not know how sourcing choices influence managers’ 
perceptions of risks and benefits.  Our research addresses this by examining the following 
question: How do managers perceive risks and benefits? 
This is an important question to answer as the value of appropriately applied risk 
management strategies is undeniable and substantial (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Tomlin, 
2006). Ironically, the focus of identification and these studies is how risk perception leads 
to some risk mitigating to contingency strategy. Yet, these studies fail to address how 
managers use of intuition may result in the misperception of risk and mismanagement of 
supply chain risks.  Most risk identification and assessment by managers is based on 
experience and intuition (Analytics, 2012; March & Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 1995).  
Given that supply chain managers often have to identify and assess risks when the nature 
and extent of risks is not well known, this reliance of intuition is not surprising.  
Moreover under the right conditions managers (e.g., a stable cause-effect relationship, a 
broad and unbiased exposure to relevant situations) may learn expert intuition (Klein, 
1997b; Simon, 1987).   
While the reliance on intuition is certainly expedient and efficient, reliance on 
intuition often leads to biases in large part because learning is imperfect (Levinthal & 
March, 1993) and other cognitive processes are fallible (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
often because of incomplete information (Klein, 1997a).  In supply chain management, 
managers may be biased as a result of unobservable information and outcomes.  For 
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example, suppliers keep information private, thus creating information asymmetry 
resulting in a bias in what a manager (buyer) knows. This asymmetry may result in a 
learning bias that prevents development of expertise (Levinthal & March, 1993) or the 
availability of information retrieval from memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  At the 
same time this information asymmetry results in an information gap, a gap that affect or 
feelings fill (Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc & Markus, 1982). Affective information aids 
judgment but also may unconsciously influence decisions and risk-related behaviors 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Finucane et al, 2000).  What we already 
know about risk identification and assessment suggests that managers may misperceive 
supply chain risk because of information asymmetries and their reliance on affective 
assessment to judge risk.   
The dominant paradigm suggests that risk and benefit are positively correlated 
(i.e., the higher the risk the higher the benefit) in the market (Fama, 1970; Fama & 
French, 1993).  Thus, managers should before, during and after their make-buy decision 
perceive risk and benefit to be positively related. Also, managers, in general, are risk 
averse (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; March & Shapira, 1987) as a result managers should 
err on the side of caution.  However, managers may be risk averse, yet behave risky 
because they are overly optimistic in their predictions about risk (Kahneman & Lovallo, 
1993).  Evidence from psychology suggests that managers may be optimistic about their 
predictions of risk when they perceive benefit is high (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & 
Johnson, 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Managers should feel the make-buy decision is 
most beneficial when there is alignment of the beneficial transactional attributes (e.g., 
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low cost, high quality and ability to monitor) with their choice to make or buy.  As a 
result of feeling good about the beneficial alignment, managers may underestimate the 
risks associated with their choice suggesting a negative relationship between the 
perception of risk and benefit.  If managers act on this perception they may be 
unknowingly increasing risks.  Thus there is a dilemma in our understanding of how 
managers perceive risk and benefit in the supply chain.  We empirically investigate this 
dilemma.  
Our research contributes to the understanding of the perception of risk and benefit 
surrounding the make-buy decision in several important ways.  First, buying 
(outsourcing) is inherently more risky then making because a firm (the principal) 
relinquishes the direct control and management of the production process and at the same 
time exposes itself to supplier (agent) opportunism.  However, upon deliberate and 
quantitative analysis the manager may feel that the benefits of outsourcing (e.g., lower 
costs, improved quality) may outweigh the risks.  Yet, our findings suggest that managers 
focus on benefits and put on rose-colored glasses when examining the risks. Surprisingly, 
we do not find that the alignment of the make-buy decision with high quality or ability to 
monitor plays a role in managers’ perception of risk or benefit. Taken together these 
findings suggest cost is king, but ironically may also be the cause of mismanagement that 
results in increased supply chain risks.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  First, we review the psychology, risk 
and supply chain management literatures to develop our hypotheses and model.  Next, we 
discuss our empirical approach that we use to examine our hypotheses. Third, we discuss 
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our findings.  Lastly, we conclude with the implications of our study for supply chain 
managers and researchers.  
3.2 Related Literature 
The dominant view in operations and supply chain management strategy is that 
the make-buy decision is driven by capability and risk considerations (Hayes, Pisano, 
Upton, & Wheelwright, 2005).  Essentially, managers are differentiating between make 
and buy to choose the governance form that will yield the greatest expected net benefit 
(Williamson, 2005).  In general, making is considered the choice of last resort because of 
lock-in costs (Hayes et al., 2005; Williamson, 2005).  Yet, buying presents its own set of 
risks and benefits.  Buying is inherently beneficial because it prevents lock-in and 
leverages the supply market. Buying is risky  with a long list of transactional costs: 
Incomplete contracting, hold-up costs, switching costs, costs of creating credible 
commitments, monitoring and enforcement costs (Williamson, 1985).  Hence the loss of 
control associated with buying is accompanied by an increase in risk and hence 
management and agency costs will increase.  
While risk and benefit are distinct concepts they are inexorably linked together ex 
ante, it is not clear to how managers assess risk or benefit (ex post) after making their 
decision.  Classical economic theory suggests, in general10, risk and benefit are naturally 
and positively related (Knight, 1921). Thus a rational manager should either perceive 
both benefit and risk to be low or high. Yet, managers may be boundedly rational and 
                                                 
10 It is possible with the right diversification of a portfolio to simultaneously decrease risk and increase 
return, see for example: Markowitz, H. 1952. Portfolio selection. The Journal of Finance, 7(1): 77-91..In 
supply chain management we believe such an opportunity would be uncommon. 
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rely on heuristics to make decisions (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1957). Managers 
may use an affective heuristic that relies on the manager’s affective state for information 
and thus may influence both the perception of risk and benefit (Finucane et al., 2000).  It 
is this perception that drives managerial intentions and subsequently behavior (Ajzen, 
1991).  However, affect and feelings are by their very nature content and context specific 
(Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001).  As such, we believe managers will 
select the make-buy choice based on the attributes of the transaction and therefore their 
perceptions will be based on the attributes that align with their choice.  Thus, neither 
making nor buying should be inherently perceived as good or bad, beneficial or 
ineffectual, risky or riskless. In other words the affective feelings of make or buy depend 
conditionally on the attributes that align with the choice. We propose a conceptual model 
in Figure 3.1, which examines how the alignment of transactional attributes with the 
make-buy decision may influence perceptions of risk and benefit. 
3.2.1 Identification and Assessment of Risks in Supply Chain Management 
Our study defines risk as the subjective assessment or judgment of the perceived 
hazards associated with their make-buy decision. We define risk as such for clarity as 
there are a wide range of definitions for what risk in supply chain management means 
(Sodhi, Son and Tang 2012).  This is not surprising as risk has different definitions and 
connotations, see Table 1, in two of supply chain management’s reference disciplines: 
economics and psychology.  
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Figure 3.1 Essay 2 Hypothesized Model 
 
In economics, risk is the probability of an outcome occurring. This includes both 
positive outcomes (gains) and negative outcomes (loss). There are two logical ways to 
assess risks: a priori and statistically (Knight, 1921).  However, there are two critical 
assumptions made in order to use an a priori distribution: 1) the a priori distribution 
accounts for all possible outcomes and 2) the a priori distribution is static. The second 
way, statistical probability assessment, is determined empirically from historical data as 
such it is predicated on the assumption that the causal mechanism that caused the past 
distribution remains the same (Knight 1921).  In psychology risk is a subjective 
assessment of a loss outcome occurring (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Yates & Stone, 1992).  
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Table 3.1 Definitions of Risk 
Author  Discipline  Definition 
Knight (1921)  Economics  Risk  is  the  probability  occurrence  of  an  event  predicted 
either a priori or statistically. 
Fama  and  French 
(1993) 
Economics  Risk  is variance  in  the probability distribution of observable 
outcomes. 
Loewenstein  et  al. 
(2001) 
Psychology  Risk  is  feeling  that  provides  information  which  aids  the 
assessment of difficult to control or observe hazards.  
Finucane  et  al. 
(2000) 
Psychology  Risk is a judgment of a perceived hazard which is influence by 
our affective interpretation of information. 
Yates  and  Stone 
(1992) 
Psychology  Risk  is  a  subjectively  determined      perception  of  the 
magnitude and uncertainty of loss. 
 
Both the objective (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Tang & Tomlin, 2008; Tomlin, 
2006) and subjective (Ellis et al., 2010; Zsidisin, 2003a; Zsidisin, 2003b) paradigms of 
risk are used in supply chain management research.  In supply chain management, we 
clearly have both objectively and subjectively assessable risks (Rao and Goldsby 2009), 
yet our study focuses on subjective assessment of risk for several reasons.  First, we 
believe subjective assessment of risk is the dominant risk assessment method that occurs 
in industry.  Recent evidence (e.g., AON Analytics 2012) suggests that managers often 
make a judgment of risk rather than a formal actuarial assessment of risk.  Second, we 
believe that the subjective judgment occurs often because managers tend to deal with 
unobservable constructs (Godfrey & Hill, 1995).  Specifically, we believe supply chain 
managers tend to encounter broad unobservable risks (e.g., supplier opportunism) vs. 
specific observable risks (e.g., probability of an earth quake in Japan shutting down 
supplier operations). Lastly, while the objective and subjective paradigms appear 
incommensurate, the line between subjective and objective risks is not clear (Fischhoff, 
Watson, & Hope, 1984).  Many seemingly expert and objective assessments (i.e., a priori 
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distributions and actuarial tables) of risks require judgment and interpretation of facts to 
draw conclusions, thus often even among experts there is often disagreement about what 
the objective risks are (Fischhoff et al., 1984). Barry Fischhoff noted: “With things of a 
human origin, it's harder to objectively figure out the probabilities.”  
Supply chain management subjective risk assessment relies on estimations of risk 
made by experts (Ellis et al., 2010; Zsidisin, 2003b). Estimations based on judgments or 
intuitions are fallible (Knight, 1921; Simon, 1987) and often biased in predictable ways 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  In general, actuarial or statistical outperform expert 
judgments (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 2002; Meehl, 1954).  In short if there is an objective 
assessment of risk managers should use it.  Again, we believe in supply chain 
management often there is not a way to objectively assess risks, what do managers do? 
How do they subjectively assess risks?  The extant literature says they rely on intuition or 
emotion (March and Shapira 1987, Simon 1987).  Moreover, managers focus on the risk 
of losses instead of both gains and losses (March and Shapira 1987; Zsidisin 2003a). Our 
study focuses on how managers perceive benefit and risk together as assessment of one 
may affect the other (Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001), while most supply 
chain studies the focus on identifying (Zdisisin 2003a,b), assessing (Ellis et al. 2009) or 
managing risks (Hult, Craighead, & Ketchen, 2010; Tomlin, 2006).(Finucane et al., 2000) 
3.2.2 Identification and Assessment of Benefits in Supply Chain Management 
We define benefit as the subjective assessment or judgment of the perceived 
financial or operational gains with their make-buy decision.  In economics, benefit is 
synonymous with profit (Knight, 1921). Benefit or the pursuit of profit generating 
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activities is a pervasive goal for most firms (Cyert & March, 1992; Williamson, 1985).  
In supply chain management benefit is often expressed as profit or operational outcomes 
that lead to profit such as on-time delivery, high quality, low production costs and 
volume flexibility (Roth, 1996).  However, managers’ assessment of benefit or 
“perception” is subjective and managers must use judgment in their forecasted prediction 
of profit or performance improvements.  Numerous studies adopt this perspective and 
link perception of operational outcomes with self-reported “perceived” performance 
(Flynn, Huo, & Zhao, 2010; Handley, 2012; Rosenzweig & Roth, 2004; Schroeder, Shah, 
& Xiaosong Peng, 2011).  Moreover, there is some evidence that self-reported 
perceptions of performance (benefit) may be reasonably accurate (Ketokivi & Schroeder, 
2004). Nonetheless, this literature does not link the perception of benefit with the 
perception of risk. 
3.2.3 Make-Buy, Risk and Benefit in Strategic Management 
The decision to determine whether a firm makes or buys is fundamental to 
operations and supply chain management.  The make-buy decision simultaneously 
determines the resources a firm have access to (Barney, 1999) and the transaction costs 
the firm experiences (Williamson, 2008), and ultimately how the firm performs (Hayes et 
al., 2005; Porter, 1980).  Essentially, managers face a cost-benefit analysis where they 
determine the net benefit of making vs. buying and go with the highest net benefit option 
(Hayes et al., 2005; Porter, 1980). In our study net benefit has the standard meaning 
where net benefit is t benefits minus costs.  However, often costs are the result of risks 
(Hayes et al., 2005; Williamson, 2008), therefore we use the terms interchangeably. 
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The resource based view and transaction cost economics differ in how they 
emphasize the tension between risk and benefit when considering whether to make or 
buy. The resource-based perspective emphasizes about how to acquire, select or develop 
resources to generate value (Barney, 1991). Essentially, managers facing the make-buy 
decision should be concerned with benefits (effectiveness).  The presumption is that 
acquisition of a valuable resource (benefit) will outpace the costs of accepting or 
managing risks (e.g., agency, coordination and opportunism) (Barney, 1999).  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) emphasizes efficiency or management of costs (risks) 
(Williamson, 1999).  TCE assumes that cost minimization is profit maximizing.  Thus the 
benefit (value) associated with any given transaction is fixed11, so in the make-buy 
decision managers should pursue the lowest cost option.  “Making” tends to have high 
opportunity costs, yet nonetheless should be used when buying has high risks (i.e., 
opportunism costs, potential for hold up, high enforcement costs, high switching costs). 
Both of these theories have different underlying assumptions about risk and benefit but 
suggest that risk and benefit are positively correlated.   
With that said these perspectives are complementary (Williamson, 1999) and 
often integrated in supply chain management to inform or predict the make-buy decision 
(see for example Gray, Roth, & Tomlin, 2009; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Poppo & Zenger, 
1998).  So while RBV and TCE emphasize that risk-benefit analysis is drives the 
managers make-buy decision, they are silent about how managers will perceive risk and 
                                                 
11 Albeit Williamson (2008) is clear that making is the option of last resort. 
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benefit after their decision.  Presumably, a manager would want to correctly perceive risk 
and benefit in order to effectively manage the supply chain. 
3.2.4 Competitive Capabilities 
Competitive capabilities are the set of heterogeneous abilities of the firm to 
perform against its competitors in target markets (Roth & Jackson, 1995). The 
capabilities and the make-buy choice that determine the attributes of a transaction are 
selected simultaneously by managers (Riordan & Williamson, 1985). While RBV tells us 
that manager’s make-buy decision will be influenced by the desire to obtain valuable 
competitive capabilities (Leiblein, 2003), it does not tell us what capabilities are relevant 
(valuable) to the decision.  We look to the SC&OM literature to tell us what capabilities 
are relevant to the make-buy decision.  SC&OM literature typically examines cost, 
delivery, flexibility and quality capability (Rosenzweig & Easton, 2010; White, 1996).  
Our study limits the focus to only cost and quality because they are competitive priorities 
that every firm encounters (Boyer & Lewis, 2002) and often are triggers of the make-buy 
evaluation process (Moschuris, 2007).  Competitive priorities are the intended attributes 
that an organization wants to improve or maintain in order to compete in the market 
(Boyer & Lewis, 2002; Skinner, 1969).  Competitive priorities are goals that guide 
managers actions to acquire capabilities (Skinner, 1969).  
Cost capability is defined as “the current ability of the manufacturing function to 
support competing on price (Gray, et al., 2009 pg. 31).”  Quality capability refers to the 
ability to compete based on conformance quality.  Conformance quality is “the degree to 
which a product’s design and operating characteristics meet established standards 
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(Garvin, 1987 pg. 105).” We build on these definitions for cost and quality to define 
relative cost and quality capabilities from the firm’s perspective relative to some 
reference a contract manufacturer, which is consistent with McIvor (2009). Superior 
(inferior) relative cost capability is the ability of the firm to produce at lower (higher) 
costs when compared to a contract manufacturer. Similarly, superior (inferior) relative 
quality capability is the ability of the firm to produce higher (lower) conformance quality 
compared to a contract manufacturer.   
 Cost and quality capabilities create competitive advantage through arrangement 
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2003) or their complementary nature (Wernerfelt, 1984).  Thus a 
manager’s role is to identify, acquire, create and arrange cost and quality capabilities to 
enable operational performance.  Managers add value in the production sourcing decision 
from acquiring cost or quality capability.  Hence, managers prefer to source from the firm 
with better relative capabilities (Barney, 1999, McIvor, 2009).  There is some empirical 
evidence that supports the notion that managers make production sourcing decisions 
based on relative cost and quality capabilities. A firms production costs compared to a 
potential supplier have been shown to have a significant impact on the make-buy choice 
(Argyres, 1996; Hall et al., 2012; Walker & Weber, 1984).  Similarly, among suppliers, 
high supplier quality relative to other suppliers favors selection (Kannan & Tan, 2002; 
Wilson, 1994).   
3.2.5 Behavioral Uncertainty 
Consistent with essay 1, behavioral uncertainty is with regards to the manager’s 
belief in the ability to monitor the cost and quality capability of the contract 
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manufacturer.  A widely accepted definition for behavioral uncertainty developed by 
John and Weitz (1988) suggests behavioral uncertainty “refers to the difficulty of 
ascertaining the actual performance or adherence to contractual agreement (John and 
Weitz, 1988 pg. 342).” We adapt this definition to include the notion that managerial 
preference is influenced by their belief in the difficulty of determining performance or 
detecting and enforcing contract violations. This is an important distinction as actual is 
different from belief.  It is the manager’s belief that will drive their preference.   
Behavioral uncertainty increases transaction costs due to increased contract terms, 
ex post monitoring and enforcement of the exchange (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
Williamson, 1985).  Contractual terms can act to eliminate the influence of the hostage 
(Williamson, 1985) by incorporating intensives, penalties, and sanctions to facilitate 
contractor behavior.  However, these contractual guarantees are not enforceable or 
credible threats if the opportunistic behavior or outcomes of the behavior (e.g. reduced 
conformance quality) cannot be observed (Kaya & Ozer, 2009). Additionally, due to goal 
conflict between the firm (principal) and the contract manufacturer (agent)(Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), it is plausible for a contractor to exaggerate cost and 
quality capability to win the contract, and then shirk their responsibilities (Gray, Roth, & 
Tomlin, 2012; Kaya & Ozer, 2009).  Therefore both cost and quality capabilities 
necessitate monitoring.  As the ability of the firm to evaluate performance decreases 
information asymmetries will increase resulting in either increased policing and 
enforcement costs or higher costs due to opportunistic behavior.  These arguments from 
agency theory and TCE suggest managers prefer to produce in-house as behavioral 
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uncertainty increases in order to avoid opportunistic behavior.  Similarly, the empirical 
evidence supports these arguments by demonstrating that as behavioral uncertainty 
increases, in-house production is preferred (Hall et al., 2012; John & Weitz, 1988; 
Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 1998).   
3.2.6 Alignment 
Our study defines alignment as the match between the make-buy decision and 
advantageous characteristics such as low cost, high quality and the ability to monitor.  
For example, a manager decides to buy and the supplier has the ability to provide low 
cost products then alignment occurs. Hence misalignment occurs when the make-buy 
decision fails to acquire an advantageous characteristic.  For example, a manager decides 
to make but their firm’s quality is inferior compared to the other potential supplier. While 
there are many views of alignment, our definition is consistent with operations strategy, 
contingency theory and transaction cost economics. In operations strategy, strategic 
alignment occurs when the operational strategy links with the priorities of the 
organization (Hayes et al., 2005; Skinner, 1969).  In the make-buy context, the manager 
aligns strategy with priorities when they select a governance form that provides them 
with the requisite competitive capabilities.  Contingency theory espouses that effective 
organizations and subsystems should be designed to fit the environment and subsystems 
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 2003).  The contingency theory perspective logic 
underlies logic of strategic alignment (Hayes et al., 2005), but also suggests 
environmental factors that may influence effective strategy such as behavioral uncertainty 
should be considered. Lastly, alignment is a key assumption of TCE.  TCE assumes that: 
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“economic organization resides in the hypothesis that transactions, which differ in their 
attributes are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and 
competencies, so as to effect a (mainly) transaction cost economizing result” (Williamson 
2005 pg. 6).  Within the context of make-buy all of these perspectives offer valuable 
insights as the strategic alignment, environmental alignment and transactional alignment 
are simultaneously determined by the make-buy decision.   
The strategic alignment perspective suggests that make-buy decisions are not 
made within a vacuum and operational choices will have an impact on firm performance.  
Therefore the best choice is the one that aligns make-buy with the priorities of the 
organization. While contingency theory suggests that the best make-buy choice is the one 
that aligns the subsystem (operations) to the organizational environment.  TCE suggests 
that the make-buy choice will determine the costs; hence the most economizing and 
aligned choice is the best.  There is evidence that each of these perspectives may be 
relevant to the make-buy choice as: 1) the alignment of competitive priorities with the 
decision to make-buy increases performance (Kroes & Ghosh, 2010); 2) The performance 
of operational practices often depends on the alignment with the operational 
environment(Sousa & Voss, 2008) and 3) alignment of the make-buy decision and 
transactional attributes may lead to increased manufacturing ((Macher, 2006) and 
technological performance(Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002).  Given that each of these 
perspectives may influence performance an effective make-buy decision is a choice that 
aligns the acquisition of competitive capabilities and management of behavioral 
uncertainty with the priorities of the firm and long term costs (risks) of the transaction.   
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Again, the extant literature suggests managers often do choose a strategy that 
acquires competitive capabilities (Argyres, 1996; Leiblein, 2003) and align priorities 
(Boyer & Lewis, 2002; Gray et al., 2009; Krause, Pagell, & Curkovic, 2001).  However, 
contrary to the assumption that managers have foresight (Williamson 1985) managers 
may be myopic identifying and assessing the long term transaction costs (risks) (Hall et 
al., 2012; Handley, 2012; Handley & Benton, 2012; Levinthal & March, 1993).  
Therefore we investigate the role that alignment plays in the perception of risks and 
benefits as misperception may be influencing risk identification, assessment and 
subsequently supply chain risk management. 
3.3. Hypotheses 
3.3.1 The Effect of Capability and Make-Buy Alignment on Perceived Risk and 
Benefit 
Low cost and higher quality are in general in demand from customers and may be a 
source of competitive advantage (Barney, 2002). Therefore managers will pursue a make-
buy decision that can reduce costs or increase quality and will undoubtedly consider their 
choice to be a beneficial.  Not surprisingly evidence of sustained competitive advantage 
from capabilities is scant(Winter, 2003).  This may be due to management of resources in 
dynamic environments (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  
For cost and quality capabilities to continue to provide competitive advantage a.k.a. 
benefit, they must be maintained and enhanced (Teece et al., 1997), otherwise manager’s 
risk losing the benefit received from their choice. 
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 There are several reasons why the benefit associated with low cost and high 
quality capabilities is high risk.  First, organizations may lose inertia such that cost or 
quality capabilities are not given the resources to maintain high performance.  For 
example, when organizations replace top management (e.g., chief executive officer), the 
new management often have different priorities and reallocate resources as a result 
organization often unlearn (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984).  Second, maintaining a 
capability may be viewed as a cost center instead of a source of future cost savings 
(Crosby, 1979; Deming, 1986).  This view may be exacerbated by the inability of the 
supplier to not receive benefit from their investment in capability development, but they 
still have the cost of maintaining their capability but see little to no returns.  Given this 
situation the supplier has every incentive to shirk or opportunistically renegotiate.  Third, 
high performing suppliers may offer their product to the firm’s direct competitors in an 
attempt to get a return on their investment in development of superior capability (Rust, 
Moorman, & Dickson, 2002).  If successful, their attempt at revenue expansion results in 
a loss of advantage (benefit) for the firm. Fourth, regression to the mean suggests that 
high performing suppliers may naturally regress towards mean performance.  For these 
reasons superior cost or quality capabilities will also be high risk.  
At the same time, there are several reasons why the risk associated with poor 
performing cost and quality capabilities is low.  First, the firm or supplier with a poor 
performing capability may have less of an ability to deviate from expected performance 
as the variance is conditional on the mean.   For example, if the mean non-conformance 
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rate12 μ is 0.5 then at most the a poor performing supplier may shirk 50% whereas if μ is 
0.01 then the high performing supplier may shirk at most 99%. The exact same logic can 
be applied to cost capability.  Secondly, the low performing supplier has less of an 
incentive to shirk.  Third, in fact a low performing supplier has market based profit 
incentives (Rust et al., 2002) as well as improved operational performance (Rosenzweig 
& Roth, 2004) to invest and develop capabilities.  Forth, the regression to the mean effect 
suggests a poor performing supplier may improve. 
Thus the extant economics, operations and strategy literature suggests that the 
benefit associated with cost and quality capabilities is positively related to risk.  The 
question becomes do managers misperceive these risks because they have positive affect 
because of obtaining beneficial capabilities?  Psychology literature (i.e., Finucane et al. 
2000, Loewenstein et al. 2001) suggests the answer to this question is yes.  This is 
because managers may focus on the positive affect or feelings they have about acquiring 
beneficial and this positive affect then influences their perception of risk.  At the same 
time, managers when faced with a low benefit experience negative affect being 
unsatisfied thus judge the situation as high risk.  Therefore we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1a: The alignment of low cost capability and a manager’s make-buy 
choice has a positive impact on their perception of benefits. 
Hypothesis 1b: The alignment of low cost capability and a manager’s make-buy 
choice has a negative impact on their perception of risks. 
                                                 
12 Conformance is considered to be a zero or one trait where either the part conforms or it does not (Crosby 
1979). 
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Hypothesis 2a: The alignment of high quality capability and a manager’s make-
buy choice has a positive impact on their perception of benefits. 
Hypothesis 2b: The alignment of high quality capability and a manager’s make-
buy choice has a negative impact on their perception of risks. 
Judgments of risk and benefit may be made at the same time resulting in a net difference 
in perceived risk and benefit (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994).  As such the perceptions are not 
independent and the difference of the two may be reflective of net benefit or net riskiness 
(Alhakami & Slovic, 1994). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1c: The alignment of cost capability and a manager’s make-buy 
choice has a positive impact on the difference between perceived benefits and 
perceived risks.  
Hypothesis 2c: The alignment of quality capability and a manager’s make-buy 
choice has a positive impact on the difference between perceived benefits and 
perceived risks.  
3.3.2 The Effect of the Ability to Monitor Supplier Performance and Make-Buy 
Alignment on Perceived Risk and Benefit 
One of the fundamental problems of the that managers face when confronted with 
the make-buy decision is information asymmetry between what the manager knows about 
what the supplier is capable or actually of doing.  In effect when information 
asymmetries exist the firm is exposed to adverse selection and morale hazard (e.g., 
supplier shirking, opportunistic renegotiation, capability fade).  The two classical 
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methods of handling of dealing with information asymmetries are signaling (Spence, 
2002) and screening (Stiglitz, 1975). 
In supply chain management supplier certification is in effect signaling (Hwang, 
Radhakrishnan, & Su, 2006) .  But common certifications may not actually be credibly 
signaling the cost or quality.  For example, ISO 9000 may not actually signal quality 
capability, but instead it signals that quality management systems are in place (Sroufe & 
Curkovic, 2008).  As ISO does not directly signal quality capability both high capable 
and low quality capable firms may be certified (Sroufe & Curkovic, 2008).    Other forms 
of signaling exist such as information sharing but once again, these signals must be 
credible and there is ample literature that suggests suppliers will distort information to 
their benefit (see for example Croson & Donohue, 2006; Gao, Gopal, & Agarwal, 2010; 
Hwang et al., 2006; Kaya & Ozer, 2009).  If a firm is able to monitor supplier 
performance, outcomes (e.g., cost and quality) to behaviors that lead to outcomes can be 
measured as a credible signal of performance (Eisenhardt, 1985). If unable to monitor 
performance, signals of performance are not verifiable and hence not credible.  
At the same time, managers may use screening to get suppliers to reveal 
information.  Screening in the supply chain context is in effect supplier evaluation and is 
often accompanied by supplier development.  While there are different forms of supplier 
evaluation (e.g., indirect vs. direct evaluation), typically direct evaluation the more 
credible form of evaluation is expensive (Purdy & Safayeni, 2000).  Direct supplier 
evaluation involves direct examination of both product and processes. At the same time a 
firm will usually supplement direct evaluation with indirect information (i.e., information 
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about processes and products provided by the supplier) (Purdy & Safayeni, 2000).  
Supplier development is a form of screening whereby the firm induces a supplier to 
reveal private information at the same time the firm invests in making the supplier better 
(Krause, 1997). Neither supplier evaluation nor supplier development is inexpensive.  
Therefore when the ability to determine supplier performance is reduced the costs of 
incentives, policing and enforcement will increase.  Often these costs are substantial so a 
manager is faced with the choice to either make and not have the problem of managing 
supplier information asymmetries or accept the information asymmetry as part of the 
transaction. 
The result of the latter or the inability of a manager to resolve the information 
asymmetry that exists should be an increase in perceived risk.  Managers may tend to 
perceive and have more negative affective reactions to uncontrollable or unobservable 
risks compared to controllable and observable risks (Slovic, 1987). As a result of 
contemplating the hazard that information asymmetries represent managers may also 
view a risky situation as less beneficial (Finucane et al., 2000). On the other hand if 
managers choose to make, they likely feel that control and avoiding morale hazards is 
beneficial and hence perceive making as low risk. For these reasons, the ability or 
inability to monitor supplier performance will impact both the perceptions of risk and 
benefit. 
Hypothesis 3a: The alignment of the ability (inability) to monitor supplier 
performance and a manager’s buy (make) choice has a negative impact on their 
perception of risks. 
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Hypothesis 3b: The alignment of the ability (inability) to monitor supplier 
performance and a manager’s buy (make) choice has a positive impact on their 
perception of benefits. 
Again, as the perception of benefit and risk may be linked we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3c: The alignment of the ability (inability) to monitor supplier 
performance capability and a manager’s make-buy choice has a positive impact 
on the difference between perceived benefits and perceived risks.  
3.4. Research Methods 
Our research questions regarding the affective drivers of managers’ perception of 
benefit and risk require a high level of control in order to make causal inference.  We 
need a high level of control because the examination of manager’s perception of benefit 
and risk may be influenced by the decision-making context (Loewenstein et al., 2001) or 
specific hazards present in the environment (Finucane et al., 2000).  In order to reduce the 
chance of spurious influences on these perceptions, we decided to use a scenario-based 
role-playing experiment (Rungtusanatham, Wallin, & Eckerd, 2011).  A scenario based 
role-playing experiment allows us to use the experienced managers to make decisions in 
a hypothetical make-buy situation in order to reduce the causes while both controlling for 
differences in individual managers experiences and   
Our study is the first supply chain management study to use an experiment to 
examine managers’ perceptions of benefits and risks.  Most existing research on the topic 
tends to use either case-based (see for example Zsidisin, 2003a; Zsidisin, 2003b; Zsidisin, 
Ellram, Carter, & Cavinato, 2004) or survey methods (see for example Ellis et al., 2010; 
 104
Sodhi, Son, & Tang, 2012). We complement these existing methods by examining factors 
that influence these perceptions in isolation and our experimental method may help 
triangulate the extant supply chain risk findings.  
3.4.1 Subjects 
Our target sample frame is supply chain management professionals with relevant 
experience making sourcing decisions.  As such, we recruited 383 volunteers from 18 
different Institute of Supply Management (ISM) chapters.  ISM is a premiere profession 
organization for supply chain professionals. Of these volunteers, we excluded some 
subjects based on several criteria.  First, we excluded subjects who self-reported that they 
had no relevant experience making sourcing decisions as we believe they may not 
representative of our target population.  Second, we excluded subjects that had excessive 
missing data and those who had missing data on the make-buy decision.  Third, we 
excluded seven subjects who had their doctorate from the analysis as they were too under 
represented to make a valid statistical inference.  We excluded 82 subjects based on these 
three criteria leaving 301 subject responses for our analysis. 
Table 3.2 provides a demographic description of our subjects.  Our sample is 
predominantly middle age with about 70% being between the ages of 41 and 60.  The 
sample is approximately 40% female and 60% male.  The subjects tend to be well 
educated with over 75% having a college or advanced degree.  Additionally, the subjects 
tend to be highly experienced with about 75% having 9 or more years of relevant 
sourcing experience.  In terms of employment background the majority of our subjects 
work for large firms in manufacturing related industries. 
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3.4.2 Experimental Procedure and Scenario Design 
We used an existing scenario-based role-playing experiment developed by Hall, 
Roth and Rungtusanatham (2012).  See Appendix B for examples of the scenarios 
implemented.  Accordingly, we implemented these scenarios using a rigorous 
experimental procedure see Essay 1 for details. 
3.4.3 Control Variables 
We control for employment (Leiblein et al., 2002) and individual characteristics (Mantel, 
Tatikonda, & Liao, 2006) as both may influence their make-buy decision.  Specifically, 
we control for the firm size and industry in which the manager is employed (employment 
characteristics) as well as the manager’s level of education, gender and years of sourcing 
experience (individual characteristics).  In addition, employment characteristics may be 
influence managers perception of risk and benefit as industries face different challenges 
and risks (Rao and Goldsby 2009) and may differ in what is considered beneficial 
(Barney, 2002).  Similarly, individual characteristics may influence risk perceptions 
(Gustafson, 1998) or perceived benefit (Atkinson, 1957).   
3.4.4 Analytical Method 
We use two stage least squares (2SLS) to conduct our empirical analysis.  We use 
2SLS because we recognize that our experiment may have a selection problem resulting 
from imperfect compliance.  We believe some of our subjects may have chosen to make 
or buy based on some variable that we did not observe because some of our subjects 
received a treatment where every factor favored either make (buy) yet nonetheless they 
choose to buy (make).  These unobservable causes could lead to biased estimates of the 
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effect of the make-buy choice on perceived benefit or risk.  Specifically, imperfect 
compliance results in under estimation of coefficients as non-compilers do not receive the 
intended treatment (Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996).  The use of instrumental variables 
can be used to correct for imperfect compliance (Angrist et al., 1996). 
Table 3.2 Sample Characteristics 
  n % 
  
Age 
  Under 30   20 6.6 
  31-40   34 12.2 
  41-50   77 32.6 
  51-60   94 35.9 
  61 or better   31 12.2 
  No response     2    0.7 
  Total 301 100.0 
Gender 
  Female 127   41.8 
  Male 177   58.2 
  Total 301 100.0 
Education 
  Less than Bachelor's degree 64 21.1 
  Bachelor's degree 145 47.7 
  Master's degree 95 31.3 
  Total 301 100.0 
Number of employees (firm size) 
  Under 1000 133 43.8 
  Over 1000 171 56.3 
  Total 301 100.0 
Industry 
  Manufacturing 221  72.3 
    Aerospace   25     8.2 
    Automotive   42   13.8 
    Chemical Mfg.   16     5.3 
    Consumer Products   29     9.5 
    Hi-Tech   26     8.6 
    General Mfg.   70   23.0 
    Pharmaceutical   13     4.3 
  Services & Other   83   27.3 
  Total 301 100.0 
Years of sourcing experience 
  Less than 3 years 16 5.3 
  3-8 years 60 19.7 
  9-15 years 102 33.6 
  16-24 years 66 21.7 
  25 or more years 60 19.7 
Total 301 100 
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3.4.4.1 Instrumental Variables  
We collected information from two variables that may be theoretically linked to 
the make-buy choice but not related to perceptions of risk or benefit: the manager’s 
impression of contract manufacturers (IMPCM) and the profit (P) level of the business 
unit where managers currently work.  Both of these instrumental variables are related to 
manager’s personal experience and learning as a result they may influence their make-
buy preference.  Hence we believe they could be related to imperfect compliance as they 
influence the make-buy decision other than our manipulated treatments. However, we do 
not believe that either of these would be related to a manager’s post hoc perceived risk or 
benefit.  We test the instruments for relevance and find that profit is negatively correlated 
with the make buy decision (-0.17p < 0.01) and impression of contract manufacturers is 
positively correlated with make-buy decision (0.12 p< 0.05).  We test the assumption that 
the instruments are exogenous or not correlated with the error using the Hansen J test 
(Hansen, 1982) and find evidence supporting that they are exogenous.   
3.4.4.2 Model Specification and the Analytical Model 
Our model specification includes the three experimental factors (i.e., cost 
capability, quality capability and ability to monitor supplier performance), our control 
variables (I.e., education, gender, sourcing experience, firm size and industry), the 
endogenous variables (i.e., Make-Buy), interactions between the endogenous variable and 
the experimental factors (i.e., γ1 Make-Buy * Cost Capability + γ2 Make-Buy * Cost 
Capability + γ3 Make-Buy * Cost Capability) and the instruments (i.e., impression of 
contract manufacturers and profit).  Using standard notation from Cameron and Trivedi 
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(2005) we specify the predictors as X, the Endogenous variables as Z and the 
instrumental variables as I.  Our basic model is: 
 	
We assume Z is correlated with  but we have an instrumental variable I 
Reduced form is: 
 
Therefore the model implied XZ is: 
X  
The expanded form for our second stage model is:  
y= α0 + α1 XED + α2 XG + α3 XSE + α4 XFS + α5 XIND + α6 XC + α7 XQ + α8 XAMSP + α9 XED*C  
+ α10 XED*Q + α11 XED*AMSP + α12 XG*C + α13 XG*Q + α14 XG*AMSP + α15 XSE*C + α16 XSE*Q  
+ α17 XSE*AMSP + α18 XFS*C + α19 XFS*Q+ α20 XFS*AMSP + α21 XIND*C + α22 XIND*Q + α23 
XIND*AMSP + α24 XQ*C + α25 XAMSP*C + α26 XAMSP*Q + β1 ZMB + γ1 ZMB*XC + γ2 ZMB*XQ + γ3 
ZMB*XAMSP + ε13 
 
The expanded forms for our four first stage models are:  
 
(1) MB (Z) = π11 XED + π12XG + π13XSE + π14 XFS + π15 XIND + π16 XC + π17 XQ + π18 XAMSP  
          + π21 IP + π22 IIMPCM + V1 
 
(2) MB*C (XCZ) = π31 XED*C + π32XG*C + π33XSE*C + π34 XFS*C + π35 XIND*C + π36 XC*C 
        + π37 XQ*C + π38 XAMSP*C + π41 XP*C + π42 XIMPCM*C + V2 
 
(3) MB*Q (XQZ) = π31 XED*Q + π32XG*Q + π33XSE*Q + π34 XFS*Q + π35 XIND*Q + π36 XC*Q + π37 XQ*Q  
     + π38 XAMSP*Q + π41 XP*Q + π42 XIMPCM*Q + V3 
 
(4) MB*AMSP (XAMSPZ3) = π31 XED*AMSP + π32XG* AMSP + π33XSE* AMSP + π34 XFS* AMSP  
          + π35 XIND* AMSP + π36 XC* AMSP + π37 XQ* AMSP + π38 XAMSP* AMSP  
          + π41 XP* AMSP + π42 XIMPCM* AMSP + V4 
                                                 
13 We exclude Cost Capability * Cost Capability, Quality Capability * Quality Capability and Ability to 
Monitor Supplier Performance * Ability to Monitor Supplier Performance terms as they are collinear with 
Cost Capability, Quality Capability and Ability to Monitor Supplier Performance respectively. 
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3.4.5 Experimental Checks 
We conduct several experimental checks to assess our manipulations, the 
potential for confounds, existence of demand characteristics. We did not find any 
evidence of validity issues. However, that does not preclude the possibility. For more 
details see Essay1. 
3.5. Results 
We estimate our two stage least squares models using Stata 11 and the ivreg2 
command.  We summarize our hypothesized results in Table 3.3. We summarize our 
statistical model the conditional14 make-buy models in Table 3.4. The coefficients 
presented in Table 3.4 represent local average treatment effects (LATE) (Angrist et al., 
1996).  Our interpretation of the LATE coefficients is the average effect of the treatments 
for compliers as we instrument for non-compliance (Angrist et al., 1996).  Additionally, 
our variables are coded in standard zero or one format for ease of interpretation.  The 
make-buy decision is coded such that make is 0 and buy is 1. Similarly, cost capability is 
coded such that the firm has a superior cost capability relative to the supplier is 0 and 
when the supplier has a relative superior cost capability is 1. Quality follows this same 
convention where when the firm has relative superior quality capability the code is 0 and 
when the supplier has relative superior capability the code is 1.  The ability to monitor 
                                                 
14 We tested an unconditional model where the make-buy decision was the only endogenous variable used 
to predict risk and benefit.  This test was performed a priori in order to establish that no existing bais 
towards make or buy existed. We did not find any significant differences.  The full results can be found in 
Appendix E 
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supplier performance is coded such that 0 is when the firm is unable to monitor 
performance and 1 is when they are able. 
Table 3.3 Summary of Hypothesized Results 
Hypothesis Result 
H1a: The alignment of cost capability and managers make-buy choice has a positive impact on the perception of 
benefit. 
Supported 
H1b: The alignment of cost capability and managers make-buy choice has a negative impact on the perception of risk. Not supported 
H1c: The alignment of cost capability and managers make-buy choice has a positive impact on the difference between 
perceived benefit and perceived risk.  
Supported 
H2a: The alignment of quality capability and managers make-buy choice has a positive impact on the perception of 
benefit. 
Not 
supported 
H2b: The alignment of quality capability and managers make-buy choice has a negative impact on the perception of 
risk. 
Not 
supported 
H2c: The alignment of quality capability and managers make-buy choice has a positive impact on the difference 
between perceived benefit and perceived risk.  
Not 
supported 
H3a: The alignment of the ability (inability) to monitor supplier performance and the manager’s buy (make) choice has 
a negative impact on the perception of risk. 
Not 
supported 
H3b: The alignment of the ability (inability) to monitor supplier performance and the manager’s buy (make) choice has 
a positive impact on the perception of benefit. 
Not 
supported 
H3c: The alignment of the ability (inability) to monitor supplier performance capability and the manager’s make-buy 
choice has a positive impact on the difference between perceived benefit and perceived risk.  
Not 
supported 
 
Lastly, while there are alternative ways to represent alignment(Venkatraman, 
1989), alignment as moderation tends to be a common conceptualization in strategy 
(Boyd, Haynes, Hitt, Bergh, & Ketchen Jr, 2012) and operations research (Sousa & Voss, 
2008). Our coefficients are conditional because we include interaction terms to represent 
alignment.  Hence, the coefficient for make-buy shows the perceived difference in y 
(where y is perceived risk, benefit or the difference between perceived benefit and risk) 
between making (coded as 1) and buying (coded as 0) when the firm has the superior low 
cost capability, the superior quality capability and the firm is unable to monitor supplier 
performance.  The coefficient for cost capability shows the difference in perceived 
benefit between when the supplier has the superior cost capability and when the firm has 
the superior cost capability given that a manager decide to make.  The same is true for  
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Table 3.4 Results  
Variable Coefficient 
Model 1: 
Perceived 
benefita 
Model 2: 
Perceived  
riska 
Model3: 
The 
differencea 
Intercept α00 5.39** 2.58** 2.80** 
Education (ED) α01 0.01 -0.10 0.10 
Genderb(G) α02 0.06 0.10 -0.05 
Sourcing experience (SE) α03 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Firm sizec(FS)     α04 -0.15 0.32 -0.35 
Industryd (IND)     α05 -0.32 -0.00 -0.42 
Cost capability (C) α06 -1.55** 1.03 -2.78** 
Quality capability (Q) α07 -0.50 1.04 -1.44 
Ability to monitor supplier performance (AMSP) α08 0.07 -0.15 0.26 
ED*C α09 0.05 0.10 0.03 
ED*Q α10 0.12 -0.27 0.37 
ED*AMSP α11 -0.00 0.31 -0.32 
G*C α12 0.56 -0.08 0.62 
G*Q α13 0.07 -0.00 0.19 
G*A α14 -0.21 -0.33 0.05 
SE*C α15 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
SE*Q α16 0.00 -0.02† 0.03 
SE*AMSP α17 0.02 0.01 0.00 
FS*C α18 -0.33 0.00 -0.39 
FS*Q α19 0.31 -0.20 0.51 
FS*AMSP α20 -0.00 -0.13 0.04 
IND*C α21 0.19 -0.33 0.60 
IND*Q α22 0.22 0.19 0.05 
IND*AMSP α23 0.37 -0.00 0.42 
Q*C α24 -0.14 -0.85 0.99 
AMSP*C α25 -0.37 0.40 -0.95 
AMSP*Q α26 -0.19 -0.34 0.08 
Make-buy (MB) β01 -2.11 1.66 -3.66 
MB*C γ01 2.86* -1.41 4.14† 
MB*Q γ02 0.32 0.18 -0.29 
MB*AMSP γ03 1.13 -1.07 2.61 
R2 0.43** 0.21** 0.36** 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; †p≤ 0.10. Bold indicates statistical significance 
a Unstandardized estimates 
b Females are the omitted group.   
c Firms Under 1000 employees are the omitted group. 
d Manufacturing firms are the omitted group. 
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interpreting quality capability and the ability to monitor supplier performance.  Each of 
the subsequent subsections discusses the statistical results for each hypothesis. 
3.5.1 The Alignment of Cost Capability and the Make-Buy Decision  
Not surprisingly, the make-buy decision, in the first stage, is driven by cost capability (p 
< 0.05) see Appendix G. H1a predicts that managers will perceive the make-buy decision 
more beneficial when they procure low cost capability than when they do not.  As a result 
of operationalizing the alignment of cost capability and make-buy decision as moderation 
we must examine the main effect of cost capability, the make-buy decision and the 
interaction between the make-buy decision and cost capability in order to test the 
hypothesis.  In other words, a manager perceives the situation where he chooses to buy 
(make) and the supplier (firm) has low costs as beneficial. We test the cost alignment 
hypothesis for both of these situations in Model 1, see Table 3.4.  The alignment between 
the firm’s low cost capability and the decision to make is directly test by the cost 
capability coefficient (α06= -1.55, p < 0.01) because of our effects coding scheme. The 
interpretation of this coefficient is when the cost capability is aligned with the make 
decision, benefit is perceived to be more beneficial than when misaligned. The interaction 
term presents the change in the perceived benefit of low cost capability due to a change in 
the make-buy Decision.  This means when the manager decides to make he finds that the 
alignment with a suppliers low cost capability is beneficial (γ01= 2.86, p < 0.05).  These 
two findings taken together give support for H1a and are summarized in Figure 2.3. 
H1b predicts that managers will perceive the procurement of low cost capability 
as lower risk than not. We test H1b by examining the cost capability (α06= 1.03, p > 0.10) 
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and the cost capability make-buy decision interaction coefficients (γ01= -1.41, p > 0.10) 
in Model 2.  We failed to find support that alignment plays a role in the perception of 
risk.  This lack of support for H1b but support for h1a might indicate that managers may 
be assessing net benefit or net risk as suggested by Alhakami and Slovic (1994).  We 
interpret this finding as managers are focused on the benefit and thus overlook the risk; 
H1c if significant would support this interpretation. 
H1c predicts that the difference in managers’ perception of benefit with risk will 
be larger when cost capability in alignment with the make-buy decision than when it is 
not.  We test H1b by examining the cost capability (α06= 2.78, p < 0.01) and the cost 
capability with make-buy decision interaction coefficients (γ01= 4.14, p < 0.10) in Model 
3.  We find support that the difference in perceived benefit and risk increases, which may 
be a rough proxy for expected net benefit, when cost capability is aligned with the make-
buy decision. This finding adds support for the notion that managers perceive higher 
benefit (e.g., a supplier with lower cost) situations as concomitantly being lower risk.  
Conversely, managers perceive misaligned situations as higher risk and lower benefit, see 
Figure 2.3. This difference in perception may lead to mismanagement of the supply 
chain.  Specifically, it suggests that managers may not put in appropriate post hoc 
mechanisms to manage the supply chain risks because they do not recognize the exposure 
to the aforementioned hazards related to the low cost benefit.  At the same time, it 
suggests that in situations where there is no low cost benefit managers perceive high risk 
and thus may over manage or develop these suppliers.  In short, this misperception may 
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lead to misallocation of risk management, supplier evaluation and development 
resources. 
3.5.2 The Alignment of Quality Capability and the Make-Buy Decision  
H2a asserts that managers will perceive the benefit associated with the make-buy 
decision to be greater when their choice has a high quality capability than when their 
choice has lower quality. This means managers will perceive higher benefit if they chose 
to make if the firm’s internal quality capability is superior to the alternative supplier.  
Similarly, the managers will perceive higher benefit when they choose to buy and the 
supplier has a superior relative quality capability. We test H2a in a similar manner that 
we examined H3a-c. We examine the main effect of quality capability (α07= 0.32, p > 
0.10) and the quality capability with the make- buy decision interaction coefficients (γ02= 
-0.50, p > 0.10) in Model 1.  We failed to find support for (p >0.10) alignment playing a 
role in the perception of benefit from increased quality.  H2b states that managers will 
perceive the procurement of high quality capability as lower risk than not. We test H2b 
by examining the quality capability (α07= 0.18, p > 0.10) and the quality capability make-
buy decision interaction coefficients (γ02= 1.04, p > 0.10) in Model 2.  We failed to reject 
(p > 0.10) that alignment plays no role in the perception of quality risk.  H2c predicts that 
the difference in managers’ perception of the benefit from quality and the risk from 
quality will be greater when quality capability is aligned than when it is misaligned. We 
do not find support for H2c as neither quality capability (α07= -1.44, p > 0.10) nor the 
interaction (γ02= -0.29, p > 0.10) in Model 3 are statistically significant.   
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Figure 3.2 The Effect of Cost Alignment on Perceived Benefit 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 The Effect of Cost Alignment on the Difference in Perceived Benefit and 
Risk 
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The failure to find support for hypotheses for H2a-c may be troublesome as 
quality capability significantly (p < 0.05) predicts the make-buy choice, see Appendix G.  
The failure to find support may reflect that managers may not perceive quality as 
beneficial or may not be aware or quality risks such as quality fade.   These findings 
suggest a lack of general understanding of quality management in the supply chain 
(Foster, 2008).  This may not be surprising as managers may misperceive relationships in 
complex systems (Sterman, 1989) or quality systems may have an inherent trade-off 
where in the short run the pursuit of quality may have negative consequences before 
improving performance in the long run (Sterman, Repenning, & Kofman, 1997). 
Additionally, these results may indicate that managers view quality as a cost center 
(Crosby, 1979), are myopic about quality costs (Deming, 1986; Hall et al., 2012; Juran, 
1986), or may be unaware of the advantages offered by planning for superior quality 
(Juran, 1992).   
3.5.3 The Alignment of the Ability to Monitor Supplier Performance and the Make-
Buy Decision  
H3a states that managers will perceive the risk from the ability (inability) to 
monitor the supplier’s performance to be lower when they chose to buy (make). H3b 
asserts that managers should find the alignment of the ability to monitor supplier 
performance and their make-buy decision to be beneficial. H3c predicts an increase in the 
difference between perceived benefit and risk associated with the alignment of the ability 
to monitor supplier.  The statistical results from Model 1, 2 and 3 in Table 3.4 suggests 
there is no support for H3a(α08= 1.13, p > 0.10,γ03= 0.07, p > 0.10), H3b (α08= -1.07, p > 
0.10, γ03= -0.15, p > 0.10) or H3c (α08= 2.61, p > 0.10; γ03= 0.26, p > 0.10). 
The failure to find support for H6a-c after confirming that the ability to monitor 
supplier performance does influence the make-buy choice (p <0.10, see Appendix G) is 
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surprising. It suggests that managers do not perceive benefits or risks with being able to 
determine supplier performance or maintain control over the transaction. It also supports 
the notion that managers do not fully understand the complexities associated being able 
to monitor supplier performance for contractual hazards (Handley, 2012). Additionally, it 
may reflect the desire to gain capabilities regardless of supplier opportunism or that the 
acquisition of the capability is worth the risk (Barney, 1999).  Yet, it may reflect the 
inability of managers to foresee moral hazard, thus enabling supplier opportunism (Hall 
et al., 2012).  Nonetheless, all of these rationales support the overlook of being able to 
evaluate performance may lead to what at best amounts to calculated gambling or at 
worst poor decision-making. 
3.6. Discussion and Limitations 
3.6.1 Discussion 
Our findings suggest that managers may misperceive supply chain risks, 
especially when pursuing low cost.  Specifically, we find that managers perceive risk and 
benefit to be negatively correlated.  If managers perceive a supplier to provide an above 
average benefit, they also perceive the supplier to be below average risk.  Conversely, if 
managers perceive a supplier to provide a below average benefit, they also perceive the 
supplier to be above average risk.  This simple finding implies that managers may be over 
managing the risks from poor performing suppliers and under managing the risks from 
high performing suppliers.  Ultimately, this finding suggests that supply chain disruptions 
or glitches may be the result of mismanagement that is driven by misperception of risks.  
Moreover, these disruptions or glitches have long term consequences for the firm’s 
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access to financial resources (Hendricks and Singhal 2005a) and operational performance 
(Hendricks and Singhal 2005b). 
Surprisingly, our lack of findings about the alignment of quality capability or the 
ability to monitor supplier performance may have interesting implications.  First, the lack 
of findings about quality alignment is surprising because quality capabilities and 
management enhances firm performance (Naor, Goldstein, Linderman, & Schroeder, 
2008; Rungtusanatham, 2001), supply chain performance (Kaijie, Zhang, & Fugee, 2007; 
Kaya & Ozer, 2009; Yeung, 2008) and customer satisfaction (Deming, 1986; Juran, 
1986).  This study finds quality does influence the make-buy choice, but does not seem to 
effect managers’ perceptions about quality alignment being either beneficial or risky.  
This finding may suggest quality is an order qualifier (Hill, 1993) or benefits from quality 
are difficult to observe directly and are time lagged (Deming, 1986; Sterman et al., 1997). 
Nonetheless, the result is the same quality appears to not matter neither as a benefit to be 
developed and maintained nor a risk to be monitored and controlled. Similarly, we find 
the ability to monitor supplier performance does influence the choice but not the 
perceptions of risk or benefit.  This is surprising because dominant supply chain theories 
such as agency theory and TCE suggest that it is beneficial to be able to evaluate 
performance and that the inability to monitor leads to increased opportunism and risks 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1985). We believe this finding may be occurring 
as a result of optimism or overconfidence (Hall et al., 2012; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993).   
Existing research suggests that managers may overweight the benefits associated 
with their make-buy decision and overlook many of the risks associated with their 
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decision (Gray et al. 2009, Hall et al. 2012, Handley 2012).  Our study provides a 
mechanism to explain these findings: benefit and risk are both evaluated using the 
managers’ affective assessment.  Therefore, if managers emphasize obtaining low cost 
benefits, one unintended result is that they may feel positive about obtaining the benefits, 
thus reduce their perception of risk.  As a result of lowered perceived risks managers do 
not reflect on the plausible and foreseeable risks because they incorrectly believe them to 
be acceptable, inconsequential or small.  Yet, this perception is which is a behavioral bias 
that likely leads to adverse selection. Moreover, if a supplier is selected this bias is likely 
to increase ex ante and ex post moral hazard because the manager perceiving low risks 
will not put into place appropriate and costly mechanisms to verify supplier actions or 
detect hidden actions.   
3.6.2 Limitations 
As with any study ours is not without limits.  The greatest limitation of our study 
is that we cannot say whether or not managers consider benefits first then through an 
affective mechanism then based on their affect infer risk or if managers consider risk then 
infer benefits. Both possibilities are plausible (Finucane et al. 2000).  Does one of these 
possibilities occur more than the other? It would be useful to know if there is a dominant 
framing of the problem as reversing the frame may counteract the bias (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981). While there is some evidence (i.e., Gray et al. 2009; Hall et al. 2012) 
that managers may be evaluating benefits first and hence often ending up with a situation 
where they under estimate risk, we cannot say what the precise inference mechanism is 
that is driving the negative correlation.  Also, we cannot preclude the possibility that our 
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findings are reflective of perceived net benefit or perceived net riskiness (Alhakami & 
Slovic, 1994).  Therefore, we suggest that future research examines if a dominant or 
plurality of mechanisms exist. 
Our study focuses on the drivers of the perceptions of risk and benefit.  We do not 
tie these perceptions with actual make-buy decision performance.  The literature on risk-
taking and performance is mixed.  Executives that are risk-takers often obtain higher 
levels of personal achievement (income, status, and wealth) than those who are risk 
averse (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1990). Risk takers are more successful in the pursuit 
of innovation (Galasso and Simcoe 2011), but tend to make poor acquisition 
(Malmendier and Tate 2008) and investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate 2005).  In 
short risk taking is clearly good for executives but not necessarily good for firm 
performance.  With that said there is clearly a need to tie our findings with firm 
performance, thus we suggest future research examine this tie. 
Our study’s findings are limited by the fact that we have weak instruments.  
While our experimental method uses random assignment to spread out omitted variables 
and measurement error (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001), we cannot preclude the 
possibility of imperfect compliance.  Imperfect compliance occurs, which is a selection 
problem, when the managers select make or buy based on some unobservable 
characteristic.  Often imperfect compliance leads to under estimation of the treatment 
effects (Angrist et al., 1996). As such we can address the problem using either regression 
discontinuity methods (Shadish et al., 2001) or instrumental variables (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005), but we limit our focus to instrumental variable methods.   With weak 
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instruments our findings are biased towards standard OLS estimates and our standard 
errors are incorrect, yet weak instruments do not display they characteristics when the 
sample is asymptotically large (Staiger & Stock, 1994). The first plausible remedy is to 
increase our sample size.  Alternatively, we can increase the number of instruments 
because as the number of weak instruments increases the bias is reduced (Murray, 2006).  
Yet, another plausible alternative is the use of a new instrumental variable created from a 
control group that would be a strong instrument for imperfect compliance (Angrist et al., 
1996).  In our study this would require additional data collection where managers are not 
allowed to make or buy instead they are forced to make, and then we measure their 
perception of risk and benefit.  This method would also have the added benefit of being 
uncorrelated with the error (i.e., instrument exogeneity), which is something that we 
cannot normally guarantee to be true nor directly test. Lastly, we could address this issue 
by using tests and confidence sets that are robust to the presence of weak instruments.  
While there are two methods that are gaining popularity Anderson-Rubin (AR) 
confidence sets (Murray, 2006) and Conditional Likelihood Ratio (CLR) test (Moreira, 
2003), right now the CLR test only applies to a single endogenous variable.  Since we 
have more than one endogenous variable future examination is limited to the AR 
confidence regions, which may be unbounded and unconnected (Anderson & Rubin, 
1949).  We recommend future research use both the control group instrumental variable 
approach proposed by Angrist et al. (1996) and AR confidence sets suggested by Murray 
(2006). 
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3.7 Conclusions 
As companies continually consider the make-buy decision in pursuit of 
competitive advantage (benefit) companies are often surprised by the risks introduced by 
their choice. The good news for companies is that managers after the make-buy decision 
has been made may be managing extreme risks such as supply chain disruptions when 
managing risks (Ellis et al., 2010; Zsidisin, 2003b).  Moreover, these expert managers 
may be proficient at identifying many of the keep drivers of risk (Dawes et al., 2002; 
Dawes, 1979).  The is that these same managers may be overlooking difficult to obverse 
risks (Hall et al., 2012) and often simple decision support tools will outperform the 
managers judgment or perception of risk (Dawes et al., 2002; Dawes, 1979).  Even worse 
news is that as managers become more time compressed the negative correlation between 
perceived benefit and risk may become larger (Finucane et al. 2000). And the worst news 
is suggested by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) that managers may be risk 
seeking when they perceive small losses but risk averse when losses are perceived to be 
catastrophic.  The extant emphasis on managing supply chain disruptions and our work 
shows that this may very well be the case.  The implication of this being true is simple 
managers may over manage low probability high magnitude risks and under manage high 
probability low magnitude risks. We suggest that future research should explore this 
possibility as clearly managers’ perceptions and behavioral preferences may drive their 
supply chain management choices. 
Our study contributes to the existing supply chain management literature by 
examining the drivers of managers’ perception or misperception of risk and benefit. Our 
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empirical evidence supports the risk as feeling literature (Finucane et al., 2000; 
Loewenstein et al., 2001) suggesting that managers may be linking their assessment of 
benefit and risk through their feelings.  This is an important area for supply chain 
management explore because often hard data on the risks or benefits of a decision is 
scant, thus managers must rely on their intuition.  We show that managers intuition is 
often biased to believe high (low) benefit supply chain choices are concomitantly low 
(high) risk.  Clearly, supply chain risk management can benefit from further exploration 
of managers’ intuitions, but also our findings suggest interventions for organizations that 
future research may explore.  A better understanding of how risk is perception is biased 
and how to counteract the bias can help develop better practices and ultimately reduce 
costs of supply chain risks. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSIONS 
“Businesses are not investing in trying to figure out what they’ve done wrong. 
That’s not an accident. They don’t want to know.”” 
-Daniel Kahneman 
4.1 Study Implications and Contributions  
 Taken together, our essays argue that managers systematically deviate 
from our normative supply chain management theories (i.e. agency theory, resource-
based view, and transaction cost economics) in systematic and predictable ways.  We 
asked three questions that are relevant to supply chain management: 1) Do managers 
account for supplier opportunism when making their governance decision? 2) Does social 
pressure encourage managers to join the outsourcing bandwagon? and 3) Do managers, 
contrary to standard economic theory, perceive risk and benefit to be negatively related?   
These questions were each investigated using a randomized scenario-based role 
playing experiment.  Our investigation and findings from this experiment suggest several 
key insights.  First, we investigated if managers do account for supplier opportunism in 
their decision.  In Essay 1, we found that managers consider cost-based opportunism but 
not quality-based opportunism when making their decision. This finding suggests that 
managers may be evaluating supplier opportunism based on their personal experience, 
intuition or sourcing factors that are most salient (i.e., cost).  Clearly, this is a bias that 
may have deleterious consequences (e.g., consumer safety, increased total cost of 
ownership, product recalls, etc.).  Nonetheless, the prevalence of this bias is troublesome.  
 134
We believe that this bias exists in part due to a bias how supply chain managers in learn 
and subsequently availability in memory. Supply chain managers have several sources of 
biased learning.  The first source of biased learning is incentive systems that reward cost 
variance but do not necessarily take total cost into account.  The second source of biased 
learning is the ambiguity associated with what quality means.  As there are many 
different definitions of quality (see for example Garvin, 1987), it is easy to see how 
managers may get confused about what ‘quality’ their organization wants to acquire or 
manage.  The third and final source is the time lag between when a decision is made and 
poor quality outcomes is most likely large, while cost outcomes are usually felt sooner.  
Thus managers may have a difficult time attributing poor quality outcomes with their 
choice of supplier where as poor cost outcomes may be more easily associated with their 
decision.  Therefore for implications for managers based on this bias are relatively 
simple: 1) Change incentive systems to reward total cost of ownership or improve the 
accuracy of the determination total cost of ownership, 2) clarify what quality means and 
emphasis its relation to both cost as well as the mission of the organization and 3) 
improve feedback and control systems to include timely and relevant information for 
supply chain managers. 
Second, also in Essay 1, we examine if managers jump on the outsourcing 
bandwagon and what enhances or mitigates this behavior.  Our findings suggest several 
key insights.  Our main finding is that counter to institutional theory bandwagon behavior 
does not seem to be due to coercion (i.e., pursuing more outsourcing to gain a quality 
advantage because the consumer or some regulatory body expects it) or adherence to 
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norms (i.e., pursuing more outsourcing to gain a cost advantage or match a competitors 
cost advantage).  However, we do find support that managers are joining the outsourcing 
bandwagon to imitate the competition, diffuse the responsibility of their decision or have 
“social proof” what the right decision is to make.  Interestingly, we did find that a 
manager’s sourcing experience may be related to the degree that they jump on the 
outsourcing bandwagon.  Managers with substantial sourcing experience, in general, 
jump on the bandwagon less often than managers with little sourcing experience.  This 
finding suggests that the phenomena may be psychological because experience is related 
to confidence, and confidence in turn influences the degree to which you look for social 
proof.  At the same time, the managerial implication of this finding is that organizations 
should assign highly experienced managers to sourcing decisions that may experience 
bandwagon pressure. 
Lastly, our findings in Essay 2 suggest that managers may be misperceiving 
supply chain risks in pursuit of supply chain benefits.  This finding is counter to the basic 
logic that managers are deliberate taking on risk to acquire benefit.  Our study shows 
three important results: 1) managers perceive superior supplier attributes to be less risky 
than inferior supplier attributes, 2) buying is systematically seen as more beneficial but 
not more risky then making and 3) risk and benefit are perceived to be negatively 
correlated.  This suggests that managers may not be appropriately managing supply chain 
risks as they perceive low risk to exist in a situation where the supplier offers a high 
benefit.  Yet, economic theory suggests that when a supplier offers high benefit then there 
is a substantial risk that the promised benefit may fail to materialize or diminish 
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overtime.  The implication of this misperception is that managers may be over managing 
the risks of suppliers with inferior capabilities but under managing supplier with superior 
capabilities. 
Collectively, these findings argue for organizations to start examining low and 
high performing sourcing decisions, supply chain risk management practices- particularly 
those that identify or assess risks and the characteristics of who is making the decision.  
Identifying these biases are important because as Mantel et al. (2006, p. 822) noted: 
“management can ensure a more rational make-buy decision if they understand the biases 
that influence the decision and point these biases out to the decision maker.”  In other 
words, by identifying biases we can begin to work on interventions that make the process 
more rational.  At the same time, these two essays suggest there may be path dependence 
in the development of supply chain risks.  Specifically, the bias in the governance choice 
suggests managers may enable quality shirking (Essay 1) and managers after the choice is 
made managers are not concerned with managing risks caused by information 
asymmetries (Essay 2).  These two behaviors compound the risk of supplier opportunism 
and may explain why manufacturers are experiencing so many quality related supply 
chain performance problems and disruptions.  While managers are concerned with ex 
ante cost capability monitoring (Essay 1), this concern does not appear post hoc (Essay 2) 
suggesting managers may be indeed overconfident.  As a result of this overconfidence 
managers not only misperceive risks but they subsequently mismanage them resulting in 
ironically increased costs. 
 137
4.2 Future Research 
The increased reliance on outsourcing for goods and services may pose a threat or 
lead to reduced performance if managers are biased.   As such one potential threat to 
supply chain risk management occurs if managers perceive an increased benefit to 
outsourcing and concomitantly do not perceive an increase in risk. At its very core 
purchasing and subsequently supply chain risk management are predicated on the notion 
that externalizing (outsourcing) the production of a good or service is inherently more 
risky than making, but may be more beneficial.  Therefore the misperception by 
managers about the true supply chain risks may indeed reduce supply chain performance.  
With that said our research on the misperception of risk and benefit is the first step in 
improving supply chain risk management. There are many possible avenues to explore, 
but we suggest that future research examines: under what conditions do managers more 
accurately perceive risk and benefit?  We suspect that managers are more accurate or 
better calibrated in when information is easily accessible, translatable and verifiable.  
Moreover, the ability of both the manager and the organization to translate this 
information into knowledge or their absorptive capacity may enhance their assessment 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).   
While we find evidence that suggests that managers are concerned with cost based 
opportunism (e.g., opportunistic renegotiation) but not quality based opportunism (quality 
shirking), we merely speculate as to the potential explanations behind the phenomena.  
These speculations need to be examined.  Is it incentives that play a role in memory 
creation, those in turn bias managers to focus on cost opportunism?  Is it ambiguity 
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around what quality is?  Do managers believe they can control supplier quality? Do 
managers believe suppliers lack the initiative to shirk on quality?  All of these are 
questions that future research should answer.  The very foundation of agency theory and 
transaction cost economics suggests managers should be accounting for all forms of 
opportunism, but clearly managers, mere humans, are fallible.  It is the functional form 
and nature of this fallibility that we need to examine in order to improve decisions and 
supply chain performance. 
We provide evidence that managers may be joining an outsourcing bandwagon.  
However, we do not know if joining the bandwagon has positive or negative performance 
implications.  Previous research is mixed as to whether or not joining the bandwagon is 
beneficial or harmful. The majority opinion suggests that joining the bandwagon may not 
be beneficial because the first mover (leader) or early movers tends to benefit the most, 
while late movers may not benefit at all (McNamara et al., 2008).  However, a 
compelling counter argument is that following the bandwagon may be seen by resource 
providers (e.g., bankers, venture capitalists, board of directors) as rational and appropriate 
given the context (Baum & Oliver, 1991).  Therefore managers who follow the 
bandwagon may have greater access to resources (Baum & Oliver, 1991), which in turn 
the increased access to resources may enable increased performance (Barney 1991). 
Hence, we suggest that future research examine the relationship between bandwagon 
outsourcing and financial as well as operational performance. 
Our collective findings suggest that there may be a need to examine the decision-
making process as well as characteristics of the decision maker in order to improve 
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supply chain performance.  At the time of this dissertation, the world is experiencing 
dynamic world trade that is leading to increased profits, but also increased supply chain 
frailty.  The real question is how do we improve supply chain management in a world 
that is complex and dynamic? These characteristics tend to be indicative of poor 
decision-making environments (Levinthal & March 1993; March 1994), yet nonetheless 
decisions must be made.  Given that firm prosperity and survival now ever increasingly 
depends on supply chain performance we must address this question. 
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Appendix B 
Baseline Information 
In designing our eight scenarios (Table 1), several aspects of our decision-making 
scenarios are held constant.  This constant baseline of information provides subjects with 
the context necessary to make the decision task realistic and still allow for a reasonable 
sample size.  To guide our choice of baseline information, we examined literature and 
included factors that have well-established influences on outsourcing.  We found that cost 
and quality priorities, type of manufacturing (i.e. component vs. contract), asset 
specificity, technological uncertainty, capacity constraints and economies of scale all 
should influence outsourcing decision-making.  In addition, we provide managers with a 
specific industrial and product context.  Specifically, we tell managers that they are to 
make sourcing decisions for a new, on-patent drug in the pharmaceutical industry.  We 
limit our outsourcing decision to this context for several reasons. First, most managers 
know what a drug is and how important it may be for the end customer.  Second, cost and 
quality are realistic priorities in this context.  Third, supplier poaching of intellectual 
property is less of a concern because the drug is on-patent.  
 We include competitive priorities as baseline information to ensure the manager’s 
sourcing decision is aligned with business strategy because business strategy (Kroes and 
Ghosh 2010) and competitive priorities guide managerial decisions (Boyer and Lewis 
2002).  Specifically, we tell managers that both cost and quality are competitive priorities 
since we are interested in examining a tension between acquiring cost and quality 
capabilities as suggested by Gray et al. (2009a).  The cost and quality priority information 
included in the scenarios was based on the facets discussed by Boyer and Lewis (2002). 
We limit the context of our scenarios to contract manufacturing, where contract 
manufacturing refers to a situation where a supplier is responsible for the entire end 
product instead of supplying only a single component part.  Moreover, contract 
manufacturers have a greater responsibility over end product quality and often greater 
incentives to shirk (Gray et al. 2012).  An additional benefit of limiting our scenarios to 
contract manufacturing is that it is easier for the manager to understand that the supplier 
has complete responsibility of production for the product versus the manager having to 
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determine the importance of the component being sourced.  Contract manufacturing 
differs from component manufacturing in that contract manufacturers often have a higher 
level of specific assets because contract manufacturing involves a greater number of 
production tasks.  As such, we include high asset specificity as baseline information.  As 
suggested by Mayer and Salomon (2006), this has the added benefit of controlling for the 
effect of asset specificity on outsourcing to help to isolate the effect of variables that do 
not have as well-established influences including: supplier cost and quality advantage, 
overconfidence and bandwagon pressure.  The asset specificity information we provide is 
based on prior literature that identifies specific assets as difficult or costly to redeploy 
(Heide and John 1990, Stump 1995). 
  In addition, we include high technological uncertainty in our baseline scenario.  
We do so for two reasons.  First, anticipation of technological shifts often favors the use 
of suppliers (Afuah 2001, Sutcliffe and Zaheer 1998).  Second, in today’s ever-changing 
world companies should anticipate that technology will change and design their supply 
chains accordingly (Fine 2000).  Our technological uncertainty baseline information is 
based on Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998) and Walker and Weber (1984).  Lastly, we 
eliminate capacity and economies of scale differences between the firm and supplier 
because economies of scale and adequate capacity may influence outsourcing (Hayes et 
al. 2005, Porter 1980).   
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The Sourcing Decision Exercise 
YOUR ROLE: You are a sourcing manager at Alpha Pharmaceuticals.  Alpha Pharma 
has just successfully completed clinical trials on a new proprietary drug, Livero.  Livero 
has been approved by the Food & Drug Administration (FDA). However, Alpha Pharma 
has not done full scale manufacturing of Livero.   
 
Your task as the sourcing manager will be to make the Livero sourcing decision for 
Alpha Pharma.  It is up to you to decide whether to manufacture Livero internally, 
outsource to XYZ Co or choose a mixture of in-house and contract production.  
Furthermore, you have been given full authority to make this choice.  There are no 
‘correct’ answers, so please respond based upon what you believe to be the best option. 
 
Please read the following scenario and answer the subsequent questions based upon your 
understanding of what you just read.  Again, there are no ‘wrong’ answers.  Additional 
space is provided for your questions and comments.  Your participation is voluntary and 
strictly confidential.  After completion please return this document to the presenter. 
 
Background information on the pharmaceutical industry 
The pharmaceutical industry currently faces the following challenges:   
 Increasing demand for pharmaceuticals.   
 Intellectual property rights allow innovative drugs (patented) to be licensed or produced 
exclusively.   
 New process technology and product offerings are common.  
 Competitive pressure to provide high return on assets, equity and revenues.   
 Low switching costs and multiple drugs within a category allow for customer 
substitution.   
 Brand image, company reputation and consumer trust are critical to achieving and 
maintaining market share. 
 The pharmaceutical industry is highly regulated.   
 Companies are required to track conformance quality as well as undergo production site 
inspections. 
 The industry is facing greater price controls and negotiated drug prices. 
Alpha Pharma  
Alpha Pharma is a pharmaceutical company that innovates and brings drugs to market.   
 To compete, Alpha Pharma has to be able to commercially produce high quality drugs at 
low cost.   
 Cost is a competitive priority because drugs are selected based on cost and patient 
benefit.   
 Quality is a competitive priority because switching costs are low, brand image is a driver 
of sales, and the cost of a drug recall is high.   
 Any sourcing decision at Alpha Pharma must consider cost and quality priorities. 
Livero  
 Livero requires a production system tailored to meet unique operational requirements.   
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 Implementation of the unique production system will require significant time and 
resources to train and develop personnel.   
 Livero’s production technology is uncertain and may change over time.   
 Future improvements in technology will likely render current technology obsolete. 
 Both Alpha Pharma & XYZ Co have the capacity to produce Livero. 
 Alpha Pharma and XYZ Co have similar economies of scale. 
XYZ Co  
Alpha Pharma has examined a number of potential contract manufacturing organizations.  
Currently, they are evaluating a particular contact manufacturer: XYZ Co.   
 XYZ Co has capabilities similar to Alpha Pharma’s competitors.   
 Alpha Pharma has requested and received quality and cost reports from XYZ Co.   
 Alpha Pharma has obtained publically available inspection records of XYZ Co from the 
FDA. 
As sourcing manager, you have just received the following information:   
 
XYZ Co’s capabilities compared to Alpha Pharma 
  
<<Insert supplier cost and quality advantage cues here >> 
 
Information about the ability to monitor XYZ Co 
  
<<Insert ability to monitor supplier performance cues here>> 
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Vignette Treatment Information 
Supplier Cost Disadvantage 
 XYZ Co’s manufacturing costs are higher than Alpha Pharma.  
 XYZ Co purchases  materials at higher costs than Alpha Pharma 
 XYZ Co is not skilled at reducing costs once production has started; Alpha Pharma is adept at 
reducing costs.   
Supplier Quality Disadvantage 
 XYZ Co’s manufacturing function provides inconsistent quality, while Alpha Pharma does 
not. 
 XYZ Co. produces a higher number of defective units of drugs similar to Livero than Alpha 
Pharma.   
Unable to Monitor Supplier Performance 
 Evaluating XYZ Co's performance will be primarily a subjective process.  
 Alpha Pharma is unable to determine the production cost of XYZ Co.   
 Alpha Pharma is unable to determine whether agreed upon quality standards and 
specifications are adhered to by XYZ Co. 
Supplier Cost Disadvantage 
 XYZ Co’s manufacturing costs are lower than Alpha Pharma.  
 XYZ Co purchases materials at lower costs than Alpha Pharma 
 XYZ Co is skilled at reducing costs once production has started; Alpha Pharma is not adept at 
reducing costs.   
Supplier Quality Disadvantage 
 XYZ Co’s manufacturing function provides consistent quality, while Alpha Pharma does not. 
 XYZ Co. produces a lower number of defective units of drugs similar to Livero than Alpha 
Pharma.   
Able to Monitor Supplier Performance 
 Evaluating XYZ Co's performance will be primarily an objective process.  
 Alpha Pharma is able to accurately estimate the production cost of XYZ Co.   
 Alpha Pharma is able to accurately determine whether agreed upon quality standards and 
specifications are adhered to by XYZ Co. 
Bandwagon Absent 
As the sourcing manager, if you can allocate production of Livero between Alpha Pharma and 
XYZ Co, how should production be allocated between Alpha Pharma & XYZ Co? 
Bandwagon Present 
As the sourcing manager, you find out that Alpha Pharma’s competitors are outsourcing 
similar production to contract manufacturers. How should production be allocated 
between Alpha Pharma & XYZ Co?  
 147
Post Vignette Questionnaire 
 
Questions about your understanding of the scenario. Please refer back to the scenario 
if you need to. 
 
1. To what degree is Alpha Pharma able to determine the production costs of XYZ Co? 
 Unable  Somewhat Unable  Neither  Somewhat Able  Able  Don’t Know  
 
2. To what degree is Alpha Pharma able to determine quality standards and 
specifications are adhered to by XYZ Co? 
 Unable  Somewhat Unable  Neither  Somewhat Able  Able  Don’t Know  
3. How would you rate cost as a priority for Alpha Pharma? 
 Low  Somewhat Low  Neither  Somewhat High  High  Don’t Know  
4. How would you rate quality as a priority for Alpha Pharma?   
 Low  Somewhat Low  Neither  Somewhat High  High  Don’t Know  
5. Livero requires investment in a unique production system and specific assets.  
 
Disagree 
 Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 Don’t 
Know 
6. Livero’s production technology may change over time.  
 
Disagree 
 Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 Don’t 
Know 
 
7.  How difficult would it be for Alpha Pharma to determine the production costs of 
XYZ Co? 
 Difficult Somewhat Difficult  Neither  Somewhat Easy  Easy  Don’t Know  
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8.  How difficult would it be for Alpha Pharma to determine quality standards and 
specifications are adhered to by XYZ Co? 
 Difficult  Somewhat Difficult  Neither  Somewhat Easy  Easy  Don’t Know  
9. XYZ Co has lower costs than Alpha Pharma.   
 
Disagree 
 Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 Don’t 
Know 
10. XYZ Co has lower quality than Alpha Pharma.   
 
Disagree 
 Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 Don’t 
Know 
11.  How subjective is the process that Alpha Pharma uses to evaluate the 
performance of XYZ Co?   
 
Subjective 
 Somewhat 
Subjective 
 
Neither 
 Somewhat 
Objective 
 
Objective 
 Don’t 
Know 
 
 
12. Alpha Pharma is able to determine the production costs of XYZ Co. 
 
Disagree 
 Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 Don’t 
Know 
 
13. Alpha Pharma is able to determine that quality standards and specifications are 
adhered to by XYZ Co. 
 
Disagree 
 Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Neither 
 Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 Don’t 
Know 
 
As the sourcing manager, it is your responsibility to choose where Livero is produced. 
 
Scenario 1: As the sourcing manager, where would you choose to have Livero 
produced? 
 Alpha Pharma  XYZ Co  
 14a. Given your choice, as sourcing manager, what is your perception of 
Livero’s supply risk?  
 Very 
Low 
 
Low 
 Somewhat 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 Somewhat 
High 
 
High 
 Very 
High 
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14b. Given your choice, as sourcing manager, what is your perception of Alpha 
Pharma’s financial and operational benefit? 
 Very 
Low 
 
Low 
 Somewhat 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 Somewhat 
High 
 
High 
 Very 
High 
Scenario 2: As the sourcing manager, if you can allocate production of Livero 
between Alpha Pharma and XYZ Co, how should production be allocated between 
Alpha Pharma & XYZ Co? 
              
100% 
XYZ 
Co 
0% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
90% 
XYZ 
Co  
10% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
80% 
XYZ 
Co 
20% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
70% 
XYZ 
Co 
30% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
60% 
XYZ 
Co 
40% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
50% 
XYZ 
Co 
50% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
40% 
XYZ 
Co 
60% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
30% 
XYZ 
Co 
70% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
 20% 
XYZ 
Co 
80% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
10% 
XYZ 
Co 
90% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
 0%  
XYZ 
Co 
100% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
 
 15a. Given your choice, as sourcing manager, what is your perception of 
Livero’s supply risk?  
 Very 
Low 
 
Low 
 Somewhat 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 Somewhat 
High 
 
High 
 Very 
High 
 15b. Given your choice, as sourcing manager, what is your perception of Alpha 
Pharma’s financial  and operational benefit? 
 Very 
Low 
 
Low 
 Somewhat 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 Somewhat 
High 
 
High 
 Very 
High 
 
Scenario 3: As the sourcing manager, you find out that Alpha Pharma’s competitors 
are outsourcing similar production to contract manufacturers. How should production 
be allocated between Alpha Pharma & XYZ Co?  
              
100% 
XYZ 
Co 
0% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
90% 
XYZ 
Co  
10% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
80% 
XYZ 
Co 
20% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
70% 
XYZ 
Co 
30% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
60% 
XYZ 
Co 
40% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
50% 
XYZ 
Co 
50% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
40% 
XYZ 
Co 
60% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
30% 
XYZ 
Co 
70% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
 20% 
XYZ 
Co 
80% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
10% 
XYZ 
Co 
90% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
 0%  
XYZ 
Co 
100% 
Alpha 
Phar
ma 
 
 16a.Given your choice, as sourcing manager, what is your perception of 
Livero’s supply risk?  
 Very 
Low 
 
Low 
 Somewhat 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 Somewhat 
High 
 
High 
 Very 
High 
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16b.Given your choice, as sourcing manager, what is your perception of Alpha 
Pharma’s financial and operational benefit? 
 Very 
Low 
 
Low 
 Somewhat 
Low 
 
Moderate 
 Somewhat 
High 
 
High 
 Very 
High 
 
Please tell us a little bit about yourself and your current employer.  Your feedback, 
answers, and identity will be anonymous and kept confidential.  Thank you for your 
participation. 
 
17. What is your current or most recent job title? _________________________________ 
 
18. How many years of experience have you had in a sourcing related role?__________ 
 
19. How many total years of work experience do you have? _______________ 
 
20. What is your highest level of education? Please circle the most appropriate 
choice. 
 High School  Associate’s Degree  Bachelor’s 
Degree 
 Master’s Degree  Doctorate 
 
21. What is your age?  20 & under     21-30     31-40     41-50     51-60        61-
70    71+ 
 
22. What is your gender?    Female    Male 
 
23. Which category below best describes the industry where you currently work or 
most recently have worked? Please circle only one. 
a) Aerospace 
b) Automotive 
c) Consumer Products 
d) High-Tech 
e) General Manufacturing 
f) Pharmaceutical 
g) Other, please specify__________________________________________ 
 
24. What is your current employment status (Please mark all that apply.)? 
 Employed   Unemployed  Retired  Student 
 
Please answer the following six questions based on how accurately the statement 
describes you personally. 
 
25. I will tolerate increased supply chain risks in order to reduce supply chain costs. 
 Very 
Inaccurate  
 Moderately 
Inaccurate 
 
Neither 
 Moderately 
Accurate  
 Very 
Accurate 
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26. I will tolerate increased supply chain risks in order to increase supply chain 
quality. 
 Very 
Inaccurate  
 Moderately 
Inaccurate 
 
Neither 
 Moderately 
Accurate  
 Very 
Accurate 
 
27. I will tolerate increased supply chain risks in order to increase supply chain on-
time delivery. 
 Very 
Inaccurate  
 Moderately 
Inaccurate 
 
Neither 
 Moderately 
Accurate  
 Very 
Accurate 
 
28. I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected supply chain events. 
 Very 
Inaccurate  
 Moderately 
Inaccurate 
 
Neither 
 Moderately 
Accurate  
 Very 
Accurate 
 
29. I can solve most supply chain problems if I invest the necessary effort. 
 Very 
Inaccurate  
 Moderately 
Inaccurate 
 
Neither 
 Moderately 
Accurate  
 Very 
Accurate 
 
30. When I am confronted with a supply chain problem, I can usually find several 
solutions. 
 Very 
Inaccurate  
 Moderately 
Inaccurate 
 
Neither  
 Moderately 
Accurate  
 Very 
Accurate 
 
31. From your experience, how much control do you think you have over the process 
to identify potential suppliers? 
 Absolutely No 
Control 
Almost No 
Control  
 
Neither 
 Almost Complete 
Control  
 Complete 
Control 
 
32. From your experience, how much control do you think you have over the supplier 
evaluation process? 
 Absolutely No 
Control 
Almost No 
Control  
 
Neither 
 Almost Complete 
Control  
 Complete 
Control 
 
33. From your experience, how much control do you think you have over the supplier 
selection process? 
 Absolutely No 
Control 
Almost No 
Control  
 
Neither 
 Almost Complete 
Control  
 Complete 
Control 
 
34. From your experience, how often is supplier information discovered after supplier 
selection has occurred that might have changed your supplier selection? 
 Very 
Frequently  
 Somewhat 
Frequently 
 
Neither 
 Somewhat 
Infrequently  
 Very 
Infrequently 
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35. From your experience, how frequently does a typical supplier change their supply 
chain management practices in response to changes in your own company’s 
practices? 
 Very 
Frequently  
 Somewhat 
Frequently 
 
Neither 
 Somewhat 
Infrequently  
 Very 
Infrequently 
 
36. From your experience, how frequently does a typical supplier change their 
behavior based on your own company’s supply chain management practices? 
 Very 
Frequently  
 Somewhat 
Frequently 
 
Neither 
 Somewhat 
Infrequently  
 Very 
Infrequently 
 
37. Given the opportunity, a typical supplier will attempt to pass additional costs on 
to your company to increase their profits. 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neither  Agree  Strongly Agree  Don’t Know 
 
38. Given the opportunity, a typical supplier will attempt to reduce quality to increase 
their profits. 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neither  Agree  Strongly Agree  Don’t Know 
 
39. A typical supplier will do things that may be detrimental to your firm’s supply 
chain performance without informing you. 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neither  Agree  Strongly Agree  Don’t Know 
 
40. Given your experience what is your impression of contract manufacturers?   
 Very 
Poor 
 
Poor 
 Somewhat 
Poor 
 
Neutral 
 Somewhat 
Good 
 
Good 
 Very 
Good 
 
41. How much experience does your current or most recent employer have with 
contract manufacturers? 
 None   Little  Some   Substantial   Extensive 
 
42. About what percentage of sales revenues from the business unit that you work in 
can currently be attributed to products made by contract manufacturers? 
______________________________________ 
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43. To what extent does the quality of your current contract manufacturers meet 
your business unit’s expectations?  
 Substantially 
Below Expectations  
 Below 
Expectations 
 Meets 
Expectations 
 Above 
Expectations 
 Substantially 
Above Expectations 
44. To what extent does the cost of your current contract manufacturers meet your 
business unit’s expectations?  
 Substantially 
Below Expectations  
 Below 
Expectations 
 Meets 
Expectations 
 Above 
Expectations 
 Substantially 
Above Expectations 
45. What was your business unit’s profit level before taxes for the most recent fiscal 
year?  
 Negative 
(net loss) 
 Break even 
(no profit/loss) 
 Up to 
5% 
profit 
 Over 5% 
to 10% 
profit  
 Over 
10% to 
15% profit 
 Over 
15% to 
25% profit 
 Over 
25% 
profit 
 
46. Which one of the following descriptions is most typical of your business unit’s 
products? 
 Standard product with no options 
 Standard product with standard options 
 Standard product modified to customer specification 
 Standard product with options modified to customer specification 
 Customized product manufactured to customer specification 
 
47. Please indicate the core competencies of your business unit.  Mark all that apply*. 
 
R&D 
 Purchasing/ 
Sourcing 
 Marketing  Project  
Management 
 Contract 
Management 
 Manufacturing 
 
48. What is the approximate number of employees employed by your business unit? 
 0-250   251- 500  501-750  751-1000 1001+ 
49. The unemployment rate at the end of 2012 will be smaller than it is today. 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
50. When you must choose between the two, you dress for fashion, not for comfort. 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
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51. The sourcing situation described in this exercise was realistic. 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
52. I took my role in this exercise seriously. 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
53. In my current or most recent work, I encounter the issues discussed in this 
exercise. 
 Strongly Disagree  Disagree  Neutral  Agree  Strongly Agree 
54. Please indicate the extent to which you are knowledgeable about the issues 
raised in this study. 
 No 
Knowledge 
 Little 
Knowledge 
 Some 
Knowledge 
 Substantial 
Knowledge  
 Extensive 
Knowledge 
55. Please list any areas in which our exercise could be improved or share any 
additional comments. (Please use the back of page if you run out of room) 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in our exercise and to fill out our survey.  Your time 
and input are greatly appreciated. 
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Appendix C 
Sensitivity Analysis of Our Results 
Sample Sensitivity 
 We are interested to see if our results are sensitive to potential location or 
selection bias.  To test our theory and its sensitivity to our location, we ran our analyses 
on the first seven locations of our sample (i.e., Buffalo, Wichita, Reading, Springfield, 
Tenneva, San Antonio, and Grand Rapids). Then we compared these results to the results 
from the next 8 locations (Madison, West Georgia, Indianapolis, Augusta, Kernersville, 
Dallas, Philadelphia and Baltimore).  We did not find substantive difference in our 
results.  Thus we have some evidence that our results may not depend on the location.  
 To examine selection bias we compared the demographics from the “Results of 
the 2009 ISM Membership Needs Survey,” 
(http://www.ism.ws/files/membership/memneedssurvey2009.pdf) to our sample 
demographics.  ISM conducts this survey every three years so 2009 represents the most 
up-to-date and most relevant comparison for our study.   We find that our sample is 
consistent with ISM’s sample of its own population in several key ways.  Specifically, we 
find that our study’s demographics are the same on age, education and gender.  
Moreover, our sample does not differ from ISM’s in the amount of sourcing experience 
or firm size.  However, we do find that our sample does deviate from ISM’s 
demographics in on key way; our sample is over representative of manufacturing and 
under representative of service organizations. 
Analytical Method Check 
 We tried three different analytic specifications.  First we tried the simplest 
analytic method which is to use a general linear model (GLM) repeated measures 
analysis.  In this analysis we did violate the homogeneity of variance assumption, but 
were well within the accepted skewness and kurtosis limits (Cohen et al. 2003) 
suggesting that the F-test s for statistical significant may be only mildly liberal.  
However, because we had heterogeneous variance we decided to use a linear mixed 
model (LMM) analysis.  In addition an LMM analysis allowed us to examine random 
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effects such as randomness introduced by the subject or by the subject’s response to 
bandwagon pressure.  Finally we used a generalized estimating equations (GEE) analysis 
in case we made specification error in the random effects.  Across these three analytic 
methods we find consistency in the results.  We believe this consistency exists because 
our heterogeneity of variance is not caused by underlying distributional issues and that 
our random effects are relatively simple because we only have one within subjects factor 
that is repeated only on period. 
Software Check 
 We wanted to make sure that our empirical results were robust to any differences 
in estimation techniques used by the software we used.  In order to do so we evaluated 
three different softwares (SAS SPSS and Stata) and four different software procedures 
(SAS: proc mixed, SAS: proc glimmix, SPSS:mixed and Stata: xtmixed).   
All of the softwares had both maximum likelihood (ML) and restricted maximum 
likelihood estimations (REML) available with the default being REML. Next, we 
compared computational algorithms available in the three softwares: 1) SAS uses the 
Newton-Raphson and Fisher scoring algorithms, 2) SPSS uses the Newton-Raphson and 
Fisher scoring algorithms, 3) Stata uses the Newton-Raphson and Expectation-
Maximization algorithms.  As we are primarily interested in the observed matrix we 
compared the Newton-Raphson method across all three softwares but did look for any 
differences between SAS and SPSS using the Fisher scoring algorithm.  
We then compared SAS proc mixed and SAS proc glimmix and found identical 
results.  However, we decided to use proc glimmix as the post hoc estimation commands 
are more useful.  Specifically, the post hoc comparison of means command 
LSMESTIMATE, which is found in glimmix, defines the linear contrasts based on the 
least squares means instead of the model effects like the ESTMATE command does in 
proc mixed.  For our model where we are testing three-way interactions it is superior 
because we can only focus on the differences due to the interaction terms not including 
the main effects.  With the ESTIMATE command you are required to include the main 
effects.  The significance of this is simply that comparisons are more parsimonious and 
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less vulnerable to typographical errors. The last important difference is that you can 
easily make multiple comparisons and adjust for multiplicity (i.e., Bonferonni 
adjustment). 
After comparing procedures within SAS, we compared procedures across 
softwares.  Estimates for the fixed effect parameters were identical as was the calculation 
of the log-likelihood for both ML and REML.  Surprisingly, we found few differences 
between SAS proc glimmix, SPPS mixed and Stata xtmixed.  SAS differed from both 
SPSS and Stata in the calculations for he random effects and residual variance, but the 
difference was very minor representing less than0.0001 difference.  Another difference is 
that SAS and SPSS only include model fixed and random parameters in the calculation of 
the AIC or BIC, while Stata includes covariates.  Lastly, in the tests for fixed effects SAS 
and SPSS used t-tests involving degrees of freedom, while Stata uses z-tests independent 
of the number of degrees of freedom.  Even with these minor differences across 
softwares, we found consistent results. 
Manipulation Checks 
 We look at different specifications for our manipulation checks.  The simplest 
model is simply to fit the complete full factorial treatment model to the specific binary 
manipulation.  However, due to few observations of failed manipulation checks 19 
participants failed ability to monitor supplier performance manipulation, 15 participants 
failed the cost manipulation check and 17 participants failed the quality manipulation 
check.  Hence the complete model does not converge based on restrictive and standard fit 
criteria.  Instead we decide to focus on techniques that will provide accurate estimates of 
our manipulation checks.  Specifically, we examine three selection methods that 
determine how effects from the complete full factorial model move in and out of the 
model: backward elimination, forward selection and stepwise selection.  Regardless of 
these selection methods the results remain the same, where the reported perception of the 
manipulated variable (i.e., ability to monitor, cost and quality) is only statistically 
significantly related to the corresponding treatment (i.e., ability to monitor, cost and 
quality).  
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The second sensitivity analysis that we perform for manipulation checks is to 
examine different effect parameterizations.  Specifically, we check the parameter 
estimates for when the GLM procedure, which is less-than full rank on the reference 
coding, is used versus when the categories are forced to be estimated as orthogonal, 
which is a full rank parameterization.  Since our experimental design is based on 
orthogonal categorical variables, the estimation of orthogonal effects makes the most 
theoretical sense.  However, we examine the sensitivity of our manipulation checks to 
alternative parameterizations. Since we have only two levels for the main effects these 
estimates should be about the same unless higher order effects are significant.  We find 
that the manipulation checks for cost, quality and the ability to monitor yield the same 
results regardless of these different effect parameterizations. 
Lastly, sensitivity analysis of algorithms is unnecessary as the Newton-Raphson 
(observed information matrix) vs. Fisher-Scoring  (expected information matrix) 
algorithm are equivalent when the link function is the logit and response variable is 
binary, hence the conclusions will be the same regardless of algorithm. 
Common Methods Variance 
We implement two methods suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003) for controlling 
for method biases: 1) Partialing out affectivity and 2) Partialing out a marker variable.  In 
the full sample, we partial out the variance from a manager’s affective disposition 
towards contract manufacturers.  After controlling for manager’s impression about 
contract manufacturers we found that our substantive results do not change.  In our last 
three data collections, we collected data that included two marker variables that are 
theoretically unrelated to our study (Lindell and Whitney 2001).  Specifically, we ask if 
managers dress for fashion or comfort (Malhotra et al. 2006) and whether or not 
managers believe the unemployment rate will be better or worse at the end of this year.  
In our humble opinion, neither of these variables should be related to outsourcing.  We 
then partial out the effect of these marker variables and found that our results do not 
change.  While these two methods essentially treat these measures of common method 
variance as covariates and control for variability due to method, we may not completely 
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eliminate the possibility of method variance still playing a significant role in our results 
(Lindell and Whitney 2001, Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
Degrees of Freedom Adjustments 
There are three competing methods to calculate the degrees of freedom used to 
estimate effects: Standard use of Type III sum of squares, a Satterwaite adjustment for 
the degrees of freedom or a Kenward-Roger adjustment for degrees of freedom.  Since 
our design is unbalanced we should take that fact into account when making our 
statistical inferences about the model.  Type III does adjust for unbalanced designs but 
assumes underlying population variances are equal, if our design was balanced this would 
not be a critical assumption (Cohen et al. 2003).  In our sample, we have evidence of 
heterogeneity and thus used LMM to mdoel a potential source of heterogeneity, the 
manager.  However, we cannot preclude the possibility that other sources of population 
heterogeneity may still exist.  A Satterwaite adjustment does not assume that underlying 
population variances are equal but does assumes sample variances may be independent 
(Satterthwaite 1946).  The assumption former is desirable but the latter may be 
problematic given that we have repeated measures in our analysis.  Unbalanced data that 
is not independent results in inflated Type I error rates (Kackar and Harville 1984). The 
final method the Kenward-Roger (KR) approach does not assume population variances 
are equal nor does it assume independence in variance (Kenward and Rogers 1997). We 
use the KR approach as it is the most conservative adjustment technique.  However, our 
results do not substantively change across the three methods.  We believe we find similar 
results despite the degrees of freedom method because our covariance structure is 
relatively simple and our design is relatively balanced. 
Response Bias Check 
As a response bias check, we compared the profile of our 304 subjects to the 79 
invitees who failed to complete the experiment, or did not provide useable responses in 
terms of individual characteristics (i.e. gender, education and years of sourcing 
experience) and employment characteristics (i.e. industry and firm size) of the decision-
makers that were included versus those who were excluded.  No statistically significant 
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differences were detected for age (χ2=1.8, df=7, p= 0.96), education (χ2=4.9, df=3, p= 
0.17), firm size (χ2=9.48, df=4, p=0.15 ), gender (χ2=0.01, df=1, p= 0.90) and industry 
(χ2=7.16, df=6, p = 0.30) by means of a contingency table analysis.  For total work 
experience and years of sourcing experience, we conducted a difference-of-means test 
assuming unequal variances across independent samples.  No significant differences were 
detected for total work experience (t= -0.32, df=43, p= 0.90) and years of sourcing 
experience (t= -0.12, df=40, p = 0.74). 
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Appendix D 
Extended Discussion about Covariates  
Individual Characteristics 
Individual characteristics may influence decision-making.  Specifically, March 
(1994, p.58) states that individual characteristics may shape decisions because “Social 
systems socialize and educate individuals into rules associated with age, gender, social 
positions and identities.”  As such, we examine the role of managers’ individual 
characteristics on their partial outsourcing decision.  Specifically, we examine the gender, 
education and sourcing experience as we believe that these characteristics may be related 
to confidence, expertise, risk-taking and conformance to bandwagon pressure, which may 
influence managers’ preferences. 
Gender 
Gender between men and women differences may reflect socialization (March 
1994) or physiological differences (Atkinson 1957) that may influence decision-making.  
Specifically, men may prefer a higher percentage of outsourcing than women because 
men tend to be more aggressive (Eagly and Steffen 1986), confident about their decisions 
(Feingold 1994) and take more risks than women (Byrnes et al. 1999, Eckel et al. 2008).  
Moreover, these gender differences persist across age groups, nationalities and time 
(Byrnes et al. 1999, Eagly and Steffen 1986, Feingold 1994).  Within the outsourcing 
context, a higher percentage of outsourcing is considered to be inherently riskier as it 
represents a larger loss of control over production.  Hence, as the percentage of 
outsourcing increases so do risks associated with supplier opportunistic behavior.  
Therefore, male managers may prefer a higher percentage of outsourcing than their 
female counterparts, ceteris paribus. 
Education 
Education is inversely related to risk aversion (Shaw 1996).  This inverse 
relationship is well established in the extant literature (Shaw 1996). Education may 
influence managers to be more confident, and hence, less risk averse.  Therefore, 
managers with higher levels of education will prefer a higher percentage of outsourcing.  
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Thus more educated managers may prefer a higher percentage of outsourcing than less 
educated managers, ceteris paribus. 
Sourcing Experience 
Experience in a domain contributes to the development of expert decision-making 
skills (Klein 1997, Simon and Chase 1973). Expert decision-makers differ from novices 
in how they recognize situations, generate alternatives, choose problem solving strategies 
and in the accuracy of their choice (Chi 2006).  Experts recognize a situation faster than 
novices (Klein 1997, Simon and Chase 1973), and search for and use fewer information 
cues when making a decision (Camerer and Johnson 1991, Simon and Chase 1973).  In 
addition, experts reconfigure cues in different temporal or causal sequences obtaining 
differing conclusions, while novices do not reconfigure (Camerer and Johnson 1991).  At 
the same time, experts recognize subtle features of a problem, which novices frequently 
miss (Chi 2006).  Moreover, experts are accurate at detecting errors or the likelihood of 
an outcome (Chi 2006).  These differences between novices and experts may explain why 
experts can select more effective problem solving strategies that generate near optimum 
solutions quickly (Chi 2006, Simon and Chase 1973). Therefore, we believe managers 
with substantial sourcing experience (or “experts”) will have experienced more losses or 
pitfalls associated with supplier opportunism, as result they will be more cautious and 
prefer less outsourcing.  Therefore more sourcing experience may have a direct negative 
influence on percentage of outsourcing, ceteris paribus. 
Moderating Effect of Individual Characteristics on Bandwagon Pressure 
Moderating Effect of Gender on Bandwagon Pressure 
Bandwagon pressure is posited to be an influential force that encourages the 
manager to conform to the perceived industry’s outsourcing choice.  As such, managerial 
characteristics that are correlated with greater or lower levels conformance are of interest.  
Gender is related to two factors that affect conformance: confidence and group 
orientation.  Specifically, greater levels of confidence lead to less reliance on social proof 
and a lower group orientation implies that manager decisions will be made independent 
of group influences (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004).  Men, on average, may be influenced 
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less by bandwagon pressure as they are more confident and less group oriented than 
women (Eagly 1978).  Therefore, the positive relationship between bandwagon pressure 
and the percentage of outsourcing may be relatively less for male managers and higher 
for their female counterparts. 
Moderating Effect of Education on Bandwagon Pressure 
Education increases decision-maker confidence (Puri and Robinson 2007).  This 
confidence may lead to optimism about managerial choice (Puri and Robinson 2007) or 
resistance to conforming as the manager believes the right choice has already been made 
(Cialdini and Goldstein 2004).  Both of these plausible explanations suggest that more 
educated managers will rely less on bandwagon pressure to determine the ‘correct’ partial 
outsourcing choice, than less educated managers. Thus, the positive relationship between 
bandwagon pressure and the percentage of outsourcing may be reduced as managerial 
education increases. 
Moderating Effect of Sourcing Experience on Bandwagon Pressure 
As experience increases managers tend to become more confident in their 
competence (Griffin and Tversky 1992, Heath and Tversky 1991), and subsequently, 
overconfident in judgments of their performance (West and Stanovich 1997).  Also, 
managers with expertise tend to be more discerning and know what is relevant to a 
decision versus what is not (Camerer and Johnson 1991, Klein 1997). Thus, the positive 
relationship between bandwagon pressure and the percentage of outsourcing may be 
reduced as the years of sourcing experience increases. 
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Appendix E 
Tests of Fixed Effects 
Variable  LMM 
Intercept  F(1,304)= 1073.89** 
Employment Characteristics (Between Subjects) 
Firm size  F(1,304)=     0.02     
Industry  F(7,304)=     1.47     
Individual Characteristics (Between Subjects) 
Gender   F(1,304)=     4.57*   
Education    F(2,304)=     2.38†     
Impression of contract manufacturers  F(1,304)=     0.56     
Years of sourcing experience   F(1,304)=     2.83†     
Between‐subjects Effects 
Supplier Cost Advantage (SCA)  F(1,304)= 110.72** 
Supplier Quality Advantage (SQA)  F(1,304)=   83.16** 
Ability to Monitor Supplier Performance (AMSP)  F(1,304)=   24.29** 
SCA x SQA  F(1,304)=     0.13     
SCA x AMSP  F(1,304)=   10.71** 
SQA x AMSP   F(1,304)=    0.18     
SCA x SQA x AMSP  F(1,304)=    1.53   
Within‐subjects Effects 
Bandwagon Pressure (BP)  F(1,304)=   9.04**   
Within‐subjects and Employment Characteristic Interactions 
BP x Firm size  F(1,304)=     3.35†   
BP x Industry  F(7,304)=     2.48*   
Within‐subjects and Individual Characteristic Interactions 
BP x Gender  F(1,304)=     0.81     
BP x Education  F(2,304)=     0.61     
BP x Impression of contract manufacturers  F(1,304)=     0.06     
BP x Years of sourcing experience  F(1,304)=    8.98** 
Within‐subjects Interactions 
BP x SCA  F(1,304)=     1.00     
BP x SQA  F(1,304)=     0.12     
BP x AMSP  F(1,304)=     0.01     
BP x SCA x SQA  F(1,304)=     2.12     
BP x SCA x AMSP  F(1,304)=     0.07     
BP x SQA x AMSP  F(1,304)=     0.00     
N1= 304 N2= 2 
Design effect= 1.81  Effective sample size = 335.33 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; †p≤ 0.10.    
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Appendix F 
2SLS Assumption and Robustness Tests 
Results of the Unconditional Make-Buy Models 
Variable Coefficient 
Model 1: 
Perceived 
benefit 
Model 2: 
Perceived  
risk 
Model 3: 
The 
difference 
Estimatea Estimatea Estimatea 
Intercept α00 4.34** 3.22** 1.13* 
Education  α01 0.08 0.03 0.04 
Genderb α02 0.30† -0.05 0.36 
Years of sourcing experience α03 0.01† -0.00 0.01 
Firm sizec     α04 -0.13 0.03 -0.17 
Industryd     α05 0.60 0.00 0.04 
Cost capability (Superior supplier cost capability) α06 -0.15 0.32 -0.49 
Quality capability (Superior supplier quality 
capability) α07 -0.12 0.06 -0.19 
Ability to monitor supplier performance (Able) α08 0.56** -0.32† 0.89** 
Make-Buy β01 0.26 0.02 0.26 
R2   0.11** 0.04† 0.09** 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; †p≤ 0.10.  
Bold indicates statistical significance  
a Unstandardized estimates 
b Females are the omitted group.   
c Firms Under 1000 employees are the omitted group. 
d Manufacturing firms are the omitted group. 
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Identification Tests for the Unconditional Make-Buy Models 
Statistical test Perceived  benefit 
Perceived  
risk Difference 
Underidentification test  
    Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistica  14.33** 14.33** 14.33** 
Weak identification test  
    Cragg-Donald Wald F statisticb 7.07c 7.07c 7.07c 
    Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statisticb 8.55c 8.55c 8.55c 
Overidentifcation test of all instruments  
    Hansen J statisticd 0.45 0.30 0.50 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; †p≤ 0.10.  
Bold indicates statistically significant regression coefficients  
a Significance provides evidence that the model is identified  
b Critical values are compared against Stock-Yogo weak id critical values 
c Critical value indicates weak identification  
d Significance provides evidence that model is not overidentified 
 
 
Identification Tests for the Conditional Make-Buy Models 
Statistical test Perceived benefit 
Perceived  
risk Difference 
Underidentification test  
    Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistica  11.16* 11.16* 11.16* 
Weak identification test  
    Cragg-Donald Wald F statisticb 0.67c 0.67c 0.67c 
    Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statisticb 1.34c 1.34c 1.34c 
Overidentifcation test of all instruments  
    Hansen J statisticd 2.63 4.31 2.99 
*p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; †p≤ 0.10.  
Bold indicates statistically significant regression coefficients  
a Significance provides evidence that the model is identified  
b Critical values are compared against Stock-Yogo weak id critical values 
c Critical value indicates weak identification  
d Significance provides evidence that model is not overidentified 
 
